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REYNOLDS AMERICAN INC., Plaintiff, v. THIRD MOTION EQUITIES MASTER FUND
LTD., MAGNETAR CAPITAL MASTER FUND, LTD., SPECTRUM OPPORTUNITIES
MASTER FUND LTD., MAGNETAR FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIES MASTER FUNDS
LTD., MAGNETAR MSW MASTER FUND LTD., MASON CAPITAL MASTER FUND,
L.P., ANTON S. KAWALSKY, trustee for the benefit of Anton S. Kawalsky Trust UA
9/17/2015, CANYON BLUE CREDIT INVESTMENT FUND L.P., THE CANYON VALUE
REALIZATION MASTER FUND, L.P., CANYON VALUE REALIZATION FUND, L.P.,
BLUE MOUNTAIN CREDIT ALTERNATIVES MASTER FUND L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN
FOINAVEN MASTER FUND L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN GUADALUPE PEAK FUND L.P.,
BLUEMOUNTAIN SUMMIT TRADING L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN MONTENVERS MASTER
FUND SCA SICAV-SIF, AMUNDI ABSOLUTE RETURN CANYON FUND P.L.C.,
CANYON-SL VALUE FUND, L.P., PERMAL CANYON IO LTD., CANYON VALUE
REALIZATION MAC 18 LTD., and BARRY W. BLANK TRUST, Defendants.
Prior History: Reynolds Am. Inc. v. Third Motion Equities Master Fund, Ltd., 2018 NCBC
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LEXIS 94 (Sept. 12, 2018)

Core Terms
projections, valuation, fair value, Merger, financial adviser, cigarettes, shareholders, shares,
Tobacco, pricing, transactions, forecasts, calculated, comparable, stock, appraisal, reliable, per
share, volume, products, cash flow, repurchase, ten-year, billion, regulation, analyses, negotiated,
growth rate, brand, Advisors'

Case Summary

Overview
HOLDINGS: [1]-Merger was an interested transaction because it was a qualifying corporate
action thereunder and a wholly-owned subsidiary was an interested person due to its 42 percent
shareholder stake and right to appoint five out of fourteen directors to the company board; thus,
the dissenters were entitled to appraisal rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-02; [2]-Merger was
negotiated at arm's length by independent directors who acted with full transparency and
extracted price increases from the subsidiary resulting in an additional $ 4.5 billion for the
company's shareholders; given that the company's size and position meant there were few likely
bidders other than the subsidiary, nothing suggested that increased competition would have
produced a better result and the resulting deal price was reliable evidence of the company's fair
value, for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-30.

Outcome
Fair value of stock determined and judgment entered.

LexisNexis® Headnotes
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Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN1 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Appraisal is the exclusive remedy for a shareholder who wishes to exercise a dissenter's rights.
An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy intended to provide shareholders
dissenting from a merger on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their shareholdings. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN2 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-30(a) provides that if a shareholder makes a demand for payment
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-28 which remains unsettled, the corporation shall commence a
proceeding by filing a complaint with the Superior Court Division of the General Court of
Justice to determine the fair value of the shares and accrued interest. The North
Carolina appraisal statute, however, does not create a general right to appraisal for shareholders
in a corporation with stock that is traded in an organized market and has at least 2,000
shareholders and a market value of at least $ 20 million dollars. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-02(b)(1).
Nevertheless, appraisal rights shall be available pursuant to § 55-13-02(a) for the holders of any
class or series of shares where the corporate action is an interested transaction. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
55-13-02(b)(4). More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > Corporations > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights
HN3 Shareholder Actions, Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights
An "interested transaction" under the appraisal statute is a corporate action described in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 55-13-02(a), other than a merger pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-11-04 or N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 55-11-12, involving an interested person and in which any of the shares or assets of
the corporation are being acquired or converted. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-01(7). The statute
defines an "interested person" as a person, or an affiliate of a person, who at any time during the
one-year period immediately preceding approval by the board of directors of the corporate action
met any of the following conditions: (1) Was the beneficial owner of 20 percent or more of the
voting power of the corporation, other than as owner of excluded shares, or (2) Had the power,
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contractually or otherwise, other than as owner of excluded shares, to cause the appointment or
election of 25 percent or more of the directors to the board of directors of the corporation. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 55-13-01(7)(a). More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN4 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Delaware's courts have developed a substantial body of law determining fair value through
judicial appraisal. Although Delaware's appraisal statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262, is not
identical to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-30, the two statutes each require a determination of fair
value and are sufficiently similar that the court finds decisions of the Delaware courts under Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 26, although not binding, to be helpful guidance in interpreting the North
Carolina appraisal statute. North Carolina courts often look to Delaware courts for guidance
regarding unsettled business law issues. North Carolina courts have frequently looked to
Delaware for guidance because of the special expertise and body of case law developed in the
Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN5 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Under the North Carolina and Delaware appraisal statutes, the trial court's ultimate goal in
an appraisal proceeding is to determine the fair or intrinsic value of each share on the closing
date of the merger. There may be no perfect methodology for arriving at fair value for a given set
of facts, but a trial court's conclusions should follow logically from those facts and be grounded
in relevant, accepted financial principles. The basic concept of value is that the stockholder is
entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a
going concern. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
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Evidence > Burdens of Proof > Preponderance of Evidence
HN6 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
North Carolina's appraisal statute, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-02, omits a specific reference to
burden of proof. Delaware's statute contemplates that the burden to establish fair value by a
preponderance of the evidence rests on both the petitioner and the respondent. Given that both
statutes compel the court to determine fair value rather than to decide between the parties'
competing positions, the court concludes that Delaware's approach is consistent with the text and
intent of North Carolina's appraisal statute. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
Evidence > Burdens of Proof > Allocation
HN7 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
No presumption, favorable or unfavorable, attaches to either side's valuation, and each party also
bears the burden of proving the constituent elements of its valuation position, including the
propriety of a particular method, modification, discount, or premium. As the Delaware Chancery
Court has explained, in language the N.C. Superior Court concludes should apply equally
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-30, the court has discretion to select one of the parties' valuation
models as its general framework or to fashion its own. The court may evaluate the valuation
opinions submitted by the parties, select the most representative analysis, and then make
appropriate adjustments to the resulting valuation. The court also may make its own independent
valuation calculation by adapting or blending the factual assumptions of the parties' experts. It is
also entirely proper for the court to adopt any one expert's model, methodology, and
mathematical calculations, in toto, if that valuation is supported by credible evidence and
withstands a critical judicial analysis on the record. When none of the parties establishes a
valuation that is persuasive, the court must make a determination based on its own analysis.
More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN8 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Under Delaware's appraisal statute, fair value does not equal best value. The court concludes that
the same is true under North Carolina's appraisal statute. Rather, for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 55-13-30, the court concludes that, as in Delaware, a fair value for the purposes
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of appraisal means a price that is one that a reasonable seller, under all of the circumstances,
would regard as within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably accept. Nor
are dissenting shareholders entitled to the best price theoretically attainable had market
conditions been the most seller-friendly. As the Delaware Supreme Court recently explained, fair
value is just that, "fair." Nevertheless, it is not sufficient for directors to achieve the best price
that a fiduciary will pay if that price is not a fair price. Nor is it sufficient to obtain a fair price if
that price is not the best alternative available for the corporation and its stockholders. More
like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN9 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
To determine the fair value of a corporation's stock, the court can consider a wide range of
factual evidence, including, but not limited to, the market price, the merger price, other offers for
the company or its assets, prices at which knowledgeable insiders sold their shares, internal
corporate documents and valuation work prepared for non-litigation purposes. Even where the
parties have retained credible experts, the court should consider factual evidence relating to
valuation as a cross-check, or reality-check, on the litigation-driven figures generated by those
experts. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN10 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
In North Carolina, as in Delaware, the court cannot adopt at the outset an either-or approach,
thereby accepting uncritically the valuation of one party, as it is the court's duty to determine the
core issue of fair value on the appraisal date. The court should first envisage the entire premerger company as a going concern, as a standalone entity, and assess its value as such. The
corporation must be viewed as an on-going enterprise, occupying a particular market position in
the light of future prospects. The trial court must assess the value of the company as a going
concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition. Fair value is determined by
valuing the business as a going concern. The appraisal endeavor is by design, a flexible
process. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

6

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN11 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
The North Carolina appraisal statute provides that fair value must be determined immediately
before the effectuation of the corporate action as to which the shareholder
asserts appraisal rights. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-01(5). The valuation date is the date on which
the merger closes. If the value of the corporation changes between the signing of the merger
agreement and the closing, then the fair value determination must be measured by the operative
reality of the corporation at the effective time of the merger. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN12 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-01(5), fair value is to be assessed (i) "using customary and current
valuation concepts and techniques, (ii) excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation
of the corporate action unless exclusion would be inequitable, and (iii) without discounting for
lack of marketability or minority status. The statute does not limit or prescribe the specific
valuation concepts and techniques that the court may use, and requires only that they be
customary and current and generally employed for similar business in the context of the
transaction requiring appraisal. In the merger context, courts, economists, and valuation
professionals customarily and currently use a wide range of valuation concepts and techniques,
including but not limited to assessing market evidence of the value of the shares, assessing
whether the transaction process was one in which the resulting deal price is a reliable indicator of
value, reviewing internal valuations performed by the company prior to consideration of the
merger, estimating the net present value of the company's expected future cash flows, comparing
the company's trading multiples to the trading multiples of similar firms, and comparing the
multiples paid in the merger to the multiples paid in similar transactions. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
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HN13 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, those knowledgeable about valuation recognize that the field is as much
art as science. Fair value is, by now, a jurisprudential concept that draws more from judicial
writings than from the appraisal statute itself. Therefore, it is appropriate to view skeptically the
use of any one approach to the exclusion of all others, particularly when that approach purports
to identify with precision a value far out of line with all other evidence. Rather than supporting
the idealized depiction of valuation as a scientific process that should be reserved exclusively for
neutral opiners, the martial metaphor suggests the need to consider other evidence as a check on
the warring experts' models. Ultimately, what is necessary in any particular appraisal case is for
the court to explain its fair value calculus in a manner that is grounded in the record before it.
More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN14 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Courts will in appropriate cases afford substantial, if not exclusive, weight to deal price in the
fair value analysis. A transaction that demonstrates an unhindered, informed, and competitive
market value is at least first among equals of valuation methodologies in deciding fair value. A
court determining fair value under Model Bus. Corp. Act. ch. 13 should give great deference to
the aggregate consideration accepted or approved by a disinterested board of directors for
an appraisal-triggering transaction. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN15 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, Delaware courts have recognized that the price produced by an efficient
market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst,
especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a wellheeled client. The fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of objective market
reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of a valuation expert)
is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair. As a result, Delaware courts will in appropriate
cases afford substantial, if not exclusive, weight to deal price in the fair value analysis. More
like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
8

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN16 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, there is no presumption that the deal price reflects fair value. As a
general matter, the persuasiveness of the deal price depends on the reliability of the sale process
that generated it. If the sale process is not open or sufficiently reliable, the deal price should not
be regarded as persuasive evidence of fair value. In short, a deal price serves as a persuasive
indicator of fair value where the sale process bears objective indicia of fairness that rendered the
deal price a reliable indicator of fair value. Although there is no checklist or set of minimum
characteristics for giving weight to the deal price, the Delaware courts have recognized objective
indicia of fairness in a deal process where (i) information was sufficiently disseminated to
potential bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii) without undue impediments
imposed by the deal structure itself. Other objective indicia include negotiations at arm's-length;
board deliberations without any conflicts of interest; buyer due diligence and receipt of
confidential information about the company's value; and seller extraction of multiple price
increases. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN17 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, the Delaware Supreme Court has particularly stressed the absence of
post-signing bidders as an objective indicator that the sale process was reliable and probative of
fair value. It cannot be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure simply
because buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a
bidding contest against each other. Fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer is willing to
pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would pay. Although some Delaware
decisions have suggested that, in certain circumstances, unless there is a robust auction involving
well-informed and unconstrained bidders, the transaction price is not a reliable indicator of fair
value, the Delaware Supreme Court has not retreated from its long-held view that when the
directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a transaction,
they may approve that transaction without conducting an active survey of the market. More
like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
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Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN18 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, Delaware courts have recognized that at least for a widely held, publicly
traded company, a sale process could result in an informed sale through the public announcement
of a transaction and a sufficiently open post-signing market check. Moreover, a board may
pursue a single transaction partner, so long as the transaction is subject to an effective market
check under circumstances in which any bidder interested in paying more has a reasonable
opportunity to do so. That said, if a board fails to employ any traditional value maximization
tool, such as an auction, a broad market check, or a go-shop provision, that board must possess
an impeccable knowledge of the company's business for the court to determine that it acted
reasonably. Even when the deal price is not given controlling weight, it remains a relevant
indicator of fair value that should not be ignored, particularly when independent and wellinformed directors negotiated with the buyer at arm's length. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN19 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, reliance on the deal price as evidence of fair value is strengthened when
independent representatives of a target company actively negotiate with potential buyers and
demonstrate a real willingness to reject inadequate bids. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN20 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, the failure of any other party to come forward provides significant
evidence of fairness, because fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer is willing to
pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would pay. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
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Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties &
Liabilities > Fiduciary Duties
HN21 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, Delaware courts have noted that contingency clauses are standard in
financial advisor agreements and seldom create a conflict of interest. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN22 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
In Delaware, the appraisal statute expressly commands a court in appraisal actions to "take into
account all relevant factors and not to ignore any indicia of fair value. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §
262(h). The court has previously held that even where the parties have retained credible experts,
the court should consider 'factual evidence relating to valuation as a cross-check, or realitycheck, on the litigation-driven figures generated by those experts. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN23 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
One common valuation concept is to consider the price an asset fetches in the market. As the
court has previously observed in an appraisal action, publicly traded companies operate in an
environment where there is a market mechanism which provides a strong, if not determinative,
indicator of the value of minority shares. There are federal and state statutory protections built
into transactions involving publicly held companies. Information from which shareholders can
evaluate transactions is readily available from public companies because of disclosure and filing
requirements of the federal securities laws. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
11

HN24 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, Delaware precedent holds that the price a stock trades at in an efficient
market is an important indicator of its economic value that should be given weight. Courts may
look to stock price to corroborate a fair value conclusion. Indeed, where there is an established
market for a corporation's stock, market value must be considered in appraising the value of the
corporation's shares. The efficient market hypothesis teaches that the price produced by an
efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single
analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a
well-heeled client. For this reason, courts have used a company's unaffected market price as a
barometer for fair value as market prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation
techniques because, unlike, a single person's discounted cash flow model, the market price
should distill the collective judgment of the many based on all the publicly available information.
When the market is efficient, the trading price of a company's stock can be a proxy for fair
value. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN25 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, the Delaware Supreme Court has noted the importance of market price in
determining the fair value of highly regulated industries like tobacco: Publicly traded companies
in industries like tobacco, energy, pharmaceuticals, and certain commercial products are subject
to close regulation, the development of which can affect their future cash flows. Precisely
because of that reality, the market's assessment of the future cash flows necessarily takes
regulatory risk into account as it does with all the other reasonable uncertain factors that affect a
company's future. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN26 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, courts may also consider more theoretical valuation concepts and
techniques, such as analyses of comparable companies, comparable precedent transactions, and
discounted cash flow (DCF) analyses. A DCF analysis is an accepted valuation methodology.
The DCF method is a technique that is generally accepted in the financial community. A DCF
analysis, although complex in practice, is rooted around a simple principle: the value of the
company at the time of the merger is simply the sum of its future cash flows discounted back to
12

present value. Yet, a DCF analysis is only as reliable as the inputs relied upon and the
assumptions underlying those inputs. The use of math should not obscure the necessarily more
subjective exercise in judgment that a valuation exercise requires. Importantly, inputs in a
discounted cash flow are predictions which are necessarily speculative in nature. More like
this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN27 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, the weight and utility of discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis and other
methodologies will depend on the specific circumstances of the case. They are generally given
less weight in cases like this one where there was an active public market for the stock and a
robust deal process. A singular DCF model is often most helpful when there isn't an observable
market price. Despite their widespread acceptance, DCF valuations involve many inputs—all
subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight
differences in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps. The DCF model typically can
generate a wide range of estimates. In the world of real transactions (capital budgeting decisions
for example) the hypothetical, future-oriented, nature of the model is not thought fatal to the
DCF technique because those employing it typically have an intense personal interest in having
the best estimates and assumptions used as inputs. In the litigation context use of the model does
not have that built-in protection. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN28 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, when a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis is used, Delaware courts
have increasingly cautioned that it is only reliable when it can be verified by alternative methods
to DCF or by real world valuations Indeed, courts in Delaware have consistently rejected DCFbased valuations that differ dramatically from other evidence of value. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote
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Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN29 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, it is common practice to cross-check the output of a discounted cash flow
analysis against comparable companies analyses. he idea is that if the market expects comparable
companies to grow at a certain rate, then one can infer the growth of the subject company by
applying a multiple drawn from the comparables to a relevant metric, such as revenues. Before a
comparable companies multiples analysis can be undertaken with any measure of reliability, it is
necessary to establish a suitable peer group through appropriate empirical analysis. If, and only
if, a proper peer set can be selected, the next step in the comparable companies analysis is to
select an appropriate multiple and then determine where on the distribution of peers the target
company falls. Where the experts' identified companies are too divergent from the company in
terms of size, public status, and products, to form meaningful analogs for valuation purposes, this
Court will disregard this valuation metric. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN30 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Like a comparable companies analysis, a comparable transactions analysis is an accepted
valuation tool in appraisal cases. The analysis involves identifying similar transactions,
quantifying those transactions through financial metrics, and then applying the metrics to the
company at issue to ascertain a value. The utility of the comparable transactions methodology is
directly linked to the similarity between the company the court is valuing and the companies
used for comparison. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN31 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, at some point, the differences become so large that the use of the
comparable company method becomes meaningless for valuation purposes. More like this
Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

14

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN32 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Delaware courts often consider analyst commentary concerning proposed transaction prices in
assessing the valuation of a company in appraisal actions. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN33 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
For appraisal purposes, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-01(5) requires a court to exclude any
appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the merger. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN34 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
Case law instructs courts for appraisal purposes to exclude any value that the selling company's
shareholders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject company, not as a
stand-alone going concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from which synergistic gains can
be extracted. In an arm's-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price generally will exceed fair
value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium that includes a share of the anticipated
synergies. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN35 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
A control premium is not part of the company as a standalone enterprise. A control premium is
the value to somebody else who thinks he/she can derive more value from the existing assets
15

than current management can, which is not the value of that company under the existing
management — assuming that no transaction occurred. Thus, a control premium does not inhere
in the standalone company but instead represents the value only under the control of the acquirer.
As such, a control premium is value arising in anticipation of the merger, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5513-01(5), and, accordingly, must be excluded from the appraisal value of the pre-merger
company. More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Fair Market Value
HN36 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value
North Carolina's appraisal statute provides that the valuation should not be discounted for lack of
marketability or minority status. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-01(5). More like this Headnote
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote

Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent
Rights > Remedies
HN37 Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Remedies
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-01(6), interest is calculated by applying the statutory rate from the
effective date of the corporate action until the date of payment. Thus, under the statute, interest
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Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL JUDGMENT
[*1] THIS MATTER arises out of the assertion of appraisal rights by Defendants, who are
former shareholders of Plaintiff Reynolds American Inc. ("RAI" or the "Company"), in
connection with the merger of RAI with and into a wholly-owned subsidiary of British
American Tobacco plc ("BAT") (the "Merger"). By statute, the Court is charged with
determining the fair value of Defendants' shares at the time of the transaction. N.C.G.S. § 55-1330(a).
[*2] The Court has considered all relevant and admissible evidence of value presented by the
parties at trial, including the pre-Merger trading price of RAI stock; the robustness of the
negotiations between RAI and BAT and the resulting deal price; the valuation work performed
by Goldman Sachs [**3] Group, Inc. ("Goldman"), Lazard (formerly known as Lazard Frères &
Co.), and JPMorgan Chase and Co. ("JPMorgan") (collectively, the "Financial Advisors") in
connection with the Merger; the pre-litigation valuations prepared by the parties; and other
evidence from the testimony of the fact witnesses, the testimony of the parties' retained experts,
and the documents introduced by the parties as set forth herein.
[*3] After full consideration of the evidence presented at trial and the parties' well-presented
arguments in voluminous pre- and post-trial submissions and at an all-day post-trial hearing, the
Court, for the reasons set forth below, concludes that the $59.64 per share that RAI has already
paid Defendants equals or exceeds the fair value of RAI shares as of the date of the Merger and

17

that RAI is therefore entitled to a judgment that no further payments to Defendants are
required.Bledsoe, Chief Judge.

I.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
[*4] RAI filed this judicial appraisal action on November 29, 2017, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 5513-30. (ECF No. 4.) The case was designated as a mandatory complex business case by Order of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina on November 30, 2017, (ECF No. 3),
and [**4] assigned to the undersigned on December 1, 2017, (ECF No. 2).
[*5] This matter came on for trial before the undersigned and was tried to the Court, sitting
without a jury, on June 10-25, 2019. By consent of all parties, the trial was held in Mecklenburg
County. The trial was conducted by very experienced and accomplished counsel and generated
an extensive record. The Court admitted into evidence 177 exhibits and received testimony both
from witnesses appearing at trial and from witnesses appearing by written deposition transcript
and/or by videotape.1 The parties have submitted post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, and the Court heard post-trial oral argument on October 2, 2019. All
issues and claims are now ripe for determination.
[*6] Having considered the relevant and admissible evidence2 and the submissions and
arguments of the parties, the Court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of
law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule(s)").

II.
FINDINGS OF FACT3
[*7] Plaintiff RAI is a corporation incorporated under the laws of North Carolina, with its
principal place of business located in Winston-Salem, Forsyth County, North Carolina.
(JX0017.0003.)
[*8] Prior to July [**5] 25, 2017, RAI was a public company traded on the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE"), with over 1.4 billion shares of common stock outstanding. (JX0017.0001,
.0003.) Pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger dated January 16, 2017 (the "Merger
Agreement"), (JX0023.0572—.0647), a wholly-owned subsidiary of BAT was merged with and
into RAI on July 25, 2017 (the "Transaction Date"), with RAI continuing as the surviving
corporation and as an indirect and wholly-owned subsidiary of BAT, (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶¶ 17,
19; JX0017.0003).
[*9] Plaintiff seeks a judgment establishing the fair value of RAI common stock at no more
than $59.64 per share. (Bornstein Tr. 13:16-18.)
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[*10] Defendants (or "Dissenters")4 are former shareholders of RAI who
asserted appraisal rights in connection with the Merger. Dissenters seek appraisal for 9,641,911
shares held on the date of the Merger. (Compl. Judicial Appraisal ¶¶ 3-25, ECF No. 4; Appendix
A.)
[*11] Dissenters contend that the $59.64 per share they received for their shares does not reflect
the shares' fair value and instead seek a judgment establishing the fair value of RAI common
stock at $92.17 per share, plus interest, pursuant to N.C.G.S. 55-13-30(e)(i). (Sadighi Tr. 30:5-8.)
Dissenters [**6] also seek to recover their costs and expenses, including their attorneys' fees.

A. RAI'S Business
[*12] At the time of the Merger, RAI was a holding company whose wholly-owned subsidiaries
collectively had three major business lines: cigarettes, moist snuff, and vapor and other "next
generation products." (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 7.) RAI's subsidiaries operated predominantly in the
United States, with domestic sales accounting for over 97% of their collective revenue in 2016.
(JX0017.0032, .0075, .0154.) RAI's wholly-owned subsidiary, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
("RJRT"), was the second largest tobacco company in the United States. At the time of the
Merger, RAI had a market capitalization of over $67 billion. (PX0115.0181; Gompers Tr.
777:25-778:10.)
[*13] RAI's primary product was cigarettes, which it sold through its subsidiaries RJRT and
Santa Fe Natural Tobacco Company, Inc. ("SFNTC"). Cigarettes accounted for approximately
90% of RAI's revenue in mid-2017. (JX0017.0005, .0018; Wajnert5 Tr. 35:5-7; Fragnito6 Tr.
1670:3-5.) RAI's primary cigarette brands were Newport, the best-selling menthol cigarette in
the United States; Camel; Pall Mall; and Natural American Spirit. (Corr. Stip'd Facts [**7] ¶ 10;
JX0017.0017.) These brands accounted for approximately 93% of RAI's cigarette units sold in
2016. (JX0017.0038-.0041; PX0063.0044-.0045; Fragnito Tr. 1670:3-12.) RAI referred to these
brands as its "drive brands" and provided greater marketing and discounting support behind
them. (JX0017.0038; PX0063.0051—.0052; Gilchrist7 Tr. 406:7-12.)
[*14] In addition to cigarettes, RAI sold moist snuff through its operating company, American
Snuff Company, LLC ("American Snuff"), which accounted for roughly 7% of RAI's revenue in
2016. (PX0009.0003.) At the time of the Merger, American Snuff was the second largest
smokeless tobacco products manufacturer in the United States, (DX0321.0008), and its primary
brands included Grizzly and Kodiak, (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 11; JX0017.0032). U.S. moist snuff
retail volumes grew 2% to 3% annually from 2011 to 2016. (Flyer Tr. 1113:4-9; DX0321.0008.)
[*15] RAI had another operating company, RAI Innovations Company ("RAI Innovations"),
that was responsible for its next generation products, including its vapor products. RAI's primary
vapor product at the time of the Merger was Vuse. (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 12.) Prior to the Merger,
RAI Innovations' revenues were [**8] never material enough to warrant separate public
reporting. RAI Innovations accounted for roughly $150 million in revenue in 2016, which was
roughly 1.2% of RAI's total revenue that year. (Hanigan8 Tr. 1623:11-13, 1648:9-17;
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DX0061.0007—.0008; DX0233.0016; JX0017.0069.) As of the Transaction Date, RAI
Innovations had not yet posted a profit on its vaping and other next generation products.
(Hanigan Tr. 1651:13-17; Crew9 Tr. 642:25-643:22; Flyer Tr. 1205:17-21; Fragnito Tr.
1683:21-25.)

B. The Challenges Facing RAI and the U.S. Tobacco Industry
[*16] Although the parties agree that the tobacco industry is in decline, the severity and rapidity
of that decline and its impact on RAI's future growth were hotly contested issues at trial. Stated
broadly, RAI tended to introduce evidence suggesting that RAI's future growth is imperiled by
real and substantial risks that were not quantified or measured through its ordinary course
financial modeling and are significant downward determinants in assessing RAI's fair value. In
contrast, Dissenters tended to introduce evidence suggesting that RAI had enjoyed strong
revenue and earnings growth in the years leading up to the Merger, its ordinary
course [**9] modeling forecasted continued strong growth for at least the next decade, and
RAI's concerns over the future risks to its business were exaggerated.
[*17] Prior to the Merger, RAI had reasons for both optimism and serious concern about its
future. Through acquisitions and divestitures, cost-cutting, and sound financial management,
RAI had weathered the decline of the U.S. tobacco industry reasonably well, and it had built a
portfolio of strong brands. Indeed, RAI's drive brands accounted for well over 90% of RAI's
cigarette sales by mid-2017, (Fragnito Tr. 1670:3-13), and three of those brands—Newport,
Camel, and Pall Mall—experienced volume growth during the ten years prior to the Merger,
(Flyer Tr. 1110:4-11).
[*18] Nevertheless, RAI management and its Board of Directors appropriately recognized that
the Company was subject to certain key negative trends affecting the U.S. tobacco industry at
large. They also understood that the Company was limited in its ability to grow in the ways it
had in the recent past and was exposed to key risks that, if they came to pass, would cause
material harm to RAI's business and profitability and substantially limit the Company's growth or
even cause its [**10] business to decline. (Wajnert Tr. 43:17-49:11; Gompers Tr. 730:10731:5.)

a. Cigarette Volume Declines
[*19] The U.S. cigarette market at the time of the Merger was "[c]learly an industry in
structural decline." (Crew Tr. 640:21-641:7; Wajnert Tr. 35:13-36:2; Fragnito Tr. 1669:141697:8.) Overall demand for cigarettes had been declining steadily at an average of 3% to 4%
per year since 1981, and that trend was expected to continue for the foreseeable future. (de
Gennaro10 Tr. 204:5-25; Wajnert Tr. 35:13-36:2; Crew Tr. 640:21-641:10; Flyer Tr. 1092:201093:6; JX0017.0005.) As a point of reference, the U.S. cigarette industry sold 624 billion
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cigarettes ("sticks") in 1981. In 2016, the number was 258 billion, an amount roughly in line
with sales during the 1940s when the U.S. population was less than half its total in July 2017:

(PX0009.0006.)
[*20] In addition to the total number of cigarettes sold, the number of consumers and the
individual levels of tobacco consumption by each consumer was also in long term decline as of
the Transaction Date. (JX0017.0018; Flyer Tr. 1188:17-1189:17.) The number of new smokers
also was steadily decreasing, (Flyer Tr. 1189:8-17), dropping from 20% of 20-yearolds [**11] to 10% over the prior 20-year period, (Flyer Tr. 1189:12-17, 1204:20-1205:13). The
age at which smokers reached their peak smoking consumption was also accelerating. (Flyer Tr.
1188:17-1189:7.)
[*21] The evidence showed that there are several factors contributing to the tobacco industry's
decline, many of which are familiar: health concerns; price increases; restrictions on advertising
and promotions; governmental and private restrictions on the locations where tobacco may be
used; increases in federal, state, and local regulation and excise taxes that have made tobacco
more expensive for consumers; a general decline in the social acceptability of smoking; and a
migration to smoke-free products. (JX0017.0018; de Gennaro Tr. 204:3-25.)
[*22] RAI was not immune to the industry-wide decline. Testimony from RAI's Fragnito
confirmed that RAI's sales volumes have declined at rates approaching the rates of decline in the
industry overall. (Fragnito Tr. 1669:10-1670:2.) Indeed, Dissenters' expert Flyer testified that it
is possible RAI's cigarette business will decline such that by 2026, cigarettes "may be 15, 20
percent of the business[,]" as opposed to nearly 90% of RAI's business in 2017.
(Flyer [**12] Tr. 1207:4-23.)
[*23] RAI had been able to partially offset declining volumes by growing its market share for
certain of its brands. (Fragnito Tr. 1678:4-9.) Increased market share, however, does not directly
correlate with increased profitability. As Fragnito put it, gaining market share in cigarettes
"essentially just means you're gaining a larger slice in a much smaller pie." (Fragnito Tr.
1678:10-15.) There was no evidence that RAI's modest share gains would materially offset
annual volume declines of 3% to 4% in the future. In fact, RAI's internal documents state
otherwise. In materials prepared for a February 2, 2017 meeting of RAI's Board of Directors, in
which RAI management described 2016 as a "BIG year" with "Outstanding results[,]" RAI saw
an overall increase of 0.3% in its share of cigarette sales, but nonetheless experienced a 2%
decline in cigarette shipments and expected that "[l]ong term, [RAI would] resume a 3% - 4%
industry decline[.]" (DX0291.0121—.0124.)

b. Limited Sources of Potential Growth
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[*24] Given the substantial declines in sales of cigarettes, which accounted for a substantial
majority of RAI's profits, RAI historically employed a variety of operating and nonoperating [**13] mechanisms in order to meet its goal of annual earnings per share ("EPS")
growth in the "high single-digit[s.]"11 (Wajnert Tr. 110:14-18; Gilchrist Tr. 373:20-374:13.)
RAI was able to achieve its EPS targets through a combination of engaging in mergers and
acquisitions, aggressively cutting costs, taking advantage of low interest rates to refinance its
debt, repurchasing its own stock, and—most importantly—raising prices for its products. (Crew
Tr. 642:7-24, 644:17-645:15, 646:4-25, 647:16-648:18; Peters12 Dep. Tr. 93:05-94:01.) The
evidence showed, however, that, at the time of the Merger, the mechanisms RAI had previously
employed to increase profitability and meet its EPS targets were less likely to be available in the
future.

i. Fewer M&A Opportunities
[*25] Historically, consolidation had been a way for the tobacco industry to lower costs and
address declining consumer demand. While there had originally been a group of seven leading
U.S. tobacco companies, commonly referred to as the "Big Seven," over time consolidation in
the industry had shrunk the number of competitors from the Big Seven to the "Big Three." (Crew
Tr. 646:17-25; Fragnito Tr. 1674:13-16.) The Big Three included (i) Altria [**14] Group, Inc.
("Altria"), the maker, through its subsidiary Philip Morris USA Inc. ("Philip Morris"), of the
leading Marlboro brand cigarette and the market leader with a nearly 50% share of sales; (ii)
RAI, with a 32.3% share of sales; and (iii) Imperial Tobacco Group, PLC ("ITG"), with a 9%
share of sales. Several smaller manufacturers of deep-discount brands competed for market share
against the Big Three. (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 8; JX0017.0005—.0006; JX0004.0024;
PX0063.0047; Fragnito Tr. 1674:9-18.)
[*26] RAI had played a leading role in this consolidation trend. As Crew testified, RAI had
long served as a "consolidator in the industry[,]" with that history of consolidation helping
Reynolds "stay[ ] in business." Crew testified that most of the Big Seven U.S. tobacco companies
"are now part of Reynolds American[,]" and described how RAI had engaged in a series of
acquisitions, culminating in the acquisition of a large competitor, Lorillard, in 2015. (Crew Tr.
646:11-647:6; JX0014.0001 ("Our 900% +return over the last 10 years ha[s] been largely driven
by deals[.]").)
[*27] By the time of the Merger negotiations in October 2016, however, it appeared that RAI
would no longer be able to rely [**15] on meaningful future mergers and acquisitions to
overcome the effect of declining cigarette sales volumes and to increase its profitability and EPS.
As RAI's CFO at that time, Gilchrist testified that "consolidation had sort of run its course in
terms of really material impact consolidation." (Gilchrist Tr. 433:13-20.) Wajnert similarly
testified that, due to antitrust concerns, there "were not major revenue [M&A] opportunities at
all" because "the industry had consolidated so much over the years[,]" leaving only three major
competitors. (Wajnert Tr. 40:18-41:2.) In addition, de Gennaro testified that, after RAI acquired
Lorillard, "it was inconceivable that the regulators" would have allowed further consolidation in
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the tobacco industry to make it effectively a duopoly. (de Gennaro Tr. 190:10-21.) In short,
"there [were] no big deals remaining." (JX0014.0001; Crew Tr. 647:3-15; Flyer Tr. 1156:14-24;
Peters Dep. Tr. 93:05-94:01.) Thus, future consolidation was not a likely strategy for RAI to
increase profitability and EPS.

ii. Reduced Cost-Cutting Opportunities
[*28] Another important tool RAI had used to increase its profitability had been cost-cutting.
RAI historically had successfully [**16] implemented numerous cost-cutting initiatives to
improve productivity and efficiency. (Wajnert Tr. 39:8-23; Crew Tr. 642:16-19.) By the time of
the Merger, however, RAI's ability to further cut costs as a standalone company had been nearly
exhausted, particularly as synergies13 had gotten "thin." (Crew Tr. 648:19-649:5; Peters Dep.
Tr. 93:05-94:01.) For example, RAI identified $800 million in synergies attributable to the
acquisition of Lorillard in 2015, but by July 2016, the vast majority of those synergies had been
achieved. (Crew Tr. 649:5-649:15; Wajnert Tr. 52:15-17; Gilchrist Tr. 490:1-10 ("I believe the
majority had been captured and we were just — the last piece of synergies had to do with
machinery and the move from the old Lorillard facility to Winston-Salem.").)

iii. Debt Refinancing Completed
[*29] RAI also employed non-operating financial strategies affecting its finances "below the
line" to meet EPS targets, including liabilities management. (Crew Tr. 647:16-25.) Given RAI's
extensive mergers and acquisitions activity, RAI often had substantial levels of debt.
Accordingly, in 2016, one of the financial steps RAI took to help meet its EPS goals was
to [**17] capitalize on historically low interest rates to refinance much of its debt. But this was a
one-time event. Because there were few opportunities for further debt refinancing, that onceeffective strategy no longer presented RAI a significant path to increase its profitability moving
forward. (Crew Tr. 648:9-18; Price14 Tr. 1044:20-25.)

iv. Limited Share Buyback Opportunities
[*30] RAI also sought to increase its EPS by repurchasing shares of its stock on the open
market in share buybacks. (Crew Tr. 647:16-25; Price Tr. 1022:16-22 ("So the share repurchases
are something that we had been doing for a number of years. Something that the analysts liked
seeing. And it was an efficient way to utilize the cash when we didn't have other uses for it.").)
Although RAI's Board of Directors approved a $2 billion share repurchase program in June 2016
due to certain unique circumstances relating to RAI's 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (the
"MSA") payment obligations in 2017, (Gilchrist Tr. 412:4-413:11; Wajnert Tr. 146:2-5), as with
debt refinancing, share buybacks were not a viable, long-term solution to overcome declining
annual cigarette sales volumes to maintain or increase profits, (Gilchrist Tr. [**18] 413:12-14).
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v. Constrained Net Price Realization
[*31] Through the date of the Merger, the primary driver of profit growth for RAI and its
competitors in the U.S. tobacco industry had been the ability to increase cigarette pricing above
the rate of volume decline over many years due in no small part to the largely inelastic demand
for cigarettes resulting from nicotine addiction. (JX0004.0006, .0028; Flyer Tr. 1095:17-21,
1096:12-21; Crew Tr. 642:7-15; de Gennaro Tr. 204:3-16; Cameron15 Dep. Tr. 25:08-16;
Wajnert Tr. 37:18-38:4.) RAI referred to this pricing power as "net price realization."
(DX0003.0094.) As Fragnito explained, "[I]f volume is declining at 3 percent, we would have
[to] price above the 3 percent in order to drive profit." (Fragnito Tr. 1672:5-11.)
[*32] RAI recognized that its reliance on net price realization would increase as volumes
continued to decline and thus that achieving sufficient net price realization was "a critical
imperative" to meet its EPS goals. (Fragnito Tr. 1726:3-17; PX0063.0044; JX0004.0006.) RAI
anticipated that its future growth "would continue through increased pricing on cigarettes as the
volumes declined[,]" but RAI also believed that the assumption [**19] that RAI could continue
to raise prices indefinitely was "tenuous at best[,]" (Wajnert Tr. 41:14-19), because "you get to a
point where the volume declines were so substantial that you would end up having to raise prices
to 30, 40, $50 a pack of cigarettes, which obviously wouldn't make sense[,]" (Wajnert Tr. 39:27). RAI's Financial Advisors and RAI management, including Cameron, shared these views,
recognizing that pricing strategies cannot offset volume decline "[i]n perpetuity" because to
assume such would require "selling the last cigarette for 20 billion" dollars. (Cameron Dep. Tr.
93:13-25; de Gennaro Tr. 204:10-25; Crew Tr. 644:17-645:15; Fragnito Tr. 1672:20-1673:5;
Gompers Tr. 746:11-17.)
[*33] Additionally, Altria's de facto control over pricing dynamics in the cigarette industry was
a significant source of uncertainty impacting RAI's ability to continue to increase prices to offset
volume declines. For the two decades prior to the Merger, cigarette pricing was led by Altria,
which would raise prices for cigarettes twice per year, amounting to about a 5% to 6% total price
increase annually. The rest of the U.S. tobacco industry, including RAI, tended to follow Altria's
pricing. [**20] (JX0004.0008—.0013; PX0063.0100, .0107; Wajnert Tr. 37:1-8; Fragnito Tr.
1673:21-25.) Altria's subsidiary Philip Morris and its pricing practices are "the number one
reason the industry can or cannot take pricing." (Jennette16 Dep. Tr. 87:08-88:25.)
[*34] RAI could not raise its prices before Altria because "Altria had a substantial market
leverage, had much more volume. They had more control over the marketplace." (Wajnert Tr.
38:7-12.) For this reason, RAI believed that if Altria did not raise prices, RAI could not
profitably raise prices either, without accelerating switching or "downtrading" from its
consumers, (Crew Tr. 644:17-645:15; Fragnito Tr. 1675:19-1676:21; PX0063.0107;
JX0009.0001), which occurs "when a consumer will choose a lower priced offering versus their
usual brand that they would buy[,]" (Fragnito Tr. 1680:5-22). In particular, RAI feared losing
volume to Altria's already popular Marlboro cigarettes, "which would be a preferred brand" if
priced lower. (Wajnert Tr. 38:17-23.)
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[*35] RAI's perception of the pricing environment is grounded in historical fact. In 1993,
Altria's predecessor decided to dramatically drop the price of Marlboro cigarettes on what is
referred to [**21] in the industry as "Marlboro Friday." As a result of Marlboro Friday, "pricing
in the U.S. came down significantly[.]" (Flyer Tr. 1090:8-14; Peters Dep. Tr. 92:8-17 ("Marlboro
Friday . . . reduced industry profits dramatically.").)
[*36] Further, Altria was a diversified company with sizeable interests in sectors besides
tobacco, including beer, wine, and cigars, among others. RAI was less diversified and more
reliant on cigarette pricing than Altria to grow its earnings. (JX0004.0008—.0013;
PX0063.0044, .0048—.0049; Fragnito Tr. 1677:1-17.) In 2016, in connection with the merger of
beer companies AB InBev and SABMiller, of which Altria owned over 25%, Altria received a
large cash payment and a roughly 10% equity stake in the newly-formed company. There was
significant concern within RAI that Altria would have less pressure to raise cigarette prices as it
had done in the past because of the additional financial flexibility brought by the SABMiller
deal. (PX0063.0044, .0048—.0049, .0107; JX0004.0008—.0009; JX0009; Fragnito Tr. 1673:171674:8, 1677:18-1678:3 ("So [Altria has] other revenue and profit streams that we don't have at
Reynolds that could potentially alleviate — if one of those [**22] other profit streams did
exceptionally well, it would reduce their need to drive a significant amount of profit on their
combustibles business via pricing.").) As Wajnert explained,
If Altria had more alternatives to deliver earnings growth to their share owners that wasn't
dependent on raising prices for their cigarette portfolio, that would be a threat to Reynolds.
Because if Altria didn't raise prices, Reynolds would not raise prices. In which case, the
reduction in cigarette volumes would have a significant impact on Reynolds.
(Wajnert Tr. 44:25-45:6.)
[*37] RAI also perceived a risk that Altria and Philip Morris International, an international
tobacco company with no presence in the United States, would re-combine and become a
stronger, even more diversified company, again reducing Altria's need to raise prices and putting
RAI's ability to compete with the combined company at risk. (JX0014.0001; Cameron Dep. Tr.
25:8-26:9; Wajnert Tr. 83:15-84:6 ("[T]hey had been together previously and had been separated
— put those two companies back together, the economic power and the brand power would be
tremendous. And, in fact, they were working together in terms of innovation products as
well, [**23] which was very threatening to Reynolds.").)
[*38] RAI also had reason to believe that it would face increased pricing pressure from deepdiscount cigarette brand manufacturers. As pricing by the Big Three continued to increase, these
smaller manufacturers could become more competitive by maintaining pricing levels, or
increasing them only slightly, and creating greater relative discounts to the brands of the Big
Three. (Fragnito Tr. 1678:16-1679:15.) In other words, the more the Big Three raised prices, the
more attractive the deep-discount brands would become to consumers and the more those brands
could raise their prices and increase their profits while still remaining lower-priced alternatives.
(Fragnito Tr. 1679:16-1680:4.)
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[*39] RAI was particularly vulnerable to this threat due to its product mix. RAI's sales were
concentrated in premium and super-premium brands, which accounted for approximately 73% of
RAI's cigarette volume in 2016. (JX0017.0018; Flyer Tr. 1113:13-17.) This concentration made
RAI more susceptible to downtrading: "as consumers look for less expensive alternatives [to RAI
products], there's less products within our portfolio that would meet that need from a price
perspective. [**24] So they ultimately move to products outside of our portfolio." (Fragnito Tr.
1680:5-22; JX0017.0018 ("RAI's subsidiaries are more susceptible to consumer price
sensitivities[.]").) In addition, smokers in the 50+ age category, who are the heaviest smokers
and account for approximately 50% of RAI's revenue, are more sensitive to increases in cigarette
prices and are more likely to downtrade in the face of increasing prices.17 (Fragnito Tr.
1682:13-1683:8.)
[*40] Despite these serious long-term risks, RAI anticipated that, in the near term (and barring a
change in behavior by Altria or increased excise taxation), it would be able to increase cigarette
prices at historical levels and continue to profit. (Fragnito Tr. 1672:2-1673:16.) Over time,
however, RAI's ability to maintain growth through increased pricing would become more and
more doubtful. (Fragnito Tr. 1672:20-1673:3 ("[T]here would ultimately be a time where . . . the
price of cigarettes would have to be at a point where it would just accelerate the rate of
decline.").)

vi. Uncertain Growth and Profitability of Next Generation Products
[*41] RAI expressed hope that its "next generation products," including vapor products, could
someday [**25] be potentially "transformative" for RAI's business and present "big
opportunit[ies]" that could provide a possible avenue for overcoming declining cigarette sales.
(Crew Tr. 642:20-24; Hanigan Tr. 1613:14-17.) The evidence shows, however, that RAI's vapor
products were not profitable at the time of the Merger. (Flyer Tr. 1205:17-21; Wajnert Tr. 36:325; Crew Tr. 642:25-643:22; Hanigan Tr. 1651:13-17.)
[*42] Indeed, despite RAI's high hopes, it was unclear whether and when RAI's vapor products
would achieve profitability or the degree to which those products would impact RAI's future
revenues and profits. Prior to the Merger, RAI did not "have a path to profitability based on a
specific milestone" for its vapor products. (Fragnito Tr. 1704:20-1705:2.) Vapor had not been
profitable because
the cost of goods associated with an electronic cigarette are exponentially higher than a
combustible cigarette as you would imagine. The electronics, the batteries, the fact that they're
manufactured in China. And we don't have the scale — the category is still relatively small in the
world of total tobacco. So without the econom[ies of] scale to offset those higher costs. And
because we're still trying [**26] to educate, inform and gain trial on consumers, there's not a lot
of pricing power in the industry. . . . So relatively low price despite the high cost of goods, on top
of the significant amount of investment required from an R&D[ a]nd then advertising and
marketing perspective makes it difficult to make money in that.
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(Fragnito Tr. 1687:17-1688:7.)
[*43] Another challenge facing RAI in the vapor market was that, unlike cigarettes, the vapor
market was highly fragmented and rapidly evolving, with more than a thousand competitors
marketing their products through different "channels," including through convenience stores and
gas stations (the "C-gas" channel, in which RAI competed) and through vape shops and ecommerce (in which RAI did not compete). (Hanigan Tr. 1639:8-1640:21; Fragnito Tr. 1684:181685:21.)
[*44] As of July 19, 2017, approximately 950,000 vapor products had been registered with the
FDA (including 900,000 e-liquids). (JX0019.0011.) RAI's leading vapor brand, Vuse, was sold
only through the C-gas channel, in which RAI was able to use its cigarette relationships to
optimize shelf space and placement. While Vuse was the industry leader in the C-gas channel
with approximately [**27] 30% share of sales, Vuse's overall market share in all channels was
estimated to be closer to 5%. (PX0009.0025; Hanigan Tr. 1618:14-19, 1643:24-1644:13.)
[*45] Sales of vapor products impacted RAI's profitability in other ways. Certain consumers
switched from cigarettes to vapor, resulting in greater sales of unprofitable vapor products at the
expense of profitable sales of cigarettes. (Crew Tr. 643:23-644:16; Fragnito Tr. 1688:8-1689:21.)
Similarly, RAI found that in 2015, 42.7% of adult tobacco users under age 35 consisted of "polyusers"—consumers who used vapor products in addition to other tobacco products. RAI's
profitability decreased as vapor sales to those customers replaced cigarette sales. (PX0009.0004;
Fragnito Tr. 1688:8-1689:21.)
[*46] RAI's efforts prior to the Merger to address its unprofitable vapor business through
mergers and acquisitions also failed. RAI Innovations considered acquiring minority positions in
three small vapor companies (Vape Forward, Cosmic Fog and Five Pawns) but elected not to
pursue transactions with any of them because none passed RAI Innovations' product integrity
tests. In any event, none of these companies had revenues that would have
materially [**28] affected the profitability of RAI Innovations' vapor business. (Hanigan Tr.
1637:20-1639:1, 1650:16-1651:7.)
[*47] In addition to these hurdles, RAI identified "major obstacles to the consumer adoption of
vapor[,]" including, among other things, the "uncertainty and potential difficulty of the vapor
innovation approval pathway" and "a tough legislative and regulatory environment."
(PX0063.0057.)
[*48] At the federal level, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") possesses broad
authority under the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the "Tobacco
Control Act"), 21 U.S.C. § 387 et seq., over the manufacture, sale, marketing, and packaging of
tobacco products. In May 2016, the FDA issued a regulation expanding the purview of the
Tobacco Control Act to include vapor products. Prior to this announcement, there had been no
federal regulation, and very little state or local regulation, of the vapor industry. Afterwards,
vapor product manufacturers were required to seek approval for existing vapor products on the
market by submitting Premarket Tobacco Product Applications ("PMTAs"). FDA approval of a
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PMTA was also required before a manufacturer could lawfully release a new tobacco product.
(JX0017.0011; [**29] Hanigan Tr. 1620:9-17; Crew Tr. 642:25-643:22; DX0230.0005.)
[*49] While RAI was better-positioned to comply with the FDA's regulations than some of its
vapor competitors, RAI was not able to capitalize on that advantage because the FDA delayed
the deadline by which manufacturers were required to submit a PMTA, allowing RAI's
competitors to sell vapor products in the market longer without FDA approval. (Hanigan Tr.
1639:8-1640:9.) From 2009 until the Transaction Date, the FDA authorized the introduction onto
the market of only eight new tobacco products, all of which were noncombustible cigarettes.
(Flyer Tr. 1087:4-1088:6.)

c. Substantial Regulatory, Taxation, and Litigation Risk
[*50] In addition to industry-wide cigarette volume declines and limited opportunities for
growth, extensive evidence was introduced showing that RAI faced a number of other serious
risks that had the potential to undermine the Company's future profitability or, depending on
their nature and magnitude, have devastating effects on RAI's future business prospects.
(Gompers Tr. 730:10-731:5; Gilchrist 387:25-391:9.)

i. Regulatory Risk
[*51] At the time of the Merger, the tobacco industry was highly regulated; tobacco
products [**30] were subject to a variety of federal, state, and local laws and regulations, and
regulation had an extensive impact on how the industry operated.18 (JX0017.0011.) The
evidence shows that the existing and future regulation of tobacco products had the potential to
substantially affect RAI's ability to increase future profits.
[*52] At the federal level, the Tobacco Control Act was a concern for the tobacco industry. As
Wajnert explained,
[H]aving the Tobacco Control Act put in place with the FDA having supervision created
perceived risks and I think have manifested themselves in that the FDA has been working to
reduce the harm within cigarettes, which could include changing formulations, could include
attractiveness of the product, and it could include banning certain flavors, for example, as in
menthol. All those were uncertain at the time and I think still uncertain.
(Wajnert Tr. 46:7-20.)
[*53] In addition to federal regulations, many state, local, and municipal governments and
agencies had adopted laws or regulations restricting or prohibiting the public use of tobacco
products, including but not limited to age and location restrictions, and bans or restrictions on the
sale or use of e-cigarettes [**31] and other tobacco products, including menthol cigarettes.
(JX0017.0011; Crew Tr. 691:23-692:9; Fragnito Tr. 1692:7-21, 1694:9-1695:6.) Indeed,
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regulation and legislation at the local level were "becom[ing] the new frontier of tobacco
control" and such efforts were viewed by RAI as a significant threat, as there were "close to 700
pieces of anti-tobacco legislation at the local level" that had the potential to impact RAI's and the
industry's growth prospects.19 (Fragnito Tr. 1692:4-21.)
[*54] The parties presented conflicting evidence concerning the likelihood of future regulation
and its effects on RAI's business. Much of this evidence related to regulation of menthol
cigarettes.
[*55] Menthol regulation was a primary concern for RAI because of the extent to which RAI
relied on menthol products for its revenue and profit, particularly in comparison to other tobacco
companies. At the time of the Merger, 60% of RJRT's revenue, and 50% of RAI's overall
revenue, was attributable to sales of menthol cigarettes. RAI's Newport brand was the number
one menthol cigarette on the market and was RAI's best-selling product. (JX0017.0016; Fragnito
Tr. 1670:17-1671:5, 1671:20-1672:1; Flyer Tr. 1212:16-19.) [**32]
[*56] The RAI Board attributed "growing . . . importance" to sales of menthol cigarettes to
RAI's adult smokers under 35 because RAI was realizing market share growth to that
demographic group, which implied that as "this segment aged, there would be continued usage of
the [menthol] product" due to nicotine addiction and brand loyalty. (Wajnert Tr. 55:18-56:4;
PX0009.0008.) As a result, heightened regulation of menthol, such as a federal ban on sales of
menthol cigarettes, was viewed as "disastrous" and "devastating" for RAI, (Wajnert Tr. 119:21120:5; Fragnito Tr. 1690:14-20), and presented a credible, significant threat to RAI's ability to
maintain or increase its profitability into the future.
[*57] Evidence was introduced that the FDA viewed a ban on menthol as a potentially viable
regulatory strategy. In 2013, the FDA announced its intention to review the possible increased
regulation of menthol cigarettes, including a potential ban on menthol-flavored products. This
announcement acted as an "overhang on the [C]ompany and in the industry." (Fragnito Tr.
1671:20-1672:1; JX0017.0016.) Crew explained that after the FDA's 2013 review of menthol,
RAI believed that the FDA
had never stopped [**33] looking at it, despite the fact they couldn't find any increased toxicity
or disease caused by menthol cigarettes, it was very clear that the government was still intending
to do something about menthol. We weren't sure what they were going to do, whether it was just
reduce the amount of menthol allowed or they could go all the way to a ban. We weren't sure
exactly whether — but they — we knew they felt like they could do that. So we were very
concerned about that. It was one of our largest profit contributors to the business.
(Crew Tr. 662:5-16.) That the FDA had, prior to the Merger, expressly considered increasing
regulation of menthol demonstrates that RAI's fears of future regulation were well-founded.
[*58] Flyer did not believe a federal menthol ban would have a meaningful impact on the value
of RAI. The Court finds this testimony unpersuasive. Flyer testified that a menthol ban would
simply push smokers to non-menthol products, but his own research indicated that when adult
smokers switched from Newport to another brand, those smokers were much more likely to
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switch to Marlboro or another non-RAI brand, thus reducing RAI revenues. (Flyer Tr. 1081:131082:20, 1215:1-1216:2 ("It [**34] makes sense it would be Marlboro because Marlboro's four
times the size or maybe five times the size of Camel. So it would have to almost certainly be
Marlboro as being the closest substitute.").)
[*59] Dissenters also offered statements by RAI reflecting RAI's expectation that it would be
able to successfully manage regulatory risks associated with menthol. (DX0009.0007 ("With
new FDA chief, see potential for some easing of the more onerous regulations."); Price Tr.
1049:6-19.) The Court is again unpersuaded. While RAI no doubt had plans to address any
future menthol regulation and seek to mitigate its impact, the record is clear that at the time of
the Merger the threat of future menthol regulation was a significant risk to RAI's future profit
growth and therefore its fair value.
[*60] The Tobacco Control Act also established onerous requirements for a manufacturer to
launch a new tobacco product or modify an existing product, which are known as "product
standards" regulations. (JX0017.0016; JX0009.0001—.0002; Flyer Tr. 1087:4-1088:6.) These
regulations imposed restrictions on the composition and use of RAI's products and had the ability
to significantly affect RAI's revenues and cash [**35] flows. (JX0017.0014-0017; Wajnert Tr.
119:21-120:5.)
[*61] Pursuant to FDA product standards regulations, manufacturers of tobacco products
introduced between February 15, 2007 and March 22, 2011 were required to file a "substantial
equivalence report" with the FDA's Center for Tobacco Products (the "CTP"). In the report, the
manufacturer had to demonstrate that the new product was "substantially equivalent" to a product
already on the market. A product subject to such a report is referred to as a "provisional product"
because it was subject to the CTP's approval. If the CTP determined that a product was not
"substantially equivalent" to a product already in the market, the FDA could force the removal of
the provisional product from the market. (JX0017.0016.)
[*62] In September 2015, the CTP issued orders determining that four RAI products, including
RJRT's Camel White and Camel Crush Bold brands, were not substantially equivalent to a
product already in the market. The CTP ordered RAI to "stop all distribution, importation, sale,
marketing and promotion" of those products. (JX0017.0016; DX0069.0013; DX0291.0112;
DX0392.0083.) Nearly all of RAI's products on the market as of the Transaction [**36] Date
were provisional products that were subject to a future FDA determination that could require
RAI to remove the product from the market. (JX0017.0014—.0017.)
[*63] In addition to product standards regulations on cigarettes, RAI's moist snuff business
faced potentially catastrophic regulation. Prior to the Merger, the FDA proposed regulations
limiting the amount of a particular compound—N-nitrosonornicotine, commonly known as
"NNN"—that was found in RAI's moist snuff products. If such a regulation were put into effect,
it could "basically ban" RAI's entire moist snuff portfolio. (Crew Tr. 663:16-664:7;
JX0016.0004.)
[*64] Product standards regulations were not the only threat to RAI's business imposed by the
FDA. In 2015, SFNTC received a "warning letter" from the FDA concerning SFNTC's use of
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descriptors including "natural" and "additive free" to describe its Natural American Spirit
cigarettes. (Crew Tr. 662:15-25.) The FDA letter was cited in over a dozen private lawsuits that
pose a threat to the future growth and profits of RAI's fastest-growing brand. (Crew Tr. 658:1820.)
[*65] The FDA also publicly announced that it was considering requiring a decrease in nicotine
levels in cigarettes [**37] to a fraction of current levels. (Flyer Tr. 1199:16-1200:1.) As
Fragnito testified, "the goal of the FDA with [lowering nicotine levels] is essentially to terminate
the existence of the industry" so that "ultimately smoking would go away." (Fragnito Tr. 1691:311.)
[*66] Restrictions on sales of flavored tobacco products generally, beyond menthol, also
represented a significant regulatory headwind for RAI. (DX0009.0007.) At the time of the
Merger, the FDA was actively considering proposals to limit the sale of flavored vapor products.
(Fragnito Tr. 1690:11-13, 1691:18-1692:3.) Certain jurisdictions, including San Francisco and
Beverly Hills, had already banned flavored products altogether. (DX0009.0007; Fragnito Tr.
1692:13-16, 1695:3-6.)
[*67] Numerous state and local governments had also passed legislation and ordinances
limiting the places in which tobacco may be used. For example, smoking had been prohibited on
government property in Charlotte, and all forms of tobacco use had been prohibited in public
parks in Mecklenburg County. The express purpose of these regulations is to "deglamorize and
denormalize tobacco use helping it become less acceptable." (Flyer Tr. 1181:14-1183:21.)

ii. [**38] Taxation Risk
[*68] In addition to risks associated with heightened regulation, RAI faced the prospect of
significant excise tax increases. Cigarettes and other tobacco products are subject to substantial
taxation at the federal, state, and local levels. On average, 45-50% of the price of a pack of
cigarettes is related to excise taxes. (JX0017.0019; Fragnito Tr. 1695:7-1696:22.) Taxing
authorities have increasingly imposed higher excise taxes on tobacco products. As Price
explained, "[A]s the governments become more and more in need of money, tobacco is a very
easy target for them to increase taxes, whether it be at the state level or the federal level." (Price
Tr. 976:12-977:5.)
[*69] These increases in taxation posed significant risks to RAI's business. While an increase in
the federal excise tax was viewed as the "most impactful" because it would be applied on a
national basis, (Gilchrist Tr. 384:12-17), state excise taxes also significantly affected RAI's
profitability. RAI projected it would face an annual five-cent-per-pack increase in net state
excise taxes, an increase that, standing alone, would cause RAI to lose sales of 300 million sticks
and about $30 million in profit every [**39] year. Fragnito explained that "at any given time of
the 50 states, there were usually a dozen or so proposals to increase" state excise taxes. RAI
expected these trends to continue, with each state proposing to increase its excise tax every two
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to four years. (Fragnito Tr. 1700:10-1701:8, 1770:25-1772:5; JX0009.0001; JX0010.0004;
JX0017.0019.)
[*70] Increased excise taxes have resulted in declines in overall sales volume and shifts by
consumers to less expensive brands. Additional increases are likely to result in future sales
declines or downtrading to less expensive brands or both. Increased taxes have also reduced
RAI's ability to increase pricing in areas with steep increases in excise taxes. (JX0017.0019;
Fragnito Tr. 1695:7-14; JX0009.0001.) As Wajnert explained,
[W]hether federal or state excise taxes, if those were raised, that would be passed through to the
consumer which would raise the prices of cigarettes which would have the effect of potentially
reducing volumes, because those pricing — the taxes are passed through.
(Wajnert Tr. 45:7-15.)
[*71] For example, in April 2017, California raised its excise taxes by $2 per pack, which had
an immediate effect on demand. Fragnito explained [**40] that the increase
essentially amounted to a 35 percent increase in prices. California's about 6 percent of industry
volume. So it's one of the largest states from a volume perspective. And so that increase resulted
in volumes declining in the range of 25 to 30 percent in California . . . [, which] drove an
additional 80 basis points. So .8 of a percentage point decline in the industry.
(Fragnito Tr. 1696:9-22.) At the time, RAI was also concerned that the California excise tax
increase would lead to a "snowball effect" and encourage other West Coast states to increase
their excise taxes to match California's taxes. (Gilchrist Tr. 387:25-388:15; JX0010.0006.)

iii. Litigation Risk
[*72] The potential for increased litigation and settlement costs posed another meaningful risk
to RAI's future profitability. Already accounting for a large portion of the tobacco industry's
costs, any increase in litigation and settlement costs would have the potential to substantially
affect RAI's ability to increase profits. (JX0017.0011, .0014-.0018.)
[*73] The risks associated with litigation had the potential to adversely affect RAI's growth
potential. In the years leading up to the Merger, RAI had more than [**41] 50 active cases going
to trial each year. There were thousands of active cases in Florida alone against RAI and other
tobacco manufacturers. (Crew Tr. 658:6-17; Gilchrist Tr. 389:8-23.) Continued litigation arising
out of the sale, distribution, manufacture, development, advertising, marketing, and health effects
of cigarettes and other tobacco products was expected for the foreseeable future. (JX0017.0014.0018, .0096-.0138; PX0009.0002; Crew Tr. 658:6-17; Wajnert Tr. 46:21-47:2, 54:23-55:3.)
[*74] In addition to litigation costs, the Big Three manufacturers all have perpetual, multibillion dollar annual payment obligations under the MSA, which resulted from health-related
lawsuits brought against tobacco companies by the attorneys general of 46 states. (JX0017.0001,
.0017-.0018; Gilchrist Tr. 390:1-12.) Fragnito estimated the MSA payment at approximately
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$0.72 per pack. (Fragnito Tr. 1702:13-1703:2, 1703:17-1704:14.) Because RAI's annual MSA
payment is indexed to inflation, RAI's payment obligations increase as inflation rises. The effect
of inflation has "a dramatic impact on [RAI's] cost of goods sold[,]" and any increase in inflation
would increase the likelihood of an associated [**42] decrease in RAI's profitability. (Price Tr.
984:19-985:9; Gilchrist Tr. 389:24-390:12; JX0009.0001.)

C. RAI's Transaction History
[*75] Prior to the Merger, RAI was involved in several significant corporate transactions,
several of which had features relevant to its competitive positioning and relationship with BAT
in the time leading up to the Merger.

a. Brown & Williamson Transaction
[*76] On July 30, 2004, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. ("RJR") and Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation ("B&W") completed a series of transactions that resulted in the
combination of RJR and the U.S. assets, liabilities, and operations of B&W (the "B&W
Transaction"). (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 1; JX0017.0003, .0074; JX0023.0042; Wajnert Tr. 60:5-9;
Price Tr. 939:7-9.) As part of the B&W Transaction, RAI was incorporated as a new publicly
traded holding company to hold the now combined businesses. (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 2;
JX0017.0003, .0074.)
[*77] Immediately prior to the B&W Transaction, RJR was publicly traded, and B&W was an
indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of BAT. (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 3; JX0017.0003, .0074.) As a
result of the B&W Transaction, BAT owned approximately 42% of the stock of RAI. The
remaining [**43] RAI shares were held by the former stockholders of RJR and publicly traded
on the NYSE. (JX0017.0003, .0155; JX0023.0042; Wajnert Tr. 60:13-21.)

b. Lorillard Transaction
[*78] In June 2015, RAI acquired Lorillard, a competing tobacco company, for consideration
valued at $25.8 billion (the "Lorillard Transaction"). (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 6.) Lorillard had been
the third-largest cigarette company in the United States and at the time its largest brand was
Newport, which RAI acquired as part of the Lorillard Transaction. (JX0017.0004, .0016.) To
achieve antitrust approval for the Lorillard Transaction, RAI divested certain cigarette and vapor
products to ITG.20 (Wajnert Tr. 40:18-41:13; de Gennaro Tr. 243:19-23.)

c. RAI and BAT Governance Agreement
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[*79] Contemporaneously with the B&W Transaction in 2004, RAI and BAT negotiated a set
of contractual restrictions designed, among other things, to maintain RAI's independence and
strictly limit the influence BAT and its subsidiaries could exert over RAI. This set of restrictions
was known as the "Governance Agreement." (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 5; JX0020; JX0023.0065;
Wajnert Tr. 61:9-15; de Gennaro Tr. 185:23-186:20.) The Governance Agreement was put
in [**44] place because the RJR Board of Directors "did not want BAT to control the [RAI]
business in any meaningful way[.]" (Wajnert Tr. 61:2-8.) Nevertheless, RAI disclosed to
investors that "BAT's significant beneficial equity interest in RAI could be determinative in
matters submitted to a vote by RAI's other shareholders, resulting in RAI taking actions that
RAI's other shareholders do not support." (DX0321.0024.)
[*80] Under the Governance Agreement, BAT had the ability to designate for nomination five
of RAI's thirteen directors,21 three of whom were required to be independent of both RAI and
BAT under applicable NYSE listing standards. (JX0020.0006, at § 2.01(c)(ii); Wajnert Tr. 62:38.) For the remaining eight Board seats, the Governance Agreement required BAT to vote its
shares as directed by the Board's Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee. As a result,
and as an example, BAT would not have been allowed to vote Thomas Wajnert, an independent
director, off the Board. (JX0020.0006, at § 2.01(c)(iii); Wajnert Tr. 62:9-16.) BAT thus
contracted away its ability to direct its vote for those eight Board seats, thereby foregoing any
right to vote for or otherwise influence the composition of a clear majority of [**45] the RAI
Board. (JX0020.0006, at § 2.01(c)(iii).)
[*81] The five BAT-appointed directors had access to confidential, nonpublic information
shared at regular RAI Board meetings by virtue of their membership on the RAI Board. (Wajnert
Tr. 50:8-19, 146:15-149:15; Gompers Tr. 844:22-845:2; Gilchrist Tr. 395:14-23, 405:2-19,
408:22-25; DX0024.)
[*82] Under the Governance Agreement, any material contract or transaction between BAT and
RAI required the approval of a majority of the seven independent directors not designated by
BAT (known as the "Other Directors"). The Other Directors did not depend on BAT's support for
their election.22 (JX0020.0010, at § 2.07; Wajnert Tr. 62:17-24, 63:2-10.)
[*83] Under the Governance Agreement, BAT agreed not to increase its ownership in RAI for
ten years after the close of the B&W Transaction in July 2004. This standstill provision expired
as scheduled in July 2014. (JX0020.0020-.0021, at § 4.01; Wajnert Tr. 66:2-8.)
[*84] The protections under the Governance Agreement persisted even if BAT became a
majority shareholder of RAI. This device ensured that BAT could not circumvent (or threaten to
circumvent) these contractual restrictions by buying more stock. Only if BAT acquired 100% of
RAI's stock [**46] would the Governance Agreement's protections fall away. (JX0020.0026, at
§ 6.11(a); Wajnert Tr. 63:11-17.)
[*85] BAT negotiated certain veto and contractual approval rights over certain RAI corporate
transactions. For example, subject to certain exceptions, approval of the BAT-appointed directors
was required for RAI to issue securities comprising 5% or more of RAI's voting power or to
repurchase RAI's common stock. (JX0020.0022, at § 5.01(ii).) BAT's approval as a shareholder
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was also required for the following RAI activity: (i) the implementation of takeover defense
measures, (ii) any transaction that would "impose material limitations on the legal rights of"
BAT or its subsidiaries, and (iii) the sale of intellectual property relating to international tobacco
brands that may be able to compete with BAT. (JX0020.0010, at § 2.04(b).)
[*86] BAT also held contractual protections that ensured its 42% ownership stake would not be
diluted. In November 2011, RAI and BAT agreed to amend the Governance Agreement,
whereby RAI would not be allowed to repurchase its shares if the repurchase was implemented
in such a way "that the number of outstanding shares of RAI common stock would not increase,
and the beneficial ownership [**47] interest of BAT and its subsidiaries in RAI would not
decrease." (DX0323.0061.) BAT took great effort to ensure its high ownership stake. For
example, concurrently with the completion of RAI's acquisition of Lorillard, BAT invested
approximately $5 billion in order to maintain its approximate 42% beneficial ownership in RAI
common stock. (de Gennaro Tr. 192:13-18.)
[*87] Considering all of the facts, the Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded that "[i]n
several ways, the Governance Agreement placed 'contractual handcuffs' on BAT that prevented it
from controlling the Reynolds board." Corwin v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605, 619,
821 S.E.2d 729, 739 (2018), reh'g denied, 372 N.C. 53, 822 S.E.2d 648 (N.C. 2019). As the
Supreme Court explained, "the fact of BAT's contractual rights did not, on its own, give BAT the
kind of coercive power over the Reynolds board that could allow BAT to exercise actual
control." Id. at 620, 821 S.E.2d at 740. "At best, the allegations that some terms in the transaction
agreement were favorable to BAT show only that BAT[ had] . . . the ability to secure some
favorable terms from the board. Those allegations do not show that BAT exercised control over
the board—that is, to make it take action." Id. at 624, 821 S.E.2d at 742. Thus, BAT was not a
controlling shareholder of RAI, and notwithstanding BAT's substantial holdings [**48] in the
Company, RAI had the freedom to make decisions independently from BAT. (JX0023.0080;
Wajnert Tr. 63:18-64:18.)

d. RAI Related Person Policy
[*88] RAI also instituted a related person transaction approval policy (the "Related Person
Policy") to foster transparency and proper governance which required various levels of review
before RAI could enter into any transaction with BAT. (PX0002.0001; Gilchrist Tr. 428:7-10.)
In addition to the Governance Agreement's prohibition on material transactions between RAI and
BAT without approval of the Other Directors, the Related Person Policy established more
granular restrictions: any transaction between RAI and BAT involving an amount that would be:
(i) less than $1 million required the prior approval of RAI's CEO, CFO or General Counsel, (ii)
equal to or greater than $1 million and less than $20 million required the prior approval of RAI's
Audit Committee, and (iii) greater than $20 million required the prior approval of the Other
Directors. (PX0002.0003.) To implement the Related Person Policy, RAI created a Related Party
Transaction Committee, which met monthly to review and approve all interactions between RAI
and BAT in the regular course [**49] of business. (Gilchrist Tr. 426:15-24.)
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e. RAI's Independence from BAT in Practice
[*89] RAI's ability to act independently of BAT, and even in a manner contrary to BAT's
wishes, was demonstrated in practice. Between July 2004 and the consummation of the Merger
in July 2017, RAI and BAT engaged in negotiations over potential agreements on a variety of
matters, some of which were protracted and contentious, some of which did not result in
agreement, and one of which led to arbitration between the two companies. (Gilchrist Tr. 431:1018; Crew Tr. 634:24-635:20.)
[*90] As further evidence of RAI's independence, in the fall of 2015, RAI invited BAT to
submit a bid to acquire the international rights to RAI's Natural American Spirit brand. (Wajnert
Tr. 91:21-92:14; Constantino23 Tr. 1812:7-20.) RAI wanted to improve its balance sheet after
the Lorillard Transaction by de-levering and reducing its overall debt level through this sale.
(Constantino Tr. 1804:12-18:06:18; Gilchrist Tr. 412:16-413:11.) After BAT expressed its
preference that RAI not sell those international rights, BAT submitted an offer. BAT's
competitor, Japan Tobacco, Inc. ("Japan Tobacco") also submitted an offer and won the
bid. [**50] Although BAT preferred that the international rights not be sold at all, and expressed
that preference to RAI's management, RAI proceeded with the sale to Japan Tobacco for $5
billion in January 2016. (Wajnert Tr. 64:4-18, 65:9-16, 91:4-92:14.)
[*91] RAI and BAT engaged in other arm's-length transactions in the years preceding the
Merger. In December 2015, after protracted negotiations with BAT, the Other Directors
ultimately approved a "vapor collaboration agreement" regarding certain next-generation
technologies. (JX0023.0066; Hanigan Tr. 1617:10-12.) In May 2016, a few months before the
Merger negotiations began in October, RAI and BAT negotiated a termination of the parties'
contract manufacturing agreement, which was approved by the Other Directors. (Crew Tr.
634:24-635:20.) There is no evidence that these interactions were not fairly negotiated.

D. Preparing for a Potential BAT Bid
[*92] Leading up to and after the expiration of the standstill provision in the Governance
Agreement in July 2014, RAI management met periodically with various investment banks to
discuss industry trends, RAI's relationship with BAT, and potential transactions involving RAI,
including a potential transaction [**51] with BAT. (Gilchrist Tr. 562:20-563:6, 568:21-569:11,
569:19-570:19, 572:8-25.)
[*93] Contrary to Dissenters' suggestions, there was nothing sinister nor nefarious concerning
these meetings. Lazard had been advising RAI regarding its relationship with BAT dating back
to 2011. (de Gennaro Tr. 185:11-186:20.) De Gennaro described his meetings with Gilchrist and
others within RAI, including Cameron, then the CEO of RAI, as a "banking exercise" and
"banker positioning[,]" and explained that "the nature of our business is that we try and stay
involved with our clients or potential clients constantly." (de Gennaro Tr. 246:7-21.) In addition
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to advising RAI on a potential offer from BAT, Lazard's meetings with RAI during these preMerger years addressed other topics, including the effects that a potential transaction between
BAT and ITG would have on RAI. (de Gennaro Tr. 244:4-23.) Lazard's evaluation of a potential
offer from BAT was part of the "comprehensive analysis" Lazard sought to offer its client. (de
Gennaro Tr. 247:5-20.)
[*94] Goldman also periodically met with RAI management to discuss financial industry
trends, RAI's business, and other topics. Around the time of the expiration of [**52] the
standstill in 2014, Goldman and RAI began discussing BAT's ownership stake and the potential
for a future transaction, the terms an offer by BAT to purchase the outstanding shares in RAI
might include, and steps RAI could take to prepare for such a potential offer. (Eckler24 Dep.
Tr. 14:8-15:16.)
[*95] JPMorgan met with RAI "on an ongoing basis in the ordinary course coverage of the
client" in the time leading up to the Merger. (Clark25 Tr. 1462:14-1463:4.) In August and
September 2016, Gilchrist and Cameron met with representatives from JPMorgan and discussed
issues related to potential transactions involving RAI and BAT, including premiums paid in
transactions with large shareholders, potential financing concerns for BAT in a transaction with
RAI, a potential mix of the offer between equity and cash, and the effects of Brexit on the
shareholder bases of RAI and BAT. (DX0063.0005; Clark Tr. 1462:14-1463:9, 1463:131469:18.)
[*96] There is no evidence anyone at RAI acted to further his or her own personal interest
ahead of the Company's in the time period prior to the Merger and, in particular, in RAI's preMerger meetings with Lazard, Goldman, and JPMorgan.
[*97] While Dissenters have tried [**53] to suggest that Gilchrist took actions to ensure he
would receive his "golden parachute" compensation,26 (Gilchrist Tr. 555:6-556:18), there is no
evidentiary basis from which to draw such a conclusion. Gilchrist's compensation arose from his
pre-existing employment contract and consisted of a standard severance package of two years'
salary and bonus, vesting of restricted stock options that he already owned, and a payout of his
pension. (JX0023.0146, .0153; Gilchrist Tr. 553:16-554:7.) None of his golden parachute
compensation arose specifically from the Merger; he would have received his compensation
regardless of the reason for his termination (other than firing for cause). (JX0023.0146, .0153;
Gilchrist Tr. 573:1-574:3.) In fact, he did not receive over 25% of his golden parachute
compensation because the conditions for its payment were not triggered. (Gilchrist Tr. 555:25556:4.)
[*98] Dissenters also suggest that Gilchrist sought the investment bankers' perspectives on the
amount BAT might be willing to pay in an acquisition of RAI to manipulate a potential future
valuation of RAI to a value within BAT's perceived price range. (DX0063.0013; de Gennaro Tr.
244:13-245:25; Gilchrist [**54] Tr. 580:18-581:8, 585:22-586:4; Clark Tr. 1466:15-1469:9.) No
credible evidence, however, was offered to support this claim.
[*99] As an initial matter, more people would have been needed to manipulate the valuation,
including Cameron, who received no personal benefit from the Merger, (Cameron Dep. Tr.
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223:11-18 ("I didn't qualify for a penny, nothing. I was out, December 31.")), and Crew, who
came to RAI with the goal of becoming CEO, (Crew Tr. 634:9-23, 669:20-671:2 ("I literally had
just been named sort of CEO elect and then this unsolicited offer came in. So, you know, it's just
personally disappointing . . . that I wasn't going to get a chance to . . . lead the company . . . as an
independent entity.")). There is no evidence either participated in this alleged scheme.
[*100] Moreover, the evidence shows that RAI management (including, but not limited to,
Gilchrist) made responsible efforts to understand the contours of a potential offer from BAT in
order to better understand the negotiating dynamics that might accompany a potential transaction
with BAT and to compare it to other strategic alternatives available to the Company.
(DX0063.0007-.0010; de Gennaro Tr. 246:22-247:4; Clark Tr. [**55] 1468:8-1469:5; Gilchrist
Tr. 580:22-581:8.)
[*101] Given BAT's 42% ownership stake in RAI and BAT's public representations that it
periodically considered the possibility of making an offer for RAI, RAI's separate pre-Merger
meetings with Lazard, Goldman, and JPMorgan were a prudent step taken by RAI management
to be better prepared for a potential offer from BAT and to be better positioned to advocate for a
higher price if such an offer materialized. Rather than evidence a conspiracy to facilitate
acceptance of an artificially low price, these meetings between the Financial Advisors and a
variety of individuals from RAI reflect prudent scenario planning on the part of RAI's
management and routine business development efforts on the part of these investment banks.

E. The Merger
[*102] As set forth in more detail below, the deal price in this case was reached through months
of arm's-length negotiations between sophisticated parties. On RAI's side, the deal was
negotiated by a fully independent and well-informed transaction committee, which showed a
willingness to walk away from a deal entirely and continue operating as an independent company
if a fair price could not be obtained. Three highly [**56] respected financial advisors separately
concluded that the deal price was fair to RAI's shareholders. RAI's non-BAT shareholders voted
overwhelmingly in favor of the Merger. For these and the other reasons set forth herein, the
Court finds that the deal price is entitled to substantial, if not determinative, weight in
determining the fair value of Dissenters' shares of RAI.

a. BAT's October 20, 2016 Offer
[*103] After the market closed on October 20, 2016, BAT made an unsolicited offer to acquire
the remaining shares of RAI that it did not already own through a letter sent to Wajnert, as Chair
of the RAI Board, and Cameron, as RAI's CEO. BAT's offer letter proposed to purchase all of
the outstanding shares of RAI for a mix of stock and cash equal to $56.50 per share of RAI
common stock (the "October 20 Offer"), a 19.8% premium over the $47.17 closing price of RAI
common stock that day (the "Unaffected Stock Price"). (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶¶ 13-14;
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JX0021.0002; JX0023.0068; PX0115.0254, .0531, .0578; DX0095.0008; Cameron Dep. Tr.
20:9-21:25; Wajnert Tr. 65:17-22.)
[*104] The October 20 Offer exceeded RAI's six-month average stock price prior to BAT's
initial offer, which was $48.97, and its [**57] all-time high price of $54.48 per share on July 5,
2016. (PX0115.0290, .0390.) The October 20 Offer implied a total equity value for RAI of
$80.56 billion. (PX0115.0128; JX0021.0002; JX0023.0068.)
[*105] Consistent with BAT's obligations under U.S. securities laws, BAT publicly announced
its proposal the next day before the markets opened. In its announcement, BAT stated that it
expected to achieve approximately $400 million in synergies from the transaction.
(JX0021.0007; JX0023.0068.)
[*106] BAT's letter acknowledged, consistent with the Governance Agreement, that a proposed
transaction between BAT and RAI would require the approval of a majority of the Other
Directors, BAT would not pursue the transaction without such approval, and BAT expected that
a merger would require the approval by a majority of the votes cast by the non-BAT
shareholders. (JX0021.0002; JX0023.0069.)
[*107] The RAI Board understood BAT's representations to mean that BAT would approach
this transaction as a "friendly transaction" and that BAT "didn't want to be threatening in any
way." (Wajnert Tr. 68:8-69:17.) The Board found these representations significant because, freed
from a hostile takeover threat by BAT, the [**58] Board would be able to "control the
transaction" and ensure that whatever decision it made about the October 20 Offer was fair to the
other shareholders. (Wajnert Tr. 68:21-22.) Importantly, the requirement that the transaction be
approved by the non-BAT shareholders gave "the power to accept or reject the transaction" to the
non-BAT shareholders. (Wajnert Tr. 68:8-69:17.)
[*108] The October 20 Offer also stated that "BAT is interested only in acquiring the shares of
[RAI] not already owned by BAT[,] and . . . BAT has no interest in selling any of the [RAI]
shares it owns, nor would BAT support any alternative sale, merger or similar transaction
involving [RAI]." (JX0021.0003.) The Board did not consider BAT's representation to limit the
Board "in terms of thinking through what the alternatives might be for" the non-BAT
shareholders; Wajnert explained that "at the end of the day, anything would be negotiable. So
while BAT was expressing an interest in not participating in a transaction with someone else, the
realities of the world, people change their minds." (Wajnert Tr. 69:18-70:19; Nowell27 Dep. Tr.
57:01-59:21 ("Q[.] . . . Did the board believe that [BAT's statement] foreclosed
the [**59] possibility of selling to another third party? A[.] No.").) Nevertheless, RAI disclosed
to investors that "BAT's significant beneficial ownership interest in RAI[ ] and RAI's classified
board of directors and other anti-takeover defenses could deter acquisition proposals and make it
difficult for a third party to acquire control of RAI without the cooperation of BAT."28
(DX0317.0026.)
[*109] Contemporaneous research analyst commentary on the October 20 Offer generally
viewed the proposed transaction as a positive for RAI shareholders. (PX0115.0129, .0289, .0459;
Gompers Tr. 802:25-803:8; Zmijewski Tr. 1380:17-1381:2.) In fact, some analysts perceived
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BAT to be overpaying or at least purchasing at a time when RAI was trading at a relatively high
multiple to its earnings. (PDX0005.0025; Yilmaz Tr. 2004:16-19; PX0115.0623.)

b. Recusal and Formation of Transaction Committee
[*110] Between October 24, 2016 and October 28, 2016, the RAI Board and the RAI Other
Directors met multiple times and interviewed potential legal and financial advisors. On October
24, 2016, Jerome Abelman and Ricardo Oberlander, the two BAT employees on the RAI Board,
voluntarily recused themselves from any RAI board meetings [**60] at which any proposed
transaction involving BAT or any potential alternative strategic transaction would be discussed
or considered. They also did not participate in any discussion or consideration of a potential
transaction with the BAT Board or any BAT employees. (PX0031.0001, .0003; PX0033.0001;
JX0023.0069; Wajnert Tr. 76:3-6.)
[*111] On October 28, 2016, the RAI Board created a transaction committee comprised solely
of the Other Directors to consider and evaluate the proposed transaction and any other strategic
alternatives (the "Transaction Committee"). (JX0007.0002-.0005; PX0033.0003-.0005;
JX0023.0069-.0070.) RAI's Board had fourteen directors at that time, seven of whom were Other
Directors. The seven Other Directors were:
a. John A. Boehner, retired Speaker of the United States House of Representatives;
b. Luc Jobin, President and CEO of Canadian National Railway Company;
c. Holly Keller Koeppel, former Managing Partner and Co-Head of Corsair Infrastructure
Management, L.P.;
d. Nana Mensah, Chairman and CEO of 'XPORTS Inc.;
e. Lionel Nowell, retired Senior Vice President and Treasurer of PepsiCo;
f. Thomas Wajnert, former Chairman and CEO of AT&T Capital Corporation;
g. John Zillmer, [**61] retired President, CEO and Executive Chairman of Univar.
(JX0023.0069.)
[*112] Wajnert was selected to serve as the Chair of the Transaction Committee. The remaining
directors on the RAI Board in October 2016, none of whom served on the Transaction
Committee, were Cameron (CEO of RAI), Murray Kessler (former CEO of Lorillard), and the
five designees BAT added to the Board under the Governance Agreement, two of whom were
BAT executives. (JX0007.0001, .0003; Wajnert Tr. 72:21-73:3, 146:6-14.)
[*113] The members of the Transaction Committee were fully independent of BAT and able to
consider the proposed transaction (and any alternatives) free of any conflicts, focused only on the
best interests of the RAI shareholders other than BAT. (Wajnert Tr. 63:5-10, 72:21-73:3.) The
Transaction Committee was "sophisticated" and included a number of current and former CEOs,
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including "[a] lot of people with financial backgrounds" and experience with mergers and
acquisitions. All members, except Speaker Boehner, had participated in the complex Lorillard
Transaction. (de Gennaro Tr. 214:9-215:14.)
[*114] The RAI Board delegated to the Transaction Committee the power and authority to,
among other things, evaluate, [**62] discuss and negotiate the terms and conditions of, approve,
recommend, and/or reject the October 20 Offer, any other potential transaction with BAT, and
any potential alternative strategic transaction. The "Transaction Committee was empowered to
analyze, accept, reject, full power to make recommendations to the board, and then eventually to
the shareowners. But it had full power to move forward, one way or the other." (Wajnert Tr.
71:21-25; JX0007.0003-.0004; JX0023.0069-.0070.) The RAI Board resolved that if the
Transaction Committee rejected the October 20 Offer or any other offer, that rejection would be
final and binding on behalf of the full Board. (JX0007.0003-.0004; JX0023.0069-.0070; Wajnert
Tr. 74:8-24 ("[W]e had the final authority to accept or reject and to move forward with another
transaction.").)

c. Retention of Financial Advisors
[*115] After interviewing several investment banks, the Transaction Committee appointed
Goldman as its financial advisor based on its reputation and experience with large complex
transactions, the tobacco industry, and with RAI and its business. Another reason the Transaction
Committee selected Goldman was because Goldman had not been hired or
compensated [**63] by BAT to provide any M&A financial advisory services in the prior two
years and had no other material relationships with BAT that may have been expected to create a
conflict of interest for Goldman. (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 16; JX0023.0070; PX0038.0005-.0006;
Wajnert Tr. 74:25-75:8; Eckler Dep. Tr. 15:17-16:20, 18:11-19:03.)
[*116] On October 25, 2016, the Other Directors hired Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP ("Weil")
and Moore & Van Allen as legal counsel. Both were fully independent of both RAI and BAT.
(Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 16; PX0035.0001-.0003; JX0023.0069; Wajnert Tr. 71:13-20, 73:11-23.)
[*117] Jones Day served as legal counsel to the Board and RAI in connection with the review
of the October 20 Offer and any subsequent developments. The Board and RAI also hired both
Lazard and JPMorgan as their financial advisors. (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 16; JX0023.0070; de
Gennaro Tr. 215:24-216:2; Gilchrist Tr. 437:5-10; Clark Tr. 1561:13-1562:1.)
[*118] The Financial Advisors were highly sophisticated and respected investment banks with
extensive experience advising large companies in corporate transactions, including in the tobacco
sector. (DX0151.0015; DX0065.0008; de Gennaro Tr. 210:6-19, 211:13-212:1; [**64] Clark Tr.
1427:10-25; Eckler Dep. Tr. 14:8-15:11.) The format of the Financial Advisors' compensation—
each was to receive a percentage of any completed deal (a "success fee")—was typical in the
industry and aligned the Financial Advisors' incentives with the Company's to get the highest
price. (Wajnert Tr. 75:13-76:2, 77:8-12; de Gennaro Tr. 217:15-219:3, 257:22-258:8.)
Investment bankers understand that they may not receive a fee for their work on a proposed
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transaction if the parties do not agree to a completed deal. (Clark Tr. 1428:23-1429:1; de
Gennaro Tr. 256:19-21.)
[*119] Although the Dissenters suggest that the Financial Advisors' contingent fee
arrangements incentivized them to encourage the Transaction Committee and RAI to agree to the
Merger at a depressed price to ensure their compensation, there is no credible evidence that any
of the Financial Advisors took any action in connection with the Merger to cause a transaction
with BAT at less than fair value. To the contrary, there was credible testimony that the Financial
Advisors' long-term reputations were more important to each of them than the compensation to
be earned on the Merger and that attempting to depress the merger [**65] price would tarnish
that reputation.29 (de Gennaro Tr. 257:2-18; Nowell Dep. Tr. 127:21-128:7.)

d. Information Provided to Financial Advisors
[*120] In the days following BAT's initial offer, Gilchrist and Price spoke with members of the
teams at Goldman, Lazard, and JPMorgan about clearing any conflicts of interest and
determining what materials the Financial Advisors wanted to review if they were selected as a
financial advisor for the Merger. Gilchrist and Price prepared the materials within days, allowing
the Financial Advisors the ability to get up to speed quickly. (JX0008.0001; DX0039.0001;
DX0041.0001; Gilchrist Tr. 441:4-442:13; Price Tr. 945:19-946:11, 1051:19-1052:2.) The
Financial Advisors likewise prepared to receive the information they expected from RAI
management so that they would be able to run their analyses as quickly as possible if they were
hired. (de Gennaro Tr. 273:12-274:3, 283:14-285:6.)
[*121] The parties' dispute over RAI's valuation in this action turns, in significant part, on the
reliability of the information RAI provided to the Financial Advisors to inform their valuation
analyses and whether RAI should have provided additional information in the form of
internal, [**66] nonpublic, ten-year financial projections that underlaid RAI management's
presentation to the Board at RAI's Strategy Day in July 2016 showing projections of 7% to 8%
compound annual growth over the next ten years. Dissenters contend that these ten-year
projections, and, in particular, years six through ten of those projections, were reliable and
accurate, and when used in a discounted cash flow ("DCF") analysis to generate an adjusted
blended terminal growth rate, result in a far higher valuation for RAI than the deal price. (Defs.'
Opening Post-Trial Br. 31-43, ECF No. 221.) RAI argues that the out years of the Company's
ten-year projections were never used or intended to value the Company and are largely
extrapolations of existing trends such that they are entirely unsuited and unreliable for purposes
of calculating RAI's fair value. (RAI's Post-Trial Br. 74-77, ECF No. 219.)

i. RAI's Financial Projections
[*122] RAI managed its business with a focus on attempting to provide regular returns to its
shareholders in the form of growing EPS by a stated target of growth in the high-single digits.
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(Gilchrist Tr. 373:20-374:13; Wajnert Tr. 110:14-18.) EPS was the single most important
metric [**67] for the RAI Board in measuring RAI's performance. Management therefore
focused its decision making and financial presentations on maintaining target growth in RAI's
EPS year over year. (Gilchrist Tr. 373:20-374:13 ("That was what the shareholders were
primarily focused on. That's what our board had structured, you know, a lot of our goals and
objectives around.").)
[*123] RAI maintained a financial projection process as part of its ordinary operation of the
business, which was designed to measure how well RAI was performing relative to its annual
EPS target. (Gilchrist Tr. 374:14-375:1.)
[*124] Before Gilchrist became CFO of RAI, he oversaw a project to overhaul RAI's
forecasting process from what was once disjointed and focused on the short-term into a more
rigorous and disciplined process. (Gilchrist Tr. 452:22-455:6.) As part of this overhaul process,
RAI started taking a "forward-looking" perspective to the forecasts, providing longer forecasts in
the range of five to ten years, as opposed to focusing on only one year, and began to update the
forecasts every month as opposed to only four times a year. (Gilchrist Tr. 454:22-455:15.)
[*125] The goal of the forecasting process was to stimulate [**68] more discussion and
transparency among business units so they would have a more cohesive view as to what was
happening at RAI as a whole. (Gilchrist Tr. 457:2-458:12.) To that end, everyone involved in
forecasting was working off one forecast for the entire company. Gilchrist testified that "what we
wanted to do was make sure that everybody — we didn't have people saying your forecast is
wrong, our forecast is right. We had one forecast, and everybody was working off the same
forecast." RAI developed a motto for the forecasts: "one version of the truth." (Gilchrist Tr.
458:20-459:11.)
[*126] As Gilchrist explained, RAI's projections were "assumption-based," in that they
incorporated
assumptions based on competitive activity, based on market dynamics. It would be assumptions
based on litigation, regulation, taxation. You know, a lot of those things are unknown so we
would obviously have to make assumptions. And the way . . . we structured that was basically to
outline what those assumptions were so there was complete transparency on the assumptions.
Obviously, you know, everybody was aware of what those assumptions would be and the — as
those assumptions changed, you would expect to see [**69] changes flow through the [forecast].
(Gilchrist Tr. 378:6-18.)
[*127] The evidence shows that RAI's financial projection process was not designed to take
into account the large looming risks to the industry, such as new or tightened regulations,
increased or new excise taxes, large litigation judgments or settlements, or competitive changes
like an alteration in Altria's pricing behavior, because these risks were difficult both to predict
and to quantify and were largely beyond RAI's control. (Wajnert Tr. 58:2-59:9, 111:5-10, 119:5120:5; Gilchrist Tr. 385:10-17, 391:4-9, 394:24-395:9.) As Jennette testified, "a company is not
going to go forward to [its] Board of Directors and say, [']Hey, you know, the industry is coming
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apart and we don't have any answers.['] " (Jennette Dep. Tr. 31:23-32:1; Holland30 Dep. Tr.
40:5-25.)
[*128] Accordingly, RAI management and the Board discussed the existence of the risks as
downside sensitivities to the forecasts, which expressly assumed that the risks would not occur
during the projection period. (JX0009.0001-.0002; PX0047.0002; JX0010.0006; PX0052.0004,
.0006; Gilchrist Tr. 380:21-391:09.) If any of those risks did occur, RAI would have to change
its projections [**70] and, more importantly, its business practices, in response to them.
(JX0010.0006; JX0023.0134; PX0052.0004, .0006; Wajnert Tr. 49:12-50:7; Gilchrist Tr.
378:22-379:15, 382:09-391:09, 462:1-8; Fragnito Tr. 1774:3-11; Price Tr. 963:25-964:1.) As one
example, Gilchrist explained that while the imposition of onerous state excise taxes was a large,
looming risk to RAI's business, RAI incorporated into its financial forecasts a California ballot
measure to raise its state excise tax in November 2016 only when it passed and its effective date
determined. (Gilchrist Tr. 462:18-463:12.)
[*129] In short, RAI's projections "were intended to be the best estimate [of] the future
performance based on the assumptions that [the Company] had[,]" (Gilchrist Tr. 377:23-378:5),
but a proper consideration of those assumptions and sensitivities was critical in determining
whether the projections could be reasonably relied upon for a particular purpose or use.
Importantly, assumptions that "were unknown either in timing, impact or scale, or
implementation . . . [were] outlined as risks and sensitivities" but not included in RAI's
management's forecasts. (Gilchrist Tr. 378:22-379:15.)

ii. The Latest Estimates [**71]
[*130] In the ordinary course of business, RAI developed financial projections every month
except January. RAI's financial planning process began with management's forecast of industrywide volumes and pricing for the forecast period. (Gilchrist Tr. 457:12-23.) These volume and
pricing forecasts were the "foundation" of RAI's financial projections, and were based on
publicly-available, historical pricing, market share and volume information, as well as publicly
available information about Altria's financial results and stated EPS targets. (Gilchrist Tr.
529:12-25.) Once the volume and pricing forecasts were developed, division finance leaders
would add projections for their specific businesses. From these, a single RAI forecast, called a
"Latest Estimate" or "LE," was developed. (Gilchrist Tr. 376:19-377:12; Price Tr. 941:15-20.)
[*131] In the Latest Estimates from February through May every year, RAI projected the
current year plus two additional years, providing quarterly projections for each of those years.
(Gilchrist Tr. 375:2-24; DX0015, at tab "Consol Fcst.") This length of time was chosen because
RAI's Board and management were focused on that short time horizon and because it
was [**72] the most likely period of time to be accurate due to the assumptions included in the
projections. (Gilchrist Tr. 376:4-18; Jennette Dep. Tr. 32:1-5.)
[*132] As Nowell testified,
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[RAI] is a business . . . trying to get through the next six months, the next quarter would have
been, in some cases, long term because it's a declining industry based off of pricing and that. So
getting out beyond five years, . . . at that point in time, wasn't value added because there were too
many variables that were outside of our control.
(Nowell Dep. Tr. 26:1-9.)

iii. The Operating Plan
[*133] Once per year, typically in October, RAI management created an "Operating Plan" for
the Board's approval, which set out the Company's financial targets and budget for the upcoming
year. Management based the financial portion of the Operating Plan on the October LE, which
contained five years of projections. (JX0012.0017-.0019; JX0016.0005-.0007; Wajnert Tr.
41:25-42:13; Gilchrist Tr. 391:10-392:2.) The Operating Plan itself, as presented to the Board,
contained high-level financial projections for only the following two years, including "industry,
company and brand volume and market share; adjusted operating income;
adjusted [**73] operating margins and adjusted EPS growth." (JX0012.0018; PX0063.0042;
Gilchrist Tr. 391:10-392:2.)
[*134] As Gilchrist explained, management used the additional years of financial projections
to make sure that we had an understanding of the dynamics of the business, to make sure that the
strategies actually were working and really for an opportunity to make sure that we had visibility
on some of the key milestones and/or gaps in the business so that we can identify three years
out[.]
(Gilchrist Tr. 392:10-15.) In contrast, the Board had no need for these additional years of
projections for purposes of evaluating and approving the Operating Plan, which the Board used
as a budget tool and to set financial performance and marketplace objectives only for the
upcoming year. (Gilchrist Tr. 392:7-394:23 (noting that projection years three through five were
generally used "as a check to make sure things are still on track").)
[*135] The final Operating Plan prepared prior to the Merger was for 2017. On several
occasions, RAI management identified the key assumptions underlying the 2017 Operating Plan.
At the September 2016 Board meeting, RAI management presented those assumptions to the
Board in [**74] preparation for the full plan review at the next Board meeting. (DX0025.0011.0012.) The key assumptions underlying the 2017 Operating Plan projections also were included
in the Operating Plan executive summary. (PX0063.0045-.0046.) Gilchrist discussed these same
assumptions and sensitivities at the December 1, 2016 Board meeting, which had been outlined
in PowerPoint slides shared with the Board prior to the meeting:

(PX0063.0100);
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(PX0063.0106-.0107; see also JX0012.0018.)

iv. The Strategic Plan and Strategy Day
[*136] Once per year, typically in July, RAI held a Strategy Day Board meeting, when
the board would gather with management to do — have deep thoughts and think about where the
company was going over the next five to ten years, and discuss what the issues were that were
obvious to everybody at that particular point and what opportunities might be there as well.
(Wajnert Tr. 50:11-19.)
[*137] Nowell described Strategy Day in similar terms, as a time when management would
present
an overview of the company and how we thought we were going to operate, say, going over the
next two, three years. That would be then overlaid with an R&D discussion about new products,
new generation products, [**75] other products we had in the pipeline, when we thought they
would be introduced. We would talk about the regulatory environment in terms of what's
happening in DC in view of that political environment, how that might impact us, what was
going on in the overall economy, and how that might impact us. And then rolling all that
together, kind of have a closer view on . . . all that being considered along with . . . a lot of risk
and other things that went through it, what does that look like for us going forward.
(Nowell Dep. Tr. 24:19-26:09.)
[*138] In preparation for each year's Strategy Day, members of RAI's finance team developed
the June LE, which contained projections for the current year plus nine years, providing quarterly
projections for the current year and the next two years and more generalized annual projections
for the remaining years. (DX0140, at tab "Consol Fcst.") RAI management typically created a
"Strategic Plan" for the Board's review at Strategy Day, the financial portion of which was based
on the June LE. (DX0011; Martin31 Dep. Tr. 34:21-37:08, 156:19-157:21). In preparing the
June LE, the finance team applied a "broad brush approach[,]" used a "much higher"
materiality [**76] threshold for forecasting years three through ten, and emphasized "identifying
significant gaps in achieving the desired earnings[.]" (DX0023.0002.) RAI management used
years six through ten of the June LE only in planning manufacturing capacity and funding for
capital expenditures. (Wajnert Tr. 116:21-118:11; JX0004.0031).
[*139] Wajnert explained the purpose of the financial information presented at Strategy Day as
follows:
the discussion related to the future state of the tobacco industry and, of course, Reynolds
American. So you would have a discussion about three years, five years, what could happen,
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discussing various scenarios. We wouldn't be looking at approving financial projections for a
long period of time. That was not the purpose. The purpose was to frame the conversation.
(Wajnert Tr. 57:7-15.)
[*140] RAI possessed "no material insight" about brand strength, trends or growth in the
industry in years six through ten that was not also available to individuals outside the Company
who were knowledgeable about the tobacco industry. (DX0023.0002; Gilchrist Tr. 405:2-406:6,
528:24-530:6, 620:8-11 ("Q. And did RAI have superior information over others in the tobacco
industry to look [**77] at and analyze that historical information and pull it forward? A. No. It
was public information.").) RAI management and the Board considered the forecasts for years
three through five to be of ever-decreasing reliability and years six through ten to be
extrapolations intended to provide information about whether a continuation of existing trends
would allow the Company to meet its EPS targets. (Gilchrist Tr. 375:2-24, 404:9-405:1, 501:916; Price Tr. 1017:13-20.)
[*141] Gilchrist testified that "the very foundational elements of the forecast, industry volume,
market share, pricing . . . were generally extrapolations" in years six through ten. (Gilchrist Tr.
626:20-627:1.) The contemporaneous evidence supports Gilchrist's explanation of RAI's
forecasting process. For instance, the Yearly Cigarette Volume tab of the June 2016 LE shows
that RAI's "Cigarettes — Share of Shipments" projections are straight-line extrapolations derived
directly from RAI's industry volume forecasts:

(DX0140, at tab "Yr — Cigt Vol," rows 42-79; see also Gilchrist Tr. 617:21-620:15 ("If you
look at market share growth, for example, which is a key component, they would just project out
a certain market share growth [**78] which then would be translated down to volume all the
way through the process."); Price Tr. 961:18-962:10.)
[*142] The fact that extrapolations provided the most fundamental inputs to years six through
ten of the ten-year projections was not contradicted. Although Dissenters identified certain
entries in the June 2016 LE, including the entries entitled "discounting" in the RJRT Detail tab,
that did not follow a straight-line pattern, (DX0140, at tab "RJRT Detail," row 940; Gilchrist Tr.
520:19-521:9), Gilchrist credibly explained that "discounting" entries and many others were
derived from the volume, market share, and pricing elements, (Gilchrist Tr. 521:5-22). The
results of the interaction among those foundational elements would not necessarily reflect
straight-line patterns, despite the results having been based on entries that were themselves
extrapolated. (Gilchrist Tr. 617:21-620:15, 623:25-627:1.)
[*143] Many topics were covered by the Board during the July 2016 Strategy Day, including
competitive analysis, research and development, regulatory developments and risks, new
business opportunities, and, briefly, a discussion of the impacts of RAI's Strategic Plan on RAI's
financial projections. [**79] (PX0009.0010-.0013, .0021-.0025; JX0003.0003-.0005;
JX0004.0020-.00231.)
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[*144] At the end of the July 2016 Strategy Day meeting, Peters presented to the Board a short
financial overview presentation, which showed summary and top-line projected financials for the
years 2016, 2017, 2018, 2021 and 2025. These projections, presented in condensed fashion,
reflected 7% to 8% compound annual growth over the next ten years, (JX0004.0027; Gilchrist
Tr. 526:22-25), and were based on certain identified assumptions that there would be no
significant changes from the status quo, (JX0004.0020-.0035; Nowell Dep. Tr. 46:23-47:12;
Wajnert Tr. 56:10-57:1, 117:19-118:4). As was the case with projections generally, the financial
information presented to the Board did not incorporate any of the large-scale risks facing RAI, in
part because many of the risks were effectively an "on/off switch" which could not have been
factored into the numbers accurately. (Wajnert Tr. 58:11-21; JX0004.0021.) The Board did not
receive the underlying ten-year projections from the June LE, nor did the Board give feedback on
the projections for management to consider. (Wajnert Tr. 56:10-57:1, 58:7-21.)

v. The October 2016 Projections [**80]
[*145] On October 29, 2016, RAI sent each Financial Advisor a set of financial projections (the
"October 2016 Projections"). (JX0008.0001; PX0039.0001; DX0043.0001.) The October 2016
Projections were based on the October 2016 LE, the most recently completed LE available at the
time of the October 20 Offer. The projections used by the Financial Advisors for years one
through five were based on a three-tab spreadsheet containing an income statement, a balance
sheet, and a cash flow statement. (JX0008.0001, .0003-.0005; PX00039.0003-.0005; DX0043, at
sheets "Income Statement," "Balance Sheet," and "Cash Flow.") The October 2016 LE also
served as the baseline for the 2017 Operating Plan that RAI's financial management was
preparing prior to BAT's October 20 Offer. (Gilchrist Tr. 441:8-442:13.)
[*146] Prior to sending the October 2016 LE to the Financial Advisors, RAI's financial team
made a series of adjustments to account for updated information and high-level financial
decisions that had not yet been made public. These adjustments were called "Top-Side
Adjustments" or "Management Overlays." The adjustments added roughly $300 million in
income before tax to each year of the October 2016 LE [**81] projections, or approximately
$1.4 billion in total. (DX0041, at tab "Top Side Adjs"; Gilchrist Tr. 443:9-12, 443:15-444:18;
Price Tr. 1053:18-1054:14, 105:23-1055:4; Zmijewski Tr. 1246:5-12.) Some Top-Side
Adjustments were based on public information that had not yet been incorporated into the
October 2016 LE, including changes to state tax laws and effects from positive stock market
performance. (Price Tr. 957:22-958:6.) Other Top-Side Adjustments related to information that
was not widely known, such as a planned restructuring of RAI's sales force that was projected to
increase RAI's income. (Price Tr. 957:10-21.) Although these Management Overlays were
typically not included in the ordinary course forecasts, RAI added them to provide the Financial
Advisors with the most accurate and reliable information it had concerning RAI's business.
(Price Tr. 983:3-985:14.)
[*147] Over the next few weeks, Gilchrist, Price, and others on RAI's finance team continued
sending documents and information to the Financial Advisors, including information about RAI's
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projections, and participated in diligence calls with the Financial Advisors to discuss the
materials that were sent and any additional [**82] questions or requested information. (Gilchrist
Tr. 440:10-22, 445:17-20; Price Tr. 945:3-12; PX0047.0001-.0004; DX0046.0001-.0004.)

vi. The Ten-Year Projections
[*148] Dissenters have alleged that Gilchrist and Price intentionally withheld certain
information from the Financial Advisors, including RAI's ten-year financial projections
developed in connection with the June 2016 Strategic Plan, in an attempt to mislead the Financial
Advisors about the prospects of the Company and deceive the Board and Transaction Committee
into accepting an offer from BAT below RAI's intrinsic value. (DX0067.0001; Clark Tr. 1518:121; Gilchrist Tr. 446:7-447:20, 628:13-629:5; Price Tr. 959:23-960:7, 1001:21-1003:2.)
Dissenters' allegation is contrary to the evidence.
[*149] First, less than two weeks after the October 20 Offer, RAI management provided each of
the Financial Advisors with the financial information given to the Board at the July 2016
Strategy Day, including projections of operating income and growth rates for years six through
ten of the June 2016 Strategic Plan. (DX0069.0021; DX0169.0040; DX0234.0021.) The
Financial Advisors were thus aware of the forecasted compound annual growth rates of
7% [**83] to 8% for the out years of those projections. A management team intent on hiding the
ten-year projections would not have provided the Strategy Day presentation with the ten-year
operating income and growth rates. At that point, the supposed conspiracy would have been
exposed because all three Financial Advisors knew the projected trajectory and could have
insisted on further detail if they believed it was necessary. That simply did not happen here.
[*150] In addition, the June 2016 LE projections were several months old by October 2016, and
Clark testified that JPMorgan "can't use [a] stale set of projections. We have to use the most upto-date set of projections." (Clark Tr. 1519:7-11.) It is undisputed that the five-year October 2016
Projections were the most up-to-date projections available.
[*151] Further, years six through ten of the June 2016 LE projections were less informative
than the projections in the October 2016 Projections because the later years, based in large part
on extrapolations of existing trends, were developed with a "broad brush approach[,]" and used a
"much higher" materiality threshold. (DX0023.0002; Gilchrist Tr. 375:2-24, 404:9-406:6 ("[I]t
was the best view of [**84] what the business would do based on the assumptions that we laid
out."), 501:9-16; Price Tr. 1017:7-23.)
[*152] Next, the evidence does not indicate that the Financial Advisors needed detailed ten-year
projections to adequately perform their valuation analyses. Indeed, representatives from
Goldman, Lazard, and JPMorgan each testified that such information was unnecessary. (Eckler
Dep. Tr. 61:3-12; de Gennaro Tr. 352:8-13; Clark Tr. 1432:23-1433:3.)
[*153] Contrary to Dissenters' suggestion at trial, de Gennaro testified that there is no "hard and
fast rule" for the number of years of projections required for any of the banks to do their work,
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although typically "five, five to ten years" are used. (de Gennaro Tr. 205:24-206:11.) Although
de Gennaro had an expectation that RAI would provide ten-year projections just as they had in
connection with the Lorillard Transaction in 2015, (de Gennaro Tr. 273:18-23), he explained that
[t]here's no magic to ten years, seven years, five years as long as it forms a reasonable and best
view and management tells us, this is what we believe to be the case, we go through it, we get
validation, that's what we use. And it's perfectly adequate for our purposes. [**85] So I
genuinely have no recollection of being concerned that we might get ten years, five years, other
than we were going to use what we got, and we wanted to be in a position to use what we got.
There's no issue with a five-year set of numbers. There just wasn't this pressing question, other
than from a procedural standpoint. We needed to know what numbers we were going to get in
order to be able to do analysis if and when the time came.
(de Gennaro Tr. 293:18-294:6, 352:8-13 ("[W]e were very comfortable working with . . . a fiveyear forecast.").)
[*154] Similarly, after reviewing and analyzing the information from RAI management, Eckler
determined that "the financial forecast was sufficient to make all of the necessary judgments for
the purposes of [Goldman's] valuation analysis." (Eckler Dep. Tr. 61:3-12.) JPMorgan reached a
similar conclusion. (Clark Tr. 1597:12-16.) Despite the preference of certain team members to
work with ten-year projections and initially asking whether RAI management could provide such
projections, JPMorgan ultimately determined that a detailed ten-year forecast was "not
necessary" to perform its valuation work. (Clark Tr. 1432:23-1433:3.)
[*155] Testimony from [**86] the Financial Advisors further indicates that it was typical when
performing valuation work to receive and use five-year projections from management. (Clark Tr.
1432:3-8; Eckler Dep. Tr. 32:03-33:20, 34:01-14, 35:08-09, 35:11-19, 67:07-67:15; de Gennaro
Tr. 205:24-206:11, 220:13-221:5, 222:19-223:5.) Indeed, Dissenters' own expert, Zmijewski,
testified that he used ten-year projections only to calculate RAI's pension liabilities; he otherwise
elected to perform his DCF analysis for purposes of this case using five years of RAI
management projections. (Zmijewski Tr. 1247:1-1248:6.) And RAI itself, in preparing its share
repurchase ceiling (as discussed below), used five-year projections when it obviously knew that
ten-year projections existed. (DX00138; DX0622, at tab "Sheet1.")
[*156] Dissenters' suggestion that the Financial Advisors agreed, at RAI's request, to use fiveyear, rather than ten-year, projections to protect their compensation at the expense of providing
an accurate and reliable valuation, is not supported by the evidence.
[*157] Price's statements at his deposition that he prepared "ten-year projections" for delivery
to the Financial Advisors in late October 2016 does not [**87] change the Court's findings. At
the time of trial, Price was no longer employed by RAI and had no incentive to be untruthful. He
offered a credible explanation at trial that he meant to refer at his deposition to the five-year
projections derived from the October 2016 Projections plus the Top-Side Adjustments and that
he had not in fact prepared ten-year projections in October 2016. (DX0039.0001; Price Tr.
946:18-952:5, 952:20-953:22, 954:4-7.) Price's trial testimony is corroborated by the fact that
there is no evidence that RAI prepared ten-year projections for any purpose other than the
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Board's Strategy Day in June of each year, (Gilchrist 375:13-376:3), and Dissenters have not
identified any evidence, documentary or otherwise, indicating the existence of up-to-date, tenyear projections as of October 2016. The Court finds that Price simply made an honest mistake at
his deposition.
[*158] Similarly, Dissenters' focus on alleged discrepancies between the testimony of the
Financial Advisors, Gilchrist, and Price does not diminish the credibility of the latter two. While
the evidence shows that JPMorgan asked RAI for ten-year projections, (Clark Tr. 1433:4-17),
and that Lazard had received [**88] ten-year projections from RAI in the Lorillard Transaction,
(de Gennaro Tr. 260:20-24, 262:23-263:11, 312:24-313:7, 364:8-365:4; DX0148.0009-.0013),
that evidence does not contradict Gilchrist's and Price's testimony that they did not recall Clark's
requests, (Gilchrist Tr. 589:23-590:11; Price Tr. 1016:23-1017:6). Clark testified that Gilchrist
and Price told him that RAI did not have "an up-to-date set of ten-year financial forecasts[,]"
(Clark Tr. 1433:4-17), and that the ones that it did have were "stale[,]" (Clark Tr. 1518:12-21),
which is consistent with all the credible evidence introduced at trial.
[*159] Considering all of the evidence, including the credibility of the relevant witnesses, the
Court cannot conclude that RAI's decision to provide the Financial Advisors with the five-year
October 2016 Projections rather than the ten-year projections from the June 2016 LE was
calculated to deprive the Financial Advisors of important information to drive down their
valuations of RAI to a range affordable to BAT. All credible evidence is to the contrary.
Ultimately, the record is clear that the Financial Advisors received all the information they
believed they needed for their valuation [**89] work, (de Gennaro Tr. 352:8-13; Eckler Dep. Tr.
61:3-12), and no credible evidence was offered at trial supporting any effort by RAI management
to hide information to depress the resulting valuation of the Company.32

e. Share Repurchase Plan
[*160] In the summer of 2016, the RAI Board approved a share repurchase program in response
to unique circumstances related to RAI's MSA payment obligations in 2017 that gave rise to a
$250 million increase in RAI's costs. RAI referred to this increase as the "NPM cliff":
[I]n 2013 a settlement was reached with 22 states and jurisdictions on disputed 2003-2012 NPM
[non-participating manufacturer] credits, plus two more states in 2014, for credits to be paid over
five years. Additionally, a settlement was reached with the State of New York related to payment
years 2004-2014 for credits to be paid over a four-year period. The NPM credits account for a
total financial benefit of approximately $1.2 billion through 2019. Some transition credits
expire[d] after 2014, with most of the remaining credits expiring after 2016, creating a one-time
$250 million drop in 2017 and $100 million in 2019 - the "NPM cliff." The removal of these
credits will increase [**90] Cost of Goods Sold for RJRT in 2017, causing year over year profit
to be flat.
(PX0063.0046.)

51

[*161] RAI management expected to mitigate the 2017 NPM cliff "through actions that will not
impact the commercial business[;] these mitigation activities will appear below operating
income." (PX0063.0046, .0100.) Management recommended to the Board a share repurchase
plan in the summer of 2016 using RAI's excess cash to help boost EPS, describing the share
repurchase program as a "cliff mitigation element to help overcome the impact of the loss of
those credits." (Gilchrist Tr. 412:16-413:14.)
[*162] A share repurchase plan involves a company's "go[ing] on the open market and
repurchas[ing] its shares to reduce its overall share count." (Gilchrist Tr. 412:7-12.) By reducing
a company's share count, the share repurchases reduce the denominator in the EPS calculation
and therefore increase EPS. (Gilchrist Tr. 413:15-21.)
[*163] To proceed with the share repurchase plan, RAI management requested and obtained
Board approval for the time frame of purchases (two-and-a-half years), the amount of capital to
be used ($2 billion), and the authorization ceiling at which management would be permitted to
repurchase [**91] shares without further Board approval ($65 per share). (Gilchrist Tr. 413:22414:14.)
[*164] The share repurchase authorization ceiling was an internal corporate grant of authority
from the Board to management, allowing management to purchase shares on the open market up
to the ceiling price if management believed it was in the best interest of the Company to do so.
(Gilchrist Tr. 415:2-5, 416:10-417:13, 417:20-418:1, 418:11-15.) Consistent with standard
practices of publicly traded companies, RAI's share repurchase authorization ceiling was an
internal matter and was not disclosed to the market. (Wajnert Tr. 166:5-21; Crew Tr. 714:15-25.)
[*165] RAI arrived at the $65 share repurchase authorization ceiling after performing a rough
discounted cash flow calculation using "conservative assumptions" over the two-and-a-half year
length of the proposed program. (DX0284.0003-.0004; Holland 30(b)(6)33 Dep. Tr. 37:1640:18 ("We would purposefully kind of weight it on the higher end."), 43:5-44:8; Gilchrist Tr.
418:2-10, 548:15-549:2.) The share repurchase DCF was not intended to value the Company, but
rather to derive a reasonable request for RAI management to make to the Board as a ceiling
price [**92] for management's authority to repurchase shares. It was not management's intention
to set the share repurchase authorization ceiling at the "intrinsic value" of RAI's shares; rather,
RAI management sought to
get authorization from the board to purchase shares up to a certain point if the market took the
stock to that point. So we were intending to obviously reduce our share count over a period of
time to help overcome that NPM cliff. That's really what we were trying to accomplish.
(Gilchrist Tr. 414:19-415:1.)
[*166] Once the ceiling price was set, RAI management retained discretion to make a judgment
in each quarter as to whether buying shares at the then-prevailing market price was an
appropriate use of the Company's resources. It was not required to proceed with the purchases,
even if the shares were trading below $65. (Gilchrist Tr. 412:7-15, 417:14-21; Wajnert Tr.
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149:16-23 (noting that in a share repurchase a company will not pay shareholders "more than
what the company believes the stock is worth").)
[*167] Indeed, the status of the share repurchase program and management's intended
purchases were subject to regular review by the Board's Audit and Finance Committee. (Gilchrist
Tr. [**93] 413:22-414:14, 419:12-420:2; DX0284.0003-.0006; DX0622.0003.) Gilchrist
testified that even though he had requested authority from the Board to buy shares at a price up
to $65 per share, he intended to discuss the matter with the Board again if the stock traded higher
and he determined the price was not attractive. (Gilchrist Tr. 417:22-418:15.) RAI ended up
purchasing only a "very small amount" of shares pursuant to the plan because RAI suspended the
plan once BAT made its first offer. (Gilchrist Tr. 416:23-417:13.)
[*168] The inputs used in the share repurchase DCF included a very wide range of terminal
growth rates from 1% to 4% and a very wide range of weighted average costs of capital from 7%
to 9.5%. (DX0622, at tab "Sheet1"; DX0138, at tab "Sheet1"; Holland 30(b)(6) Dep. Tr. 58:1659:7.) The DCF analysis RAI created for the share repurchase program ultimately used a 7.5%
weighted average cost of capital ("WACC") and a 3.0% perpetuity growth rate ("PGR") for RAI.
(Gilchrist Tr. 543:20-24; DX0284.0003.) The analysis was "based on the 2016 Strat[egy] Plan as
of June 2016 for a five-year period" and did not include the projected compound annual growth
of 7% to 8% in years six through [**94] ten referenced in the 2016 Strategic Plan. (Gilchrist Tr.
545:7-12, 547:3-13; DX00138.)
[*169] These inputs are not a reliable basis for valuing RAI. The range of weighted average
costs of capital is much higher than is supported by any of the other evidence in the case,
including from both sides' experts and all three Financial Advisors. Indeed, in the context of a
valuation, there are significant methodological flaws with RAI's selection of the weighted
average cost of capital. (Gompers Tr. 759:7-762:10, 762:15-19.) These problems undermine the
utility of both the weighted average cost of capital and the perpetual growth rate in the share
repurchase DCF because the two are linked, and RAI management considered them together in
making its selection as to the authorization ceiling to request from the Board. (DX0622, at tab
"Sheet1"; DX0138, at tab "Sheet1"; Gilchrist Tr. 421:12-20; Gompers Tr. 760:3-13; Flyer Tr.
1226:23-1228:18 ("So the higher the WACC, the actually higher my implied PGR would be,
because I'm weighing the beginning period more. The lower the WACC, the lower the PGR
would be, because I'm weighing the later periods more.").)

f. Further Deliberations and Negotiations
[*170] [**95] On November 6, 2016, RAI sent each Financial Advisor a planned presentation
for Board and Transaction Committee meetings on November 8 that outlined the assumptions
and sensitivities to the October 2016 LE Projections as well as some of the high-level figures.
(PX0052.0001, .0004, .0006; JX0010.0001, .0004, .0006; Gilchrist Tr. 380:21-381:8.)
[*171] On November 8, 2016, the RAI Board met and reviewed the October 2016 Projections.
During the meeting, Gilchrist gave a presentation to the Board in which he explained that the
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financial forecasts incorporated significant assumptions about the industry dynamics, including
"[c]ontinuation of recent pricing environment — no significant disruption[,]" "cigarette industry
volume down ~3 - 4 percent[,]" "moist and vapor industry volume up ~2 percent[,]" "3 percent
inflation[,]" "[state excise taxes] $.05 per pack annually, moist snuff $.01 per can annually[,]"
"Share repurchase beyond 2018 at $1 billion per year[,]" and "Capital expenditures continue at
$150 - 200 million per year[.]" (PX0052.0004; JX0010.0004.)
[*172] Gilchrist also identified upside and downside sensitivities to the financial projections,
including "Accelerated growth from new revenue [**96] streams — Vapor/Transformation" as
an upside and the greater risk of adverse FDA regulations as a downside. (JX0010.0006.) After
his presentation, Gilchrist and Crew spoke with the Board about "potential upside and downside
to the business based on their current thinking[,]" (PX0054.0002-.0003), and specifically advised
the Board that "the upside sensitivities and the downside sensitivities are not all created equal[.]"
(Gilchrist Tr. 389:1-3; JX0010.0003, .0006; PX0115.0127, .0377; JX0023.0070-.0071.)
[*173] On November 11, 2016, RAI rejected BAT's October 20 Offer. (JX0023.0071-.0072).
On December 5, 2016, BAT made a revised offer to acquire RAI, which RAI also rejected. On
neither occasion did RAI make a counterproposal. As shown on the following chart, BAT
ultimately raised its offers four times before a final deal was reached on January 17, 2017:
Date

BAT

Cash

Shares

Value Per
Share on Date

Oct. 20, 2016

0.5502

$24.13

$56.50

Dec. 5, 2016

0.4923

$29.44

$56.60

Dec. 20, 2016

0.5105

$29.44

$58.30

Jan. 10, 2017

0.5250

$29.44

$59.15

Jan. 10, 2017

0.5260

$29.44

$59.20

Jan. 17, 2017

0.5260

$29.44

$59.64

(Corr. [**97] Stip'd Facts ¶ 17; JX0023.0068-.0078.)
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[*174] The Transaction Committee never demanded that BAT support an alternative
transaction to allow for an auction process, (Wajnert Tr. 70:7-11, 90:7-9), although there was no
evidence at trial that BAT would have agreed to withdraw its announced opposition had it been
pressed. Nor did the Transaction Committee authorize the Financial Advisors to solicit any
expressions of interest from other parties concerning the sale of the Company or an alternative
transaction, (JX0023.0650, .0652, .0655; DX0272), but, similarly, there was no admissible
evidence at trial from any source that any third party was interested in purchasing RAI with or
without BAT's support.
[*175] Indeed, given the nature of the tobacco industry, regulatory requirements, RAI's large
size, and antitrust concerns, there were few (if any) companies in the world—in the tobacco
industry or adjacent industries—that could have made an offer for RAI, regardless of BAT's
stock ownership. (JX0023.0070; PX0115.0469; Eckler Dep. Tr. 51:08-52:08.) Significantly,
although BAT's offer was widely publicized, no third party ever contacted the Transaction
Committee, RAI management, or any of RAI's [**98] Financial Advisors about the possibility
of engaging in diligence or making a competing bid. (Wajnert Tr. 90:3-6; Clark Tr. 1429:16-18.)
[*176] Goldman reviewed alternatives to negotiating a merger with BAT with the Transaction
Committee. (Eckler Dep. Tr. 50:13-50:25.) The Transaction Committee considered whether
Japan Tobacco could be a serious potential alternative buyer but concluded that it was not. This
conclusion was based on RAI's previous dealings with Japan Tobacco in which Japan Tobacco
was quick to respond to RAI's offers but maintained a difficult internal process to move forward.
Past conversations with Japan Tobacco also led the Transaction Committee to reasonably believe
that Japan Tobacco would not be interested in dealing with the U.S. regulatory regime. The
Transaction Committee also reasonably believed that, given their positive relationship with Japan
Tobacco and Japan Tobacco's 2016 purchase of the international rights to RAI's Natural
American Spirit brand, if there had been any real interest in purchasing RAI, Japan Tobacco
would have reached out to RAI directly. (Wajnert Tr. 91:1-3, 99:17-100:1, 171:19-172:12
("[W]e were not optimistic at all about Japan Tobacco [**99] being a potential bidder. And we
knew them well enough individually, had visited together and the like, that if there had been an
interest, a real interest, they would have called.").)
[*177] While BAT indicated that it was not interested in selling its shares to an alternative
buyer, that did not mean RAI had to sell the Company to BAT, nor did it mean that the members
of the RAI Transaction Committee and Board were willing to—or had any reason to—sell the
Company for less than its fair value. (JX0021.0003; Wajnert Tr. 73:24-74:24.) Multiple
witnesses testified that RAI seriously considered strategic alternatives, including remaining
independent from BAT. (Nowell Dep. Tr. 150:13-24; Cameron Dep. Tr. 106:16-107:11; Crew
Tr. 665:16-666:15.) Indeed, the Transaction Committee twice rejected BAT's merger offers
without making a counterproposal—showing the Transaction Committee thoroughly explored
the viability of RAI's remaining independent as an alternative to executing a transaction with
BAT. (JX0023.0067-.0073.)
[*178] It was not until after the Transaction Committee successfully negotiated four price
increases, securing an additional $4.5 billion in value for shareholders by the time
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of [**100] signing, that the Transaction Committee concluded that a merger with BAT was
more attractive than other alternatives. (JX0023.0065-.0078.) In fact, JPMorgan advised RAI on
various alternatives to BAT's offers, including
continuing to operate as a stand-alone entity, looking at other M&A transactions where Reynolds
would not — not be the seller but be a potential acquirer of assets . . . [,] alternatives related to
the company's capital structure, whether or not a leveraged recapitalization could make sense,
alternatives as it relates to its use of free cash flow in the context of repurchases or dividends. A
variety of alternatives.
(Clark Tr. 1429:2-12.)
[*179] The Transaction Committee and its advisors ran a thorough deal process from October
28, 2016 to the signing of the Merger Agreement on January 16, 2017. All negotiations with
BAT were conducted by the Transaction Committee or its representatives. Wajnert, as
Transaction Committee Chair (and after his retirement on December 31, 2016, his replacement,
Nowell), negotiated directly with BAT CEO, Nicandro Durante. (Wajnert Tr. 79:13-81:9;
Nowell Dep. Tr. 169:11-170:6, 170:13-171:4, 171:12-173:9, 174:21-176:25; JX0023.0072.0076.)
[*180] [**101] Likewise, Goldman negotiated directly with BAT's bankers at Centerview and
Deutsche Bank. The Transaction Committee repeatedly rejected BAT's offers and did not make a
counterproposal until after BAT made its third offer, on December 20, 2016, which BAT had
said was its final proposal. (Wajnert Tr. 79:13-81:5; JX0023.0073-.0074.) The Transaction
Committee regularly met and spoke with Goldman about the offers and investor reactions.
(JX0023.0070-.0078.) Goldman and JPMorgan made many presentations of their valuation
analyses to the Transaction Committee and to the Board during the negotiation process.
(JX0023.0070-.0078.)
[*181] As a result of the Transaction Committee's efforts, BAT increased its offer to purchase
RAI's common stock four times from a per-share value of $56.50 in the October 20 Offer to a
per-share value of $59.64 when the transaction was announced on January 17, 2017, amounting
to an additional $4.5 billion in deal value for RAI's shareholders and a 26.4% premium over the
Unaffected Stock Price. (Wajnert Tr. 80:19-22; Nowell Dep. Tr. 173:25-176:25; JX0023.0068.0076, .0088.)

g. Financial Advisors' Fairness Opinions and Shareholder Vote
[*182] Corporate boards contemplating [**102] a sale of a company often seek fairness
opinions from their financial advisors before agreeing to recommend the transaction to
stockholders. In order to arrive at a fairness opinion, a financial advisor performs a financial
analysis of the company typically using a variety of techniques. (de Gennaro Tr. 192:24-194:3.)
[*183] To prepare their fairness opinions in connection with the Merger, Goldman, Lazard, and
JPMorgan each separately evaluated the final BAT offer from January 10, 2017 and determined
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that it was fair from a financial point of view to the RAI shareholders other than BAT. Each of
the Financial Advisors presented a draft fairness opinion to its fairness committee prior to giving
the bank's final fairness opinion to the Board or the Transaction Committee or both on January
16, 2017.
[*184] Each Financial Advisor conducted several types of valuations of RAI, including
analyses of comparable companies' market multiples, precedent transaction multiples, and DCFs,
based on their knowledge of RAI, the tobacco industry, and the market. These valuation analyses
were meant to be examined together. (JX0023.0077-.0078; PX0115.0252-.0282, .0526-.0570,
.0572-.0635; de Gennaro Tr. 227:19-229:14, [**103] 232:19-235:20; Clark Tr. 1448:24-1449:8,
1435:14-1436:5, 1448:24-1449:8; Eckler Dep. Tr. 49:4-15, 201:7-22.)
[*185] RAI management represented to the Financial Advisors that the five-year projections
provided earlier were management's best estimates of its future cash flows, and the Financial
Advisors relied on that representation, stating in their fairness opinions (also published in SEC
filings in connection with the Merger): "[T]he unaudited financial forecasts were prepared on a
reasonable basis and reflected the best then-currently available estimates and judgments of RAI's
management." (JX0023.0133, .0649; Martin Dep. Tr. 113:05-113:10 ("Q. . . . [D]o you recall
anyone at Reynolds commenting that the projections that were going to go into the proxy
statement were unrealistic? A. No."); Price Tr. 710:15-19 ("Q. [Y]ou would never give the
financial advisors projections that were — that you thought were unreliable . . . . A. Well, no.
We're going to be very transparent with everything we can. We disclose all of this.").)
[*186] In preparing their valuations, the Financial Advisors had access to whatever information
they requested from RAI for their analyses. (Gilchrist Tr. 445:17-20, [**104] 446:7-447:20,
481:1-13, 481:19-482:12 ("I am certain they had everything that they requested and that they
needed."), 587:8-12; Price Tr. 1017:5-6; de Gennaro Tr. 222:12-18.) As illustrated by the
"football field" slides reproduced below from each of the Financial Advisors' January 16, 2017
presentations to the RAI Transaction Committee and/or Board, the $59.64 per-share deal price
was well within the calculated ranges of equity value per share:

(PX0115.0539);

(PX0115.0258);

(PX0115.0582).
[*187] The deal price that RAI negotiated with BAT, as described by Lazard's de Gennaro, was
a "very full price" and a "landmark price." (de Gennaro Tr. 236:6-16.) JPMorgan's Clark
described it as a "homerun transaction for [RAI,]" (Clark Tr. 1443:24-1444:5); he further
57

testified that he had no concerns about issuing a fairness opinion for the Merger, stating that "it
was a fantastic transaction[,]" and that he wished he "had the ability to get transactions like this
for all of [JPMorgan's] clients[,]" (Clark Tr. 1451:7-12). A number of analysts even expressed
concern that BAT was overpaying. After the announcement of the Merger, research analysts did
not comment that BAT was receiving a bargain or that [**105] RAI was undervalued in the
deal. (Gompers Tr. 802:25-803:8; Yilmaz Tr. 2003:4-22.)
[*188] From BAT's October 20 Offer until the Transaction Date in July 2017, the S&P 500, a
broad measure of large U.S. companies, rose 17.15%. Altria, the only other major U.S. tobacco
company, rose 20.44% over that same period. (Gompers Tr., 792:2-11.)
[*189] At the shareholder vote on the Merger, RAI's shareholders overwhelmingly approved
the deal, by both a majority (83%) of the outstanding shares and by a majority (71%) of the nonBAT-owned outstanding shares. Nearly 72% of the non-BAT-owned shares were voted in the
Merger, and 99% of those shares were voted in favor of the Merger. (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 18;
DX0277.0011; DX0324.0002; JX0023.0044; Crew Tr. 671:23-672:10.)
[*190] Roughly 80% of RAI's public shareholders were sophisticated, institutional investors.
(PX0115.0618.) Among those voting in favor of the Merger were RAI's directors and officers,
who had the best information about the value of the Company. RAI witnesses testified that they
voted in favor of the deal, including Price, who lost his job as a result of the Merger. (Wajnert
Tr. 85:13-24; Price Tr. 1061:1-1062:2.) None testified that they [**106] voted against it.
[*191] On July 25, 2017, the Merger became effective, and an indirect, wholly-owned
subsidiary of BAT was merged with and into RAI, with RAI continuing as an indirect and
wholly-owned subsidiary of BAT. (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 19; PX0109.0002, .0085-.0086;
DX0325.0003.) The merger consideration on that date had a cash value of $65.87. The increase
in the value of the merger consideration from January 16, 2017 to the Effective Date of the
Merger was due to the increase in the BAT share price and favorable changes to the British
pound/U.S. dollar exchange rate. (DX0325.0003-.0004; Zmijewski Tr. 1241:24-1242:10.)
[*192] In September 2017, RAI sent payment to Dissenters for RAI's $59.64 per-share estimate
of the fair value of the shares held by Dissenters, plus interest calculated pursuant to N.C.G.S. §
55-13-01(6). (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶¶ 20-25; Appendix A.)

F. Evidence of Value
[*193] At trial, RAI introduced evidence of value using various valuation concepts and
techniques that, when cross-checked against one another, show that the price paid by BAT
reflected the fair value of RAI. Additionally, RAI presented testimony from its executives, Board
members, and Financial Advisors regarding the contemporaneous [**107] analyses and
assessments they performed based on their knowledge of the Company and the industry—most
of which supported the conclusion that RAI shareholders received fair value in the transaction.
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[*194] The conclusion that the deal price reflected fair value was further corroborated by the
testimony of RAI's valuation expert, Gompers, who testified about his own valuation analyses
and those of the Financial Advisors. Based on that evidence, and for the reasons set forth below,
the fair value of RAI at the Merger closing on July 25, 2017 was no more than the deal price of
$59.64.
[*195] Dissenters sought to explain why all of the valuation evidence presented by RAI should
be ignored, and that the value of RAI should be determined based solely on the DCF model
developed by their experts, Zmijewski and Flyer. Relying entirely on this made-for-litigation
analysis, Dissenters request that the Court find that RAI's fair value as of July 25, 2017 was
$92.17—an amount that far exceeds any other evidence of value in the record and suggests that
RAI's management, RAI's Board, RAI's Financial Advisors, RAI's shareholders, stock market
analysts, and the market itself mispriced RAI by as much as $50 [**108] billion.35

a. Market-Based Valuations
[*196] Extensive evidence was offered showing that RAI's fair value was in line with the value
that the market ascribed to RAI. In the circumstances presented here, the market's view of the
value of RAI is persuasive evidence of underlying fair value. As Gompers testified, "[I]f the
market is efficient and there's no material, non-public information, then the market price will be
the best estimate of a firm's . . . intrinsic or fundamental value." (Gompers Tr. 784:1-6.)

i. RAI's Stock Price
[*197] On October 20, 2016, RAI's common stock closed at $47.17 per share (the "Unaffected
Stock Price"). (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 13.) The evidence shows that this price did not represent a
substantial deviation from the price at which RAI's stock was previously trading. RAI's 52-week
trading average prior to BAT's initial offer was approximately $49.00. (PX0115.0258.) RAI's
common stock hit its all-time high of $54.48 per share on July 5, 2016. (PX0115.0390.) In fact,
RAI's share price had realized significant gains in the years leading up to BAT's initial offer.
(PX0063.0039.)
[*198] RAI's stock was trading "at a peak multiple in the marketplace" prior to BAT's October
20 [**109] offer. (Gilchrist Tr. 560:22-561:11.) Although RAI's share price had dropped at that
time from its all-time high three months before, from the time the Lorillard Transaction closed in
June 2015 until October 20, 2016, the volume weighted average price of RAI stock was
$46.26—slightly below the Unaffected Stock Price. And trading data shows that the deal price
was substantially above prior price levels:

(PX0115.0071.)
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[*199] Yilmaz testified that there are certain circumstances where the presence of large
blockholders that have access to nonpublic information can lead to an increase, rather than a
decrease, in a company's value. (Yilmaz Tr. 1967:18-1968:13 ("Q. . . . [I]f the large blockholder
does a good job . . . monitoring management's performance, that could lead to an increase in
value . . . ? A. Yes. Q. And if the large blockholder has expertise in the industry . . . it can
provide to management, that too can increase the company's value . . . ? A. It is possible. Yes.").)
While Zmijewski suggested that BAT's ownership stake in RAI could have depressed RAI's
market price to some degree, (Zmijewski Tr. 1384:25-1387:1), he presented no evidence to
support his suggestion or the magnitude [**110] of any hypothetical depressive effect of BAT's
stake. Contrary to his suggestion, numerous analysts indicated that, prior to BAT's October 20
Offer, RAI's unaffected stock price incorporated some value attributable to a possible acquisition
by BAT. (Cameron Dep. Tr. 80:14-81:2; Nowell Dep. Tr. 107:11-19; PX0115.0091.)
[*200] A detailed analysis of market efficiency requires an answer to three questions: (i) "[d]id
the . . . stock trade in [an] efficient market?"; (ii) were "there market frictions that would cause a
disconnect between the company's publicly traded stock price and its fair value?"; and (iii) "was
there value-relevant, non-public information?" (Zmijewski Tr. 1317:19-1318:8.)
[*201] RAI possessed many attributes that courts have found to suggest that a stock trades in an
efficient market. Experts for both sides testified that they had identified no "trading frictions" or
other evidence suggesting that RAI's stock was not trading efficiently. (Yilmaz Tr. 1966:181967:6; Gompers Tr. 785:9-11, 785:24-786:8.)
[*202] Experts for both sides also agreed that the market for most publicly traded stocks on
most days is close to semi-strong form efficient, particularly stock for large
companies [**111] like RAI.36 (Yilmaz Tr. 1967:7-13; Gompers Tr. 785:3-8.) Although both
sides' experts agreed that the fact a company is widely traded on a national exchange does not
mean it automatically trades in a semi-strong efficient market at any given point, (Gompers Tr.
833:23-834:6; Zmijewski Tr. 1320:17-1321:2), given the evidence introduced by RAI, which
was not disputed by Dissenters, there is a sufficient factual record37 for the Court to determine
that the market for RAI's stock was semi-strong form efficient:
a. Until the Merger, RAI was publicly traded in high volumes and with high liquidity on the
NYSE, the largest stock exchange by market capitalization and monthly trading volume in the
world. (JX0017.0003.)
b. RAI was a very large company with a market capitalization of approximately $67.3 billion on
October 20, 2016. (Gompers Tr. 777:25-778:10; PX0115.0181.)
c. Information about RAI was both widely available and readily disseminated to the market. (de
Gennaro Tr. 215:15-23 ("No indication that the market wasn't absorbing news on a regular
basis.").) For most public companies, "most of the relevant information is disclosed." (Wajnert
Tr. 124:4-7.)
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d. RAI's historical stock price increased [**112] and decreased in relation to the release of new
Company-specific information and market-wide trends. (Wajnert Tr. 59:10-60:4; de Gennaro Tr.
215:15-23.)
e. RAI's stock was followed by 16 equity analysts, who frequently published research about the
Company. (PX0063.0010, .0025; de Gennaro Tr. 187:18-188:8 (RAI was "a well-covered
company . . . . A lot of analysts issued regular reports.").) These analysts were well-informed
about RAI's business and the U.S. tobacco industry. (PX0063.0010, .0025; de Gennaro Tr.
187:18-188:8, 199:2-19.)
f. RAI did not have a controlling shareholder at any time prior to the Merger. (JX0023.0080;
Wajnert Tr. 63:18-64:18.)
[*203] Dissenters also sought to prove at trial that RAI's stock price was not a reliable indicator
of fair value because of the existence of certain material nonpublic information that was not
reflected in the stock price: (i) the Top-Side Adjustments to the October 2016 Projections
provided to the Financial Advisors, (ii) the projected growth rates for years six through ten in the
June 2016 LE, and (iii) the $65 share repurchase authorization ceiling. (See Defs.' Resp. PostTrial Br. 22-24.) None of this nonpublic information warrants [**113] disregarding RAI's
Unaffected Stock Price as evidence of value. Indeed, Dissenters' expert, Yilmaz, admitted that he
did not have an opinion "one way or the other on whether the private information at the
company, on balance, was more negative or more positive[.]" (Yilmaz Tr. 1959:1-12 ("Given
that I have not done the work, I [can] not opine on that.").)
[*204] First, the Top-Side Adjustments amounted to an additional $1.4 billion in RAI's income
before taxes, or roughly $300 million added to each year of the five-year projections. (DX240, at
tab "top side adj," row 14; Price Tr. 989:18-990:16.) As of the record date of June 12, 2017, RAI
had approximately 1.426 billion shares of common stock outstanding. (JX0023.0029.) Given
RAI's immense size, public disclosure of this additional projected income would not likely have
affected the stock price in a meaningful way, and it does not undermine the relevance of the
Unaffected Stock Price as evidence of value. There is certainly no basis to find that this
information could justify the massive premiums to RAI's Unaffected Stock Price for which
Dissenters advocate. Further, some of the Top-Side Adjustments were based on public
information that [**114] had not yet been incorporated into the October 2016 LE, such as
changes to state tax laws and effects from positive stock market performance. (Price Tr. 957:22958:6.)
[*205] Next, as discussed previously, the growth rates in years six through ten of the June 2016
LE were based largely on extrapolations of current volume and pricing trends in the industry,
which were publicly available and therefore already likely to be reflected in RAI's stock price.
(Gilchrist Tr. 375:2-24, 404:9-406:6, 529:12-25.)
[*206] Moreover, and also as previously discussed, RAI management credibly testified—and
the documents relating to the ten-year projections confirmed—that the projections for these later
years did not account for any of the various serious risks facing the Company. (DX0023.0002;
Gilchrist Tr. 410:8-412:2.) In particular, they were not intended to be used to value RAI's shares
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but only in connection with certain limited planning objectives. The projected growth rates were
not based on any underlying material, value-relevant information about specific business plans or
other developments. They did not constitute the kind of information that, if disclosed, would
have meaningfully affected the stock [**115] price, and they do not provide any reason to
believe that the fair value of RAI materially deviated from the Unaffected Stock Price.
Dissenters do not contest that RAI was not required to have disclosed these projections. (Yilmaz
Tr. 1959:15-25.)
[*207] Finally, the authorization ceiling for the share repurchase approved by the Board is not
material, value-relevant information because it was not a valuation of RAI. Rather, as discussed
above, it was an internal corporate authorization for a purchasing program, which was
intentionally set at a price that was higher than what RAI management ever expected it would
need to spend. (Gilchrist Tr. 414:19-415:1.) Indeed, Zmijewski pointedly declined to testify that
the authorization ceiling was value-relevant information even when prompted by counsel.
(Zmijewski Tr. 1316:10-1317:3.)

ii. Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price
[*208] RAI's July 24, 2017 stock price is not a relevant proxy for fair value on the Transaction
Date because after BAT's announcement of its October 20 Offer, RAI's stock price would have
reflected the expected deal price, including expected synergies created by the Merger, and the
market's view of the likelihood of the deal closing. [**116] (Gompers Tr. 790:1-11.)
[*209] In addition, in the time between the October 20 Offer and the Transaction Date, events
took place that may have affected RAI's standalone value and been reflected in RAI's stock price
had BAT not made its October 20 Offer. (Gompers Tr. 790:12-791:12.) In particular, Donald
Trump had been elected President of the United States, and the Republican Party held a majority
in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Both President Trump and Republican
congressional candidates had campaigned on a lowered corporate tax rate. While no formal tax
plan had been proposed or implemented prior to the Transaction Date, there was speculation that
the Republican-led Congress would pass a tax bill that would lower the corporate tax rate and
that there would be a more benign regulatory climate for the U.S. tobacco industry.
(PX0115.0185, .0446, .0456; Eckler Dep. Tr. 101:07-102:3.)
[*210] To estimate the effect that these and other market industry developments would likely
have had on RAI's stock price between BAT's October 20 Offer and the closing of the Merger on
July 25, 2017,38 Gompers calculated an "Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price" that indexed RAI's
Unaffected Stock [**117] Price to the performance of its closest competitor, Altria, and to the
performance of the S&P 500 generally from October 20, 2016 through July 24, 2017. Based on
the performance of the S&P 500 Total Return Index, Gompers calculated that RAI's unaffected
stock price of $47.17 would have grown to $53.78 as of July 24, 2017. Based on the performance
of Altria's stock during that period, Gompers calculated that the implied value of RAI's stock as
of July 24, 2017 would be $55.33. (Gompers Tr. 791:13-792:25; PDX0005.0020.)
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[*211] Using either metric, the evidence shows that, while RAI's stock price may have
appreciated to some degree in the time between the October 20 Offer and the Transaction Date,
RAI's stock would still have traded 7% to 10% below the deal price as of July 24, 2017. The
Court finds Gompers's Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price to be persuasive evidence that suggests
that the deal price is consistent with, and Dissenters' proposed valuation is inconsistent with,
RAI's fair value on the Transaction Date.

iii. Comparable Companies
[*212] A comparable companies analysis is a valuation technique that involves comparing a
company's valuation multiples to those of its peers. Often, an [**118] enterprise value to
EBITDA multiple is used. (Gompers Tr. 770:12-20; de Gennaro Tr. 198:1-17.) Companies with
more shared characteristics will be more informative for valuation purposes, but disregarding
companies that share important characteristics, even if not a perfect twin, would not be
constructive. (Gompers Tr. 771:7-24; de Gennaro Tr. 329:21-330:16.)
[*213] Two of RAI's Financial Advisors, Lazard and JPMorgan, performed comparable
companies analyses in their valuation work on behalf of RAI. (PX0115.0258, .0586.) According
to Lazard's de Gennaro, there was a "fairly well-defined set of tobacco companies" that provided
"informative and relevant" information for purposes of determining the value of RAI. (de
Gennaro Tr. 198:1-13, 233:21-234:7.)
[*214] Not all of the tobacco companies identified as comparable to RAI operated in the United
States or even sold cigarettes. But as de Gennaro explained, the goal of performing a comparable
companies analysis is not to identify a perfect twin but to develop information that would be
informative for valuation purposes. (de Gennaro Tr. 331:19-332:20, 335:12-337:9; Gompers Tr.
772:16-773:3 ("[C]ertainly some of these are going to provide more information [**119] about
value than others.").)
[*215] Lazard and JPMorgan each calculated RAI share values based on the price to earnings
ratio (the "P/E Ratio"), which compares a company's stock price to its earnings per share, for
comparable companies. JPMorgan's range was $32.50 to $51.25, and Lazard's range was $43.08
to $50.68. (PX0115.0258, .0582; Clark Tr. 1439:5-1440:2; de Gennaro Tr. 233:21-234:7.) Both
Financial Advisors also calculated RAI share values based on the enterprise value ("EV") to
EBITDA trading multiple. JPMorgan's range was $36.50 to $51.75, and Lazard's range was
$40.86 to $49.67. (PX0115.0258, .0582; Clark Tr. 1439:5-1440:2; de Gennaro Tr. 233:21234:7.)
[*216] One purpose for calculating the multiples of comparable companies is to check the
results of other valuation techniques. (de Gennaro Tr. 227:19-229:14; Gompers Tr. 770:21771:6.) Gompers also conducted a comparable companies analysis for RAI as part of his review
of the reasonableness of the DCF analyses of the Financial Advisors. In picking his set of
comparable companies, he looked in the tobacco industry because those companies
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are going to have similar sets of regulatory risk and use issues and that will help them
provide [**120] information to the value of RAI. Certainly the closer a company is in terms of
the geography, operating in the U.S., its product mix in terms of mostly being cigarettes, that will
provide more information. But to disregard companies that have other characteristics which are
shared with RAI would be inappropriate.
(Gompers Tr. 771:7-24.)
[*217] Gompers used eight companies in his comparable companies analysis: Altria, ITG, ITC
Limited, Japan Tobacco, Philip Morris International, Scandinavian Tobacco Group, Swedish
Match AB, and Vector Group. (PDX0005.0008.) Lazard and JPMorgan both used most of this
same group for their analyses as well. (PX0115.0259, .0586.) Gompers found that Altria was the
most informative company because
it's — you know, it's the biggest rival of RAI in the U.S. In fact, it's the market leader larger than
RAI. Its sales are primarily cigarettes. Virtually all of their sales are cigarettes. And they operate
in the U.S. And so it has — you know, it's subject to the same regulatory environment, the same
consumer issues and the like. And so while it's not a perfect twin, it's probably the most
important as a check of value.
(Gompers Tr. 773:4-20; PDX0005.0009.)
[*218] Gompers [**121] also calculated the multiples for a full set of RAI's peers. (Gompers
Tr. 774:10-775:16; PDX0005.0010.) He applied those multiples to RAI's EBITDA projections
and arrived at the following valuations:
Peers' Mean
Next Twelve

Peers' Medi

$49.70

$46.79

$51.76

$48.52

Months EBITDA
13-24 Months
EBITDA
[*219] Zmijewski reviewed market multiple methodologies, including a comparable companies
analysis, and concluded that such an analysis would not result in a reliable valuation of RAI.
(Zmijewski Tr. 1287:8-24.) He testified that a robust comparable company analysis requires
review of all determinants of a company's EBITDA multiples: "risk, growth, for EBITDA
multiple, working capital requirements, capital expenditure requirements, tax rates, cost
structure, rates of return, margins, all of those factors drive multiples in one direction or
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another." (Zmijewski Tr. 1289:3-13.) Zmijewski concluded that potentially comparable
companies that were not located in the United States or did not sell products in the United States
were likely not reliable comparators to RAI due to differences between the U.S. and foreign
markets as to (i) tax rates, (ii) accounting principles, (iii) GDP growth [**122] rates, (iv)
inflation rates, (v) regulatory structures, and (vi) competitive landscapes. (Zmijewski Tr.
1289:14-1291:15.) In light of these concerns, Zmijewski determined that for a company to be
comparable for valuation purposes, it must (i) generate at least 25% of its revenue in the United
States, (ii) sell cigarettes, and (iii) follow U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP"). (Zmijewski Tr. 1291:16-1292:12.)
[*220] The only company selected by the Financial Advisors and Gompers that met
Zmijewski's selection criteria was Altria. ITG, ITC Limited, and Philip Morris International all
generated less than 25% of their revenue in the United States; Scandinavian Tobacco Group and
Swedish Match did not sell cigarettes and did not follow U.S. GAAP reporting standards.
(Zmijewski Tr. 1291:21-1292:17.)
[*221] Zmijewski opined that where, as here, "you [have] one comparable company, there's no
group. The comparable company has to be very near a twin, because you cannot put it in a
distribution somewhere. You have to use it. You only have one. So it has to be very, very
similar." (Zmijewski Tr. 1294:20-1295:7.) In Zmijewski's view, Altria was not a "near twin"
because it had different [**123] business lines, including cigars, wine, and beer (most
importantly, its substantial ownership stake in the brewery AB InBev, the manufacturer of
Budweiser and other alcoholic products), and it had a much different growth profile. (Zmijewski
Tr. 1292:18-1294:6.) He testified that because Altria's growth rates were lower than RAI's (as
reflected in the June 2016 LE), "its market multiple is going to be lower[,]" (Zmijewski Tr.
1294:2-5), and that although RAI had a similar market capitalization to Altria, the two
companies had different revenues, growth rates, and margins and were therefore not comparable,
(Zmijewski Tr. 1298:2-24). Zmijewski concluded that none of the companies selected by the
Financial Advisors and Gompers, including Altria, was a comparable company for purposes of
valuation. (Zmijewski Tr. 1292:13-17, 1294:1-6.)
[*222] While providing persuasive evidence that Altria and the other companies selected by the
Financial Advisors and Gompers for their comparable companies analyses were not perfect twins
of RAI,39 Zmijewski's testimony did not establish that Altria was wholly irrelevant as a
benchmark in the analysis of RAI's fair value. To the contrary, there are obvious
similarities [**124] in many aspects of RAI's and Altria's businesses as the two largest United
States cigarette companies, and a comparison of the two companies provided useful information
to the Financial Advisors and served as a helpful market check in performing their work.
[*223] Moreover, in addition to the peer multiples, Gompers calculated the implied multiple
based on Zmijewski's valuation of $92.17 per share. Zmijewski's valuation implied a 24x
multiple compared to Altria's multiples of 11.79x (for next 12 months EBITDA) and 12.29x (for
13-24 months EBITDA), which if correct would suggest that RAI's "prospects are twice as good
as . . . the other peer companies in the industry[,]"(Gompers Tr. 777:8-22), including companies
that operate in countries where "there are almost twice as many smokers . . . than there are in the
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United States" and where "over 60 percent of men" smoke, (de Gennaro Tr. 334:11-17). That
would be an unrealistic conclusion not supported by the evidence presented at trial and raises
significant doubt concerning the reliability of Zmijewski's valuation.
[*224] Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that the comparable companies
analyses performed by RAI's Financial Advisors [**125] and by Gompers provide relevant
information that, when considered in connection with other valuation concepts and techniques,
supports a conclusion that Zmijewski's $92.17 per share valuation is excessive. The Court further
finds, however, that the many differences in the peer group companies compel the Court to give
no weight to these analyses in assessing the deal price as fair value for RAI's shares.

iv. Precedent Transactions
[*225] A precedent transactions analysis is a valuation technique that is similar to a comparable
companies analysis and involves comparing a company's multiple to the multiples of the prices
paid for selected peer companies. (Gompers Tr. 779:25-780:16; de Gennaro Tr. 196:22-197:25;
Clark Tr. 1440:3-1441:5.) The same factors that help determine comparability between the
subject company and selected public companies in a comparable company valuation apply
equally to a precedent transactions analysis. (Zmijewski Tr. 1299:5-15.)
[*226] Each Financial Advisor presented a range of RAI share values based on the Advisor's
analysis of comparable precedent transactions.40 Goldman's range was $38.12 to $59.51,
Lazard's was $43.03 to $55.69,41 and JPMorgan's was $43.00 to
$60.00. [**126] (PX0115.0258, .0539, .0582; de Gennaro Tr. 233:12-20; Clark Tr. 1440:231441:5.) Goldman and Lazard also calculated RAI share values based on the premiums paid to
the trading prices in precedent transactions. Goldman's range was $54.25 to $61.32, and Lazard's
range was $56.60 to $63.68. (PX0115.0539, .0582.)
[*227] As with his comparable companies analysis, Gompers conducted a precedent
transactions analysis for RAI as part of his review of the reasonableness of the DCF analyses of
the Financial Advisors. (Gompers Tr. 779:25-780:8.) He testified that he selected his precedent
transactions by searching
the Capital IQ database which is just a database of transactions. I looked at all the mergers or
acquisitions which were in the tobacco industry that closed within five years of the transaction
here closing. And then I restricted it to those that had an enterprise value greater than $500
million.
(Gompers Tr. 780:17-25.)
[*228] Gompers used five precedent transactions: Japan Tobacco's acquisition of Gryson NV,
Japan Tobacco's acquisition of JT International, ITG's acquisition of the U.S. cigarette brands
and other assets of Lorillard and RAI ("ITG Transaction"), RAI's acquisition of
Lorillard, [**127] and BAT's acquisition of Souza Cruz. (PDX0005.0015; Gompers Tr. 780:17781:8; PDX0005.0015.) Goldman, JPMorgan, and Lazard considered more precedent
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transactions than Gompers in their analyses, but each included a number of the transactions later
examined by Gompers. (PX0115.0260, .0542, .0586.)
[*229] Gompers determined the multiples from his five precedent transactions,
(PDX0005.0017), applied those multiples and the multiple from the Lorillard Transaction alone
to RAI's EBITDA projections, and calculated the following valuations:

Last Twelve

Precedent

Precedent

Transactions' Mean

Transactions' Med

$46.46

$41.04

$45.80

$41.17

$47.19

$42.50

Months EBITDA
Next Twelve
Months EBITDA
13-24 Months
EBITDA
[*230] Dissenters challenged the relevance and applicability of each of the precedent
transactions chosen by the Financial Advisors and Gompers. In particular, Zmijewski testified
that the following selection criteria were appropriate for determining potential comparable
transactions: (i) transactions in the tobacco industry within five years of the Transaction Date,
(ii) transactions where the target was a domestic U.S. company, and (iii) transactions where
consideration [**128] was $1 billion or greater (approximately 2% of the value of the BAT-RAI
transaction). (Zmijewski Tr. 1300:4-12.) He found only two transactions that met his three
criteria—the Lorillard Transaction and the ITG Transaction, (Zmijewski Tr. 1302:18-1303:3)—
and concluded that neither was comparable enough to the Merger to perform a comparable
transactions analysis,42 (Zmijewski Tr. 1307:2-9 ("There just aren't any comparable
transactions. Therefore, you can't use that analysis.").
[*231] Dissenters put particular emphasis on Zmijewski's rejection of the Lorillard Transaction
on grounds that RAI had much higher growth prospects at the time of the Merger than it did at
the time of the Lorillard Transaction. (Zmijewski Tr. 1304:1-1305:18.) As Gompers and de
Gennaro testified, however, regardless of differences in the structures of the Lorillard
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Transaction and the Merger, the Lorillard Transaction closed just two years earlier, it involved a
U.S. company whose business primarily sold cigarettes, and Lorillard's largest brand was
Newport (which became the largest brand at RAI and which was subject to the same mentholrelated regulatory risks before and after the Lorillard Transaction). (Gompers [**129] Tr. 781:921; de Gennaro Tr. 339:18-342:7; Wajnert Tr. 120:6-121:2.)
[*232] While de Gennaro and Gompers agreed that not all of the selected precedent transactions
are equally informative, a conclusion with which the Court agrees,43 as with comparable
companies analysis, the goal in performing a precedent transactions analysis is not to identify a
perfect or near twin transaction, but to develop information that would be informative and
relevant for valuation purposes. (de Gennaro Tr. 337:14-338:1; Gompers Tr. 772:16-773:3; Clark
Tr. 1588:23-1589:8.)
[*233] The precedent transactions analysis, particularly as it relates to the Lorillard Transaction,
is informative in considering the value of RAI. In particular, the deal price was at a higher
multiple over RAI's EBITDA than any other prior transaction involving a U.S. tobacco company
that Lazard had analyzed. (de Gennaro Tr. 236:6-16; PX0115.0578, .0585.) This undercuts
Dissenters' contention that BAT paid less than fair value for RAI. Further, although the
precedent transactions analysis is of limited value because of the differences in the selected
transactions, the specific values generated by the various precedent transactions
analyses [**130] contemporaneously performed by the Financial Advisors, as well as by
Gompers in his analysis, provide support that the deal price of $59.64 was at or above RAI's fair
value and that Zmijewski's valuation was clearly excessive.

v. Analyst Price Targets
[*234] Goldman, Lazard, and JPMorgan each presented a range of equity analyst price targets.
The range found by Goldman was $52 to $62 per share, and the range found by both JPMorgan
and Lazard spanned from $47 to $62 per share. (PX0115.0258, .0539, .0582.) The $59.64 per
share deal price, measured as of January 16, 2017, was at the upper end of the unaffected analyst
price targets for RAI as a standalone company. (PX0115.0539.) Gompers testified that "not a
single analyst . . . said that BAT was getting a steal." (Gompers Tr. 803:7-8.) By contrast, in a
transaction that Dissenters identified to try to show that the large disparity between RAI's
Unaffected Stock Price and Zmijewski's valuation is not unprecedented—the leveraged buyout
of RJR Nabisco in the 1980s—analysts contemporaneously opined that the initial offer for RJR
Nabisco was a "lowball bid" and that in that case, management was "trying to steal the
company." (Yilmaz Tr. 1997:15-1998:2, [**131] 2000:17-21.) There was no such concern with
BAT's initial offer for RAI.

vi. Mason Capital's Market Valuation
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[*235] In November 2016, after BAT made its initial offer but before the final deal price was
agreed, Dissenter Mason Capital sent to the Transaction Committee two substantially similar
letters intended to argue for a higher deal price than BAT was then offering. (JX0022.0002.0004; PX0065.0002-.0005.) In these letters, Mason Capital attempted to identify "any credible
arguments or information that would support a higher stock price for Reynolds than what the
market price reflected or what was reflected in BAT's offer[.]" (Constantino Tr. 1843:21-1844:1;
JX0022.0002-.0004; PX0065.0002-.0005.)
[*236] Mason Capital incorporated its views into a chart containing a multiples-based valuation
of RAI. (JX0022.0004; PX0065.0004.) In its chart, Mason Capital started with the last year of
earnings for each of RAI's separately reported business segments. For each segment, Mason
Capital multiplied the earnings by what Mason Capital believed to be a reasonable multiple for
that segment. (JX0022.0004; PX0065.0004; Constantino Tr. 1827:6-1829:1, 1846:18-23.) Mason
Capital then added several dollars [**132] per share to reflect additional points of value that it
did not believe were fully incorporated into the reporting segments' earnings. (JX0022.0004;
PX0065.0004; Constantino Tr. 1827:6-1829:1, 1847:12-1848:5.) After adding these estimates
together and subtracting RAI's net debt and other liabilities, Mason Capital arrived at a "Market
Value of Equity" of $54.44 per share. (JX0022.0004; PX0065.0004; Constantino Tr. 1827:61829:1, 1848:6-25.)
[*237] Mason Capital referred to the Market Value of Equity as a "reasonable starting
valuation" for purposes of negotiation with BAT, (JX0022.0004; PX0065.0004), and
Constantino admitted that it was "how we, Mason Capital, think that [RAI's] stock should be
valued on its own[,]" (Constantino Tr. 1830:16-17, 1845:19-22; 1850:8-1851:7). She further
testified that "in terms of fundamental value, I think [the $54.44/share] represents what we
thought the market would trade the stock at if they had the advantage of kind of being caught up
with regard to what Reynolds owns." (Constantino Tr. 1829:9-16, 1848:19-25 ("Q. The way the
valuation's constructed, it's an enterprise value analysis. And enterprise value means the value of
the enterprise, right? A. [**133] Yes.").)
[*238] Constantino made clear that the $54.44 per share valuation did "not include any sort of
overhang from BAT's holdings[,]" (Constantino Tr. 1846:10-17), and did "not include any sort of
minority discount[,]" (Constantino Tr. 1848:16-18). Mason Capital's letter to the Transaction
Committee is persuasive evidence of Mason Capital's pre-litigation views of RAI's value.
[*239] The difference between Mason Capital's contemporaneous $54.44 valuation and its
litigation valuation of $92.17 cannot be explained by the discovery of nonpublic information in
the litigation process, including of the June 2016 LE year six-through ten-year projections.
Indeed, as part of asserting its appraisal rights, before the litigation began and before any
discovery was had, Mason Capital provided a fair value estimate of $88.16 per share. (Compl.
Judicial Appraisal ¶ 47.) Thus, based on Mason Capital's own calculations, the nonpublic
information obtained through discovery could have had, at most, an impact of only $4.01 per
share. (Constantino Tr. 1854:19-1856:1.) The substantial discrepancy in Mason Capital's
contemporaneous and litigation-driven valuations of RAI's shares undermine the
credibility [**134] and reliability of the latter.
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b. Discounted Cash Flow Valuations
[*240] In addition to their market-based valuations, each of the three Financial Advisors
conducted an independent DCF analysis. (PX0115.0261, .0541, .0583; Price Tr. 1060:8-16; de
Gennaro Tr. 217:1-14.) A DCF valuation requires three steps, each of which entails making a
number of assumptions: (i) estimating the free cash flows that RAI would have been reasonably
expected to earn through a projected number of years into the future, (ii) estimating the
appropriate perpetuity growth rate ("PGR") after the end of the projection period, and (iii)
estimating the appropriate rate at which to discount the expected future cash flows to the
valuation date (the "Discount Rate," often calculated as a WACC). (Gompers Tr. 725:12-726:15;
Zmijewski Tr. 1243:18-1244:11.) The parties do not dispute that a DCF is a reliable
methodology, and no evidence was introduced at trial that a DCF is not a "customary and current
valuation technique." N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).
[*241] Each of the Financial Advisors conducted an independent DCF analysis. (PX0115.0261,
.0541, .0583; Price Tr. 1060:8-16; de Gennaro Tr. 217:1-14.) They used a range of inputs to get a
resulting range [**135] of DCF valuations, which were used to account for the fact that small
changes to the DCF inputs, like the WACC or PGR, would lead to significant variations in the
Company's value. (PX0115.0261, .0541, .0583; de Gennaro Tr. 203:13-19, 229:15-230:6; Clark
Tr. 1441:9-21; Eckler Dep. Tr. 48:24-15, 79:19-80:18, 108:17-18.)
[*242] While a company's WACC and its PGR are calculated separately, these inputs must be
scrutinized to ensure that, when incorporated into a DCF, the results are not "untethered to
reality." (de Gennaro Tr. 360:5-361:1 ("[T]here is an interrelationship between the inputs, and . .
. we don't have a perfect view of the future so we're applying a judgment.").) Therefore, inputs to
a DCF analysis must be analyzed together to determine reasonableness. As de Gennaro testified,
the inputs "[a]re part and parcel. You can't just look at one assumption in isolation." (de Gennaro
Tr. 328:10-329:4, 325:22-327:1.)
[*243] In the presentation made with its Fairness Opinion, Goldman's DCF yielded a range of
$45.16 to $72.17 and a midpoint of $55.74. (PX0115.0541.) JPMorgan's DCF led to a range of
$47.54 to $68.63 and a midpoint of $56.26. (PX0115.0261; Clark Tr. 1441:6-12.) Lazard's
DCF [**136] led to a range of $50.03 to $73.38 and a midpoint of $59.59. (PX0115.0583; de
Gennaro Tr. 232:19-233:2.) Gompers testified that, after analyzing and evaluating the inputs of
the Financial Advisors' DCF analyses, he concluded that the results are "reasonable in this
context," even though he believed "their valuations are optimistic because of the projections they
used." (Gompers Tr. 767:5-20 ("[T]hose five-year projections don't take into account the
possibility that even over the next five years, one of those negative events or more may occur.").)
[*244] Financial projections used in a DCF analysis must be probability-weighted, or riskadjusted, to reflect the expected value of the future cash flows because, as Gompers testified,
"[i]f you don't have . . . expected cash flows, you're not going to get to that intrinsic or
fundamental value." (Gompers Tr. 726:16-729:23 (noting the "value when you do a DCF is
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wholly dependent, entirely dependent on using the expected cash flows, not the best case or
upside scenarios"); Zmijewski Tr. 1243:18-1244:11; Yilmaz Tr. 1964:1-1965:23 ("Q. And what
you need are the expected cash flows of the company; right? A. That's correct. Q. You're not
looking [**137] for the best case or the worst case; right? A. . . . Yes, I am looking for the
expected one, not the best-case scenario.").)
[*245] RAI's regular financial projection process was not intended to create a probabilityweighted value of future cash flows, but instead expressly assumed that current industry trends
and dynamics would continue without substantial change. (JX0009.0001-.0002; PX0047.0002;
JX0010.0006; PX0052.0004, .0006; Gilchrist Tr. 380:21-391:09 ("Q. And were these various
sensitivities actually modeled into the numbers themselves? A. No, they were not. So this was
really intended to show that there is a sensitivity to this and these things could happen.").)
[*246] As Crew testified, projections that are developed for valuation purposes are different
from the projections that RAI used to operate on a day-to-day basis. (Crew Tr. 711:10-13.)
Specifically, Crew testified that she would not want to use RAI's ten-year projections for
valuation purposes because in a valuation
the unknowable, the unquantifiable, you have to somehow figure that into your thinking as a
board. So you can't just look at these numbers and say nothing's ever going to change. You have
to look at the total picture. [**138]
(Crew Tr. 705:22-706:5.) She further explained that the projections for a valuation have to be
considered
in the context of all of the risks and the potential upsides. So you have to look at it all. So you
can't just lift this and say, oh, this is what the company's worth. No, you've got to look at a total
context. . . . Which is very difficult in tobacco.
(Crew Tr. 706:9-17; Gompers Tr. 732:24-733:7, 733:20-734:18 ("[I]t's not only what I teach, it's
what I've advised when I've been on the board that you can have projections for business
purposes, but the evaluation for valuation purposes could be substantially different.").)
[*247] The Financial Advisors used the October 2016 Projections in their DCF calculations. As
described in detail above, those projections were based on the October 2016 LE, which was
developed as part of RAI's regular financial projection process, including assumptions
concerning, among other things, a "continuation of recent cigarette industry pricing dynamics[,]"
"moderate share growth[,]" a "stable regulatory environment[,]" and no litigation risk.
(JX0023.0134; JX0010.0004, .0006; Gilchrist Tr. 382:09-391:09; Gompers; 730:10-731:17
("The projections were business [**139] as usual, but they were very clear at saying that these
risks were out there and were real probabilities occurring.").)
[*248] Zmijewski used the July 2017 LE as the basis for his DCF valuation. (Zmijewski Tr.
1246:13-1247:8.) Flyer used the June 2017 LE as a set of ten-year projections to calculate a
perpetuity growth rate. (Flyer Tr. 1075:3-1076:6.) Like the October 2016 Projections, the June
2017 LE and the projections therein came out of RAI's regular financial projection process and
assumed "business as usual" without accounting for major "downside risks." (Gompers Tr.
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730:10-731:17; JX0009.0001-.0002; PX0047.0002; JX0010.0006; PX0052.0004, .0006;
Gilchrist Tr. 380:21-391:09.)
[*249] Although Dissenters suggested at trial that the projections used by the Financial
Advisors were viewed as "out of date" by April 2017 based on a set of BAT talking points sent
to Price, the forecasts were not out of date for the Financial Advisors' purposes
because that's valuing the company as a stand-alone entity. This [BAT document] is looking at
the entity as a combined entity going forward. And I think they're talking into their shareholders .
. . that don't expect the results that we show for Reynolds [**140] American to be the exact
same as what's in the forecast because there are these things . . . that didn't occur that we would
have done in the ordinary course of business, but we did not do because the transaction was
being contemplated.
(Price Tr. 1044:9-1047:19; DX0056.0003.) In fact, the evidence indicates that, for the periods
that overlapped, the October 2016 Projections were a bit more optimistic than the July 2017 LE
relied on by Zmijewski. (Zmijewski Tr. 1370:17-1372:7 ("Q. In between . . . November of '16 . .
. [and] June 2017 . . . , did the company's outlook for those five years improve or did it worsen?
A. It's about the same without the management overlays. So probably a little lower, but about the
same."). Compare DX0240, at tab "Top Side Summary," with DX0141, at tab "Consol Fcst.")
[*250] The Financial Advisors understood that RAI included certain assumptions in its ordinary
course financial projections and that these projections were subject to specifically identified
sensitivities that were not reflected in the numerical forecasts. These sensitivities included major
competitive, regulatory, litigation, or other exogenous shocks. (JX0010.0003-.0004, .0006;
JX0023.0134.) [**141]
[*251] As Clark testified, JPMorgan's understanding was that there were "significantly larger
downsides to the financial forecasts than there were upsides." (Clark Tr. 1435:6-8.) Gompers
likewise noted that RAI was susceptible to a "tremendous number of game changing downside
risks." (Gompers Tr. 730:10-731:17.) For these reasons, the RAI Board and management
recognized that the projections were optimistic and biased upwards. (Wajnert Tr. 49:8-11; Price
Tr. 984:20-24; Gompers Tr. 734:19-735:7.) Gompers agreed, noting that the projections were
"more like an upside case" rather than "the expected value case." (Gompers Tr. 729:24-730:9.)
[*252] At trial, Zmijewski disagreed with this characterization of RAI's financial projections.
He noted that the downside risks faced by RAI are largely unknowable in their scope,
unpredictable in their timing, and unquantifiable in their impact to RAI. He therefore used the
management projections as if they were a set of expected cash flows. (Zmijewski Tr. 1255:11259:21 ("But uncertainty doesn't in any way eliminate the validity of having expected cash
flow. Expected cash flows are based on uncertain forecasts.").)
[*253] Zmijewski explained that RAI "had experience [**142] forecasting and they do that on
a regular basis. As you see, they forecast annually a ten-year forecast and then they have an
operating plan once a year, and then they update those forecasts every month. So they pay a lot
of attention to the forecasts[.]" (Zmijewski Tr. 1251:22-1252:8.) As a result, Zmijewski
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determined that management's projections were a reliable estimate of RAI cash flows because
they were bottoms-up estimate forecasts created in the ordinary course of business. (Zmijewski
Tr. 1251:4-21.)
[*254] Zmijewski's approach disregards the expressly stated assumptions and sensitivities to
RAI's financial projections. While these assumptions and sensitives were not incorporated into
the numerical projections that RAI developed and used in the ordinary course of business, that
does not mean that they can be ignored when valuing the Company. The evidence indicates that
if one or more of these risks were to materialize, it would have a dramatic, negative effect on the
Company's growth and profitability. A valuation predicated upon the theory that a tobacco
company like RAI will suffer no significant adverse regulatory, tax, or competitive effects in the
future is simply not credible [**143] or reliable.
[*255] In defending his view that the management forecasts did not have an upward bias,
Zmijewski testified that "as long as the upside and downside, after adjusting for the timing, the
amount, and the probability, i[f] they offset each other, the forecasts that we're using in the
management forecasts are exactly the right forecasts to use." (Zmijewski Tr. 1258:19-23
(emphasis added).) But the evidence was clear that the upside and the downside to the
management forecasts do not "offset each other," because the downside was much more serious,
meaning that the forecasts are more optimistic than the expected cash flows.
[*256] Dissenters also contended that RAI's Financial Advisors' DCF valuations were too low
because the October 2016 Projections contained five years, and not ten years, of projections.
First, as discussed previously, there is no evidence to support Dissenters' contention that RAI
deliberately withheld ten-year projections to drive a lower valuation within BAT's price range.
(See supra § II(E)(d)(vi)). Moreover, each Financial Advisor testified unequivocally that the
information it received from RAI management, including the five-year October 2016
Projections, [**144] was entirely sufficient to adequately and competently perform the
Advisor's valuation analysis. (Eckler Dep. Tr. 61:3-12; de Gennaro Tr. 352:8-13; Clark Tr.
1597:12-16.)
[*257] To support its contention that five-year projections were inadequate, Dissenters
introduced evidence that (i) Lazard, in its work on the Lorillard Transaction, was provided with
ten-year projections, (DX0148.0009-.0010; de Gennaro Tr. 260:20-262:9); (ii) prior to receiving
the October 2016 Projections, junior members of the Lazard deal team were unsure whether the
projections they received would contain five or ten years, (DX0157.0001; de Gennaro Tr.
280:17-281:14); and (iii) a junior member of the JPMorgan deal team emailed RAI's Holland
asking for a detailed ten-year projection, (DX0067.0001; Clark Tr. 1518:1-21).
[*258] This evidence, however, does not warrant a conclusion that the Financial Advisors' use
of five-year projections was unreasonable; it indicates only that the Financial Advisors
considered whether ten years of projections were available. The evidence shows that when
BAT's offer arrived in October 2016, RAI did not have up-to-date ten-year projections and
provided the Financial Advisors with the most [**145] recent set of projections the Company
had completed, which were the five-year projections in the October 2016 LE. The Financial
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Advisors wanted the most recent set of projections rather than projections from June 2016 that
had already been revised four times. (Clark Tr. 1519:1-11.) Despite Dissenters' arguments to the
contrary, the record is clear that the Financial Advisors received all the information they believed
they needed for their work.
[*259] Moreover, the evidence shows that RAI management was actually advocating for
a higher valuation and the highest possible purchase price for the Company. (Price Tr. 1054:231055:4, 1055:11-14.) For example, in October 2016, before providing its most recent projections
to the Financial Advisors, RAI management added the Top-Side Adjustments that served to
increase projected pre-tax income by approximately $300 million per year. (DX0240, at tab "Top
Side Summary"; Price Tr. 990:10-16.)
[*260] In response to this evidence, Dissenters asked questions suggesting that the $1.4 billion
increase attributable to the Top-Side Adjustments was "swamp[ed]" by a $3 billion planned
share repurchase program, (Price Tr. 1055:15-16), but that suggestion is not [**146] supported
by the evidence, (DX0075.0001; Price Tr. 1021:14-1022:1). As Price testified, the cash used for
a share repurchase program is a non-operating expense and does not affect the cash flow figures
used in a DCF analysis. (Price Tr. 1055:5-17.)
[*261] Further, when negotiations between RAI and BAT had reached an impasse in December
2016, RAI management assisted the Financial Advisors in providing information to BAT
intended to support a higher valuation than BAT's models showed. Indeed, at the Transaction
Committee's behest, Goldman and JPMorgan attempted to convince BAT to pay a higher price
by showing that BAT's financial model was flawed, and that updating BAT's valuation model
with proper inputs would demonstrate that a higher price would still be accretive for BAT.
(DX0057.0002; Price Tr. 1034:20-1035:12, 1060:17-25.) These types of actions are inconsistent
with Dissenters' allegations of a concerted effort by RAI management to mislead the Financial
Advisors into undervaluing RAI. (Price Tr. 1034:20-1035:12, 1060:17-25; DX0057.0002.)
[*262] Based on the evidence, the Financial Advisors' use of the October 2016 Projections as
an input in their DCF calculations was reasonable. These [**147] projections were RAI's most
current financial projections at the time, and RAI management supplemented those projections
with a wealth of additional information for the Financial Advisors' consideration, including the
financial presentation from the 2016 Strategy Day with ten years of operating income and growth
rates.

i. Perpetuity Growth Rates
[*263] A PGR is the rate at which a company's expected free cash flows are assumed to grow
indefinitely after the period for which there are year-by-year forecasts. (Gompers Tr. 742:17743:4.) In a typical industry, a company is often assumed to have a PGR between the rate of
inflation and the rate of nominal GDP growth. (Gompers Tr. 743:15-744:6; de Gennaro Tr.
368:15-369:6.) Where an industry is expected to decline in the future, however, a PGR below the
rate of inflation may be appropriate; it is not unusual to see a zero or negative PGR used for
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companies or industries that are in structural decline, like the tobacco industry. (Gompers Tr.
744:7-23, 746:4-5; Crew Tr. 640:21-641:10; de Gennaro Tr. 204:3-25, 326:6-13, 368:17-369:6;
Clark Tr. 1446:1-12.)
[*264] The Financial Advisors used the following PGR ranges in their DCF analyses: Goldman,
negative [**148] 0.50% to positive 0.50%, (PX0115.0541); JPMorgan, 0.00% to positive
1.00%, (PX0115.0261; Clark Tr. 1445:1-6); Lazard, negative 0.50% to positive 0.50%,
(PX0115.0583; de Gennaro Tr. 227:7-18).
[*265] In the Financial Advisors' DCF analyses, the vast majority of the total value of RAI was
comprised by the terminal value, i.e., the value attributable to the period of time after the explicit
year-by-year forecasts, which requires carefully considering the appropriate PGR "because it is
the most critical factor in terms of determining the value of RAI." (Gompers Tr. 757:24-758:20;
Clark Tr. 1441:22-1442:2; de Gennaro Tr. 227:19-229:14, 311:19-312:22, 349:16-351:3;
Zmijewski Tr. 1282:19-1283:20.)
[*266] The Financial Advisors' PGR ranges were based on research into, and their own
experience and knowledge regarding, the tobacco industry and RAI's competitive position within
the industry, including their understanding of the threats and potential upsides facing the
Company and tobacco companies generally. (de Gennaro Tr. 203:5-12, 204:3-25, 225:8-18;
Clark Tr. 1445:7-25; Eckler Dep. Tr. 64:1-24, 65:15-24, 66:20-67:06.)
[*267] The Advisors also considered (i) growth rates used for other tobacco
transactions, [**149] including the 2015 Lorillard Transaction, (ii) industry analysts' views
regarding appropriate growth rates for a tobacco company, and (iii) the concern that increased
prices would not be able to offset increasing volume declines in the longer term. (DX0068.0003;
Clark Tr. 1445:7-17; Eckler Dep. Tr. 80:11-81:02; de Gennaro Tr. 224:10-225:7, 300:12-23.)
Gompers identified the same factors in his analysis of the Financial Advisors' PGR ranges as
evidence supporting their reasonableness. (Gompers Tr. 746:8-747:2, 879:15-24.)
[*268] In order to test their perpetuity growth rates, the Financial Advisors checked their
analyses using terminal exit multiples, among other things, as a "sanity check." (Clark Tr.
1441:22-1442:2, 1445:18-25, 1448:2-23; de Gennaro Tr. 204:3-25, 227:19-229:14, 300:12-23,
311:19-312:22, 365:5-366:6; Eckler Dep. Tr. 78:22-79:18, 79:19-80:10, 84:11-85:02.) A
terminal exit multiple is the portion of the DCF value that resides in the period after the end of
the year-by-year projections, i.e., the ratio of earnings in the last year of the projection period to
the terminal value. The terminal exit multiple is a measure of the company's growth rate in the
terminal period and [**150] can be compared to a company's current multiple to check the
reasonableness of the terminal period assumptions. (Gompers Tr. 752:1-753:16.) In general, a
company's terminal exit multiple should be near but below the company's current multiple
because "looking forward, you would expect the growth rate off into the future five years from
now will be lower than the growth rate today." (Gompers Tr. 753:12-757:23.)
[*269] Gompers opined that the Financial Advisors' PGR ranges were reasonable based on his
own analysis, which was the same analysis that he would have performed had he conducted his
own DCF analysis. (Gompers Tr. 745:5-12.) Just as the Financial Advisors had done, Gompers
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checked the Financial Advisors' PGR ranges against RAI's implied terminal exit multiple and
found that the choice of PGRs was reasonable, in particular because they were lower than RAI's
multiple at the time of BAT's October 20 Offer. (Gompers Tr. 753:12-757:23; PDX0005.0007.)
Specifically, he identified RAI's pre-Merger trading multiple as 12.4x, and found that the
Financial Advisors' implied terminal exit multiples ranged from 10.5x to 11.5x. (PDX0005.0007;
Gompers Tr. 753:19-755:16.) Gompers, as detailed above, [**151] also performed a comparable
companies analysis and precedent transactions analysis that confirmed the reasonableness of the
Financial Advisors' PGRs. (Gompers Tr. 770:7-11, 779:25-780:8.)
[*270] Lazard used the same PGR range in its work on behalf of RAI in the Lorillard
Transaction, even though RAI was the seller in the Merger and had been the purchaser in the
Lorillard Transaction. (de Gennaro Tr. 225:8-18.) Dissenters contended that it was inappropriate
for Lazard to use the same PGR for both transactions because the Lorillard Transaction was
"transformative[,]" (Gilchrist Tr. 494:4-7), and a "fundamental change[,]" (de Gennaro Tr.
305:1-16), that resulted in a "new and improved [RAI,]" (de Gennaro Tr. 365:5-366:6). But as de
Gennaro testified, Lazard's work on the Lorillard Transaction included a valuation of the pro
forma combined "new and improved" RAI—the exact same company that was then sold to
BAT—meaning that any "fundamental change" had already been considered in the valuation
performed for the Lorillard Transaction. (de Gennaro Tr. 239:20-240:6; DX0393.0147-.0148.)
[*271] Moreover, de Gennaro explained that a component of the PGR range was trends in the
U.S. tobacco landscape, [**152] and that there had been no significant changes since Lazard's
initial analysis. (PX0115.0583; de Gennaro Tr. 225:8-12.) Lazard's PGRs were based on a longterm view of the prospects of the Company and the industry rather than the specifics of a few
nearer-term years. (de Gennaro Tr. 303:20-307:18.) After performing reasonableness checks on
its DCF results, Lazard determined that "there was nothing suggesting that it was an
unreasonable set of assumptions[,]" (de Gennaro Tr. 311:19-312:22), and that there was "no
reason to be uncomfortable with the perpetual growth rate" because "all the trends were the same
in terms of volume declines." (de Gennaro Tr. 307:11-18.)
[*272] Dissenters also suggested that the Financial Advisors' PGRs were too low because they
were applied after five years of projections instead of ten years. (DX0068.0001-.0003; Clark Tr.
1529:15-1530:12; Eckler Dep. Tr. 67:16-20; 67:23-68:5.) In support, Dissenters cite an internal
JPMorgan email in which the JPMorgan deal team discusses the appropriateness of different
ranges of PGRs. (DX0068.0002-.0003.) The evidence suggests, however, that JPMorgan used a
higher PGR than it otherwise would have used if it had begun applying [**153] the PGR after
ten years of projections. JPMorgan's contemporaneous documents reveal, and Clark consistently
testified, that JPMorgan discussed internally changing the range of PGRs to a negative range if
given an up-to-date set of ten-year projections:
Q. And why would you have used lower growth rates if you had ten-year projections than growth
rates you had used after the five years of projections?
A. Because our anticipation was that there would be, you know, some growth — continued
growth at the company in years six through ten and thus, to account for that, in the context of the
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five years of projections that we did have, we used a slightly higher range of perpetuity growth
rates relative to if we had ten years worth of projections, and then had accounted for that
potentially higher growth in years six through ten. We would have married that with a view that
the industry would continue to decline following that point in time at a likely negative rate.
(Clark Tr. 1446:17-1448:1; DX0068.0002-.0003.) As noted above, JPMorgan ultimately
determined that a detailed set of ten-year projections was not necessary to perform its valuation
work. (Clark Tr. 1432:23-1433:3.)
[*273] Dissenters have [**154] suggested that the PGR ranges used by the Financial Advisors
amounted to an assumption that RAI's business would "fall off a cliff after five years of sustained
year after year growth[.]" (Sadighi Tr. 28:9-12.) But a growth rate below inflation does not mean
that RAI would stop being profitable or soon cease to exist. Rather, because RAI had such high
cash free cash flows, it would continue far into the future even with a growth rate below
inflation. As Eckler explained,
So the free cash flow EBITDA would have been $9 billion, so with $9 billion of free cash flow
and very little leverage, I can't think of a single instance of a company that's not viable. So the
judgment was that $9 billion would continue into perpetuity.
(Eckler Dep. Tr. 81:3-5, 81:7-82:8.)
[*274] Further, as Gompers testified, Dissenters' view is a "mischaracterization of what a zero
percent growth rate means." (Gompers Tr. 747:18-22.) In the Financial Advisors' DCF models,
RAI's growth does not necessarily stop cold right after the projection period. (Eckler Dep. Tr.
67:18-68:05; Gompers Tr. 747:18-749:17, 750:14-751:2.) A PGR "averages over the time with
maybe some positive and then negative in the future and averages [**155] across scenarios
some of which may be very large negative events that happen." (Gompers Tr. 749:13-17.) Thus,
a company with a 0% growth rate could continue to see positive growth for some time, which
would then be balanced out by negative growth and/or by the possibility of a major adverse
event.
[*275] Compared to the PGR ranges used by RAI's Financial Advisors in their DCF analyses,
the 2.24% PGR that Zmijewski incorporates into his DCF analysis is substantially higher.
Dissenters' PGR was calculated as follows: Flyer first determined that a 1% or 1.25% PGR was
appropriate to use after 2026. (Flyer Tr. 1075:14-122.) In support of his 1% PGR conclusion,
Flyer pointed to JPMorgan's use of 1.0% as the upper bound of its PGR range and to RAI's use
of a 3% PGR in its stock repurchase plan. (Flyer Tr. 1129:1-17.) Flyer was asked by Dissenters'
counsel to use a 1% or 1.25% PGR in conjunction with the growth rates extracted from the last
five years of the June 2017 LE to calculate a "blended" PGR to be applied starting in 2023.44
(Flyer Tr. 1078:9-11.) This blended rate is simply a mathematical calculation in which Flyer
converted his 1.0% PGR and the growth rates for the years covered by the [**156] June 2017
LE into a single flat rate. (Flyer Tr. 1078:23-1079:19.) The result is a blended PGR of 2.24% or
2.42%. (Flyer Tr. 1075:3-1076:6.)
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[*276] In his DCF analysis, Zmijewski chose to use Flyer's 2.24% blended PGR. (Zmijewski
Tr. 1244:7-9.) No testimony was offered as to why he chose the lower of Flyer's blended PGRs,
and Zmijewski testified that he had not tested what the results of his DCF analysis would have
been had he used Flyer's higher 2.42% blended growth rate. (Zmijewski Tr. 1363:1-10.)
[*277] Zmijewski testified that he had "no opinion on growth rates for this company[,]"
(Zmijewski Tr. 1379:17-18), and that he did not calculate a PGR to use in his DCF analysis
because
after I was engaged in this matter and I started working on this particular company, I realized this
company isn't your standard consumer products company. This is a company that[ ] . . . has a
highly concentrated industry, you quickly discover volumes are decreasing, but revenues are
going up. So you know prices are increasing at a faster rate than volumes are decreasing. So this
is not your standard industry. Somebody with good expertise needs to figure out how all of that
pulls together to think about a long-run [**157] forecast. You need industry expertise. I don't
have that expertise.
(Zmijewski Tr. 1264:1-11.) Instead, Zmijewski relied entirely on the PGR calculated by Flyer,
even though the vast majority of Zmijewski's valuation is dependent on the PGR that was used.
(Zmijewski Tr. 1362:21-1363:2.) For example, simply changing the PGR from 2.2% to 0%, the
midpoint of Goldman and Lazard's PGR ranges, in Zmijewski's DCF analysis decreased his
valuation from $92.17 to $58.00 per share. (Zmijewski Tr. 1396:2-9.) Incorporating the range of
PGRs used by the Financial Advisors (negative 0.5% to positive 1.0%) into Zmijewski's analysis
results in a range of valuations of $53.62 to $69.56. (Zmijewski Tr. 1396:10-1398:13.)
[*278] In calculating his PGR, Flyer did not incorporate into his analysis the effects or the
likelihood of adverse regulation on menthol cigarettes, concluding that he "didn't see any reason
why [the June 2017 LE projections] were biased." (Flyer Tr. 1195:18-1196:1.) For reasons stated
above, it is not credible for a valuation of RAI to assume that a menthol ban is impossible or that
such a ban would have no effect on RAI's future cash flows.
[*279] Flyer also testified that he "explicitly [**158] estimated the 1 percent for combustibles
[i.e., cigarettes]" and yet admitted that combustibles "may be 15, 20 percent of the business" in
2026, as compared to approximately 90% at the time of the Merger. (Flyer Tr. 1207:9-23.) Any
scenario in which such a set of circumstances would obtain is exceedingly unlikely. If
combustibles were to drop that dramatically in the years leading up to 2026, there is no reason to
believe they would then grow at 1.0% in perpetuity thereafter.
[*280] Flyer further testified that it was inappropriate to calculate a PGR of 0% after 2021 (five
years), as the Financial Advisors did, when the Company projected robust growth through 2026.
(Flyer Tr. 1121:18-23.) Flyer's PGR analysis ignores, however, the substantial evidence showing
that these ten-year projections were not intended to create a probability-weighted value of future
cash flows, disregarded significant assumptions and sensitivities that could dramatically impact
RAI's business, and were largely extrapolations of current industry trends and dynamics without
substantial change. And Flyer ignores that a 0% PGR can represent continued but slowing
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growth for a period followed by a plateau and then negative [**159] growth in the future to
balance out the positive growth in the earlier years. (Gompers Tr. 749:13-17.)
[*281] Just as Gompers checked the reasonableness of the PGRs used by RAI's Financial
Advisors, he also checked the reasonableness of the PGR used in Zmijewski's DCF valuation by
calculating its implied terminal exit multiple. Gompers calculated Zmijewski's implied terminal
exit multiple to be 17.7x, which was significantly higher than the Financial Advisors' terminal
exit multiples and also significantly higher than RAI's multiple of 12.4x at the time of BAT's
October 20 Offer. (PDX0005.0007; Gompers Tr. 753:23-757:23.) Zmijewski's 17.7x terminal
exit multiple means that under his valuation, RAI would be growing at a faster rate five years
into the future than at the present time—an unreasonable expectation given that tobacco is an
industry in "structural decline." (Crew Tr. 640:21-641:10; Gompers Tr. 756:19-757:23.)
[*282] Based on its review of the evidence, the Court finds the PGR ranges used by the
Financial Advisors to be reasonable and reliable, and the PGRs calculated by Flyer and used by
Zmijewski to be unreasonable and unreliable.

ii. Discount Rate/WACC
[*283] A discount rate is a [**160] rate of return used to discount future cash flows back to
present value. It is intended to capture the level of risk associated with a stream of cash flows in
the context of the market as a whole. (Gompers Tr. 726:10-15.) A lower discount rate will lead to
a higher present value of a company. (Clark Tr. 1444:21-25.)
[*284] Both sides used a WACC for purposes of discounting RAI's future cash flows. A
WACC is based primarily on the cost of the company's debt, the cost of its equity, the relative
percentages of debt and equity in its capital structure, the volatility of the company's common
stock, an appropriate risk premium, and the applicable tax rate. (PX0115.0278; PX0115.0562;
PX0115.0627.)
[*285] There is very little disagreement between the WACC calculations performed by
Gompers, Zmijewski, and the Financial Advisors. The Financial Advisors used the following
discount rate ranges: Goldman, 5.00% to 6.50% (PX0115.0541); JPMorgan, 5.75% to 6.75%
(PX0115.0261; Clark Tr. 1444:13-17); and Lazard, 5.00% to 6.00% (PX0115.0583; de Gennaro
Tr. 226:7-10). Similarly, Gompers calculated the WACC for RAI as of July 25, 2017 at 5.78%,
(Gompers Tr. 761:11-762:4), and Zmijewski calculated the WACC for [**161] RAI as of July
25, 2017 at 5.7%, (Zmijewski Tr. 1243:18-1244:11, 1267:23-1268:22).
[*286] Gompers's and Zmijewski's WACC calculations resulted in only a 2% to 3% difference
in valuation. (Zmijewski Tr. 1268:7-22; Gompers Tr. 761:22-762:3.) The primary source of
disagreement between the two experts concerned whether to use the promised yield or the
expected yield when calculating RAI's cost of debt. Gompers's use of promised yield has greater
evidentiary support because the cash flows used in the DCF analyses were not risk-adjusted and
therefore were not truly expected cash flows, (Gompers Tr. 763:18-764:5), and Zmijewski's use
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of the expected yield was prone to error because he estimated the expected yield by referring to a
portfolio of similarly rated debt rather than by using the actual terms of RAI's debt instruments,
(Gompers Tr. 764:6-11).

iii. 2016 Share Repurchase Program
[*287] On occasions prior to BAT's October 20 Offer, members of RAI's finance or accounting
teams performed DCF calculations of RAI. In the ordinary course of business, RAI would, as an
initial matter, use an 8% WACC. (PX0047.0002; Gilchrist Tr. 422:14-424:2.) This 8% WACC
was "risk-adjusted" and used for purposes [**162] such as evaluating capital expenses.
(Gilchrist Tr. 423:15-424:2.) When analyzing riskier potential expenses, RAI would increase the
WACC, and for safer investments, it would decrease the WACC. Gompers opined that this type
of WACC calculation was not a market-derived cost of capital and was improper when
conducting a valuation. (Gompers Tr. 760:23-763:6; PX0047.0002.)
[*288] In June 2016, members of RAI's accounting team performed a DCF calculation in
connection with identifying the proposed authorization ceiling for the planned share repurchase
program. (See supra § II(E)(e).) Initially, RAI ran a range of DCFs with a wide variety of
discount rates and PGRs, amounting to 30 total scenarios and valuations. In its DCF calculation
for the share repurchase program, RAI created a series of scenarios using the first five years of
the June 2016 LE, a range of risk-adjusted WACCs from 7% to 9.5%, and a range of perpetuity
growth rates from 1% to 4%. The average of the 30 DCF valuations in June 2016 was $51.46 per
share. (DX0622, at tab "Sheet1.") RAI management later conducted additional scenarios, adding
60 scenarios using a set of "Constrained" projections and a different tax rate. The
average [**163] share price resulting from the second set of scenarios was $53.33. (DX0138, at
tab "Sheet1.")
[*289] The June 2016 DCF calculations also identified the "scenario utilized for purposes of
[RAI's] goodwill evaluation at most recent year-end[.]" This scenario used an "Assumed
WACC" of 9.5% and an "Assumed Terminal Growth Rate" of 3%. Applied to the first five years
of the June 2016 LE, the calculation resulted in a total equity value for RAI of $38.94 per share.
(DX0622, at tab "Sheet1"; Gilchrist Tr. 424:10-425:16.)
[*290] Flyer cites as support for his 1.0% PGR beginning in 2026 the PGR ranges of 1.0% to
4.0% appearing in the DCF calculation worksheet prepared by RAI in connection with the share
repurchase plan. (Flyer Tr. 1129:1-17, 1233:1-10; DX0138, at tab "Sheet1"; DX0622, at tab
"Sheet1.") Flyer's reliance on that worksheet is misplaced. The range of PGRs used by RAI
management cannot be considered in isolation from other inputs like the range of discount rates.
(Gompers Tr. 760:3-13; de Gennaro Tr. 328:10-329:4, 325:22-327:1.) Further, RAI's DCF
calculations used five years of projections and not ten years, and RAI's PGR range was applied
in 2022, not 2026. (DX0138, at tab "Sheet1"; [**164] DX0622, at tab "Sheet1.")
[*291] The evidence shows that the WACC and PGR used by RAI for purposes of the share
repurchase plan were inextricably linked, such that RAI was concerned more with the valuation
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produced by the interaction between the two inputs and less on what the precise inputs were.
(Gilchrist Tr. 421:12-20; Gompers Tr. 760:3-13.)
[*292] Accordingly, the Court concludes that the DCF scenarios run for the share repurchase
plan provide support for a fair value at or below the $59.64 per share deal price.

iv. Lazard's Has-Gets Valuation in the Lorillard Transaction
[*293] Prior to the Merger, Lazard had experience in large-scale tobacco transactions, including
advising RAI in connection with the Lorillard Transaction. (JX0006.0004; DX0151.0015; de
Gennaro Tr. 186:21-188:8.) As previously noted, de Gennaro was a lead banker for RAI in that
transaction. (DX0151.0006.)
[*294] Even though Lazard represented RAI as a buyer in the Lorillard Transaction, Lazard's
valuation work there was consistent with the work it performed on behalf of RAI as a seller in
the BAT transaction. RAI performed the same valuation analyses and incorporated similar
assumptions about industry trends in the tobacco [**165] industry into its valuation work. (de
Gennaro Tr. 224:10-226:6.)
[*295] In both the Lorillard Transaction and the Merger, RAI performed a "has-gets" valuation
analysis of the pro forma entity resulting from each transaction. (de Gennaro Tr. 195:2-9,
235:10-16.) A "has-gets" analysis is essentially a comparison between the projected value of the
existing company as a going concern—what a shareholder already "has"—and the projected
value of the potential newly created company—what a shareholder "gets." (de Gennaro 200:9201:7; Wajnert Tr. 133:5-21.)
[*296] In calculating its pro forma DCF valuation for RAI, Lazard used a range of perpetuity
growth rates between negative 0.5% and positive 0.5% and a WACC range of 5.0% to 6.0%.
(DX0393.0147-.0148; de Gennaro Tr. 194:23-195:16; 239:19-240:9.) The results of Lazard's
"has-gets" analysis of the pro forma combination of RAI and Lorillard was a valuation range of
$60.15 to $93.39 per share. (DX0393.0147.)
[*297] Dissenters relied on the high-end of this valuation in pre-trial briefing and at trial as
evidence supporting the reasonableness of their proposed $92.17 per share valuation. (Wajnert
Tr. 131:7-144:19; Defs.' Pretrial Br. 23-24, ECF No. 190.) [**166] However, as Wajnert
identified during his cross-examination and as de Gennaro later explained, Dissenters failed to
account for the fact that, following the close of RAI's acquisition of Lorillard in June 2015, RAI
effected a two-for-one stock split in August 2015—doubling the number of outstanding shares of
RAI common stock from 700 million to 1.4 billion. (Wajnert Tr. 170:3-7; de Gennaro Tr. 208:8209:13, 238:20-24; DX0317.0001, .0004; JX0023.0029, .0085.) As a result of the stock split,
Lazard's has-gets valuation from the Lorillard deal equates to a range of between $30.08 and
$46.70 per share. (de Gennaro Tr. 240:10-22, 241:12-242:5.) Thus, rather than supporting
Zmijewski's valuation, this analysis (which Dissenters themselves touted as an appropriate
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benchmark) strongly undermines it and instead supports the deal price as fair value for RAI's
shares.

c. Fair Value Does Not Include a Control Premium
[*298] A control premium is the additional value that a buyer ascribes to an asset under the
assumption that the buyer will be able to derive more value from that asset. (Gompers Tr.
789:14-17.) In other words, as Gompers explained, "the control premium is essentially what an
acquirer [**167] is willing to pay because they can better manage that asset, drive additional
cash flows from that asset or get synergies." (Gompers Tr. 845:17-20.)
[*299] The value attributable to a control premium is a subjective value on behalf of the
acquirer; that is, it only reflects the value that the acquirer believes it can add. (Gompers Tr.
912:10-17 ("[S]omebody buys the assets because they believe that they're going to be better.
They're going to be able to, you know, fire lazy managers and the like." (emphasis added)).)
Because this value is unique to the particular acquirer—here, BAT—the "control premium
represents the value only under the control of the [acquirer]." (Gompers Tr. 912:17-18.)
[*300] As Yilmaz testified, a company's value is determined from the perspective of "an
independent firm that is expected to go on as an independent entity[.]" (Yilmaz Tr. 1866:241867:7.) Yilmaz clarified: "Just to be sure we are all on the same page, this does not have any
kind of minority discount or some kind of acquisition premium or control premium attached to
it." (Yilmaz Tr. 1867:8-10.) Gompers agreed with Yilmaz: "So if what you're trying to value is
the firm, the fair value of the firm, assuming [**168] no transaction, you should not gross it up
by some control premium." (Gompers Tr. 911:7-9.)
[*301] Thus, evidence relating to whether certain calculations in the record need to have a
control premium added to them to be reflective of RAI's fair value is neither persuasive nor
relevant in determining RAI's fair value here. (Wajnert Tr. 165:23-166:4, 167:10-17, 168:4-13;
Gilchrist Tr. 551:1-17; Gompers Tr. 846:16-848:9, 854:24-855:3, 858:5-22, 901:19-902:16,
908:10-18; DX0277.0019-.0020; PX0115.0397-.0398; DX0277.0019-0020; PX0115.0397-0398;
Constantino Tr. 1829:24-1830:3, 1830:10-24, 1848:16-18.)

d. Fair Value Determination
[*302] Based on the admissible evidence of record, the Court concludes that Dissenters'
valuation of $92.17 is an extreme outlier. It implies a $50 billion mispricing of RAI's shares,
which if accepted would appear to be the largest mispricing ever identified in an appraisal case in
North Carolina, Delaware, or elsewhere, by far. Moreover, Dissenters' approach to valuation is
unreasonable both as a matter of common sense fact-finding and under North Carolina law,
insisting that the only reliable evidence of value is their expert's litigation-generated DCF
valuation, which [**169] is starkly inconsistent with all other evidence of value including the
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market evidence, contemporaneous DCFs, and various sanity checks that Dissenters' experts
agree are a typical part of the valuation process.
[*303] Dissenters' theory that RAI management and the Financial Advisors conspired to sell the
Company at a depressed price is not supported by the record, which revealed that diligent and
knowledgeable professionals worked in good faith to get the best result they could for RAI's
shareholders.
[*304] Based on the admissible evidence introduced at trial, the Court finds the fair value of
RAI as of the date of the Merger was no more than the $59.64 per share that Dissenters have
already been paid.

III.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
[*305] This case was properly designated as a mandatory complex business case and assigned
to the undersigned. The Court has authority to make its Findings of Fact following the
completion of the trial and the submission of all disputed issues for resolution by the Court
without a jury. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following
Conclusions of Law. Any Findings of Fact that are more appropriately deemed Conclusions of
Law are incorporated by [**170] reference into the Court's Conclusions of Law.

A. North Carolina's Appraisal Statute
[*306] HN1 "Appraisal is the exclusive remedy for a shareholder who wishes to exercise a
dissenter's rights." Osher v. Ridinger, 162 N.C. App. 155, 157, 589 S.E.2d 905, 907 (2004); see
also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del.
1988) ("An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy intended to provide shareholders
dissenting from a merger on grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their shareholdings.").
[*307] HN2 N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(a) provides that "[i]f a shareholder makes a demand for
payment under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-28 which remains unsettled, the corporation shall commence a
proceeding . . . by filing a complaint with the Superior Court Division of the General Court of
Justice to determine the fair value of the shares and accrued interest." The North
Carolina appraisal statute, however, does not create a general right to appraisal for shareholders
in a corporation like RAI with stock that is "[t]raded in an organized market and has at least
2,000 shareholders and a market value of at least twenty million dollars[.]" Id. § 55-13-02(b)(1).
Nevertheless, "appraisal rights shall be available pursuant to subsection (a) of this section for the
holders of any class or series of shares where the corporate action is [**171] an interested
transaction." Id. § 55-13-02(b)(4) (emphasis added).
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[*308] HN3 An "interested transaction" under the appraisal statute is "[a] corporate action
described in N.C.G.S. § 55-13-02(a), other than a merger pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 55-1104 or N.C.G.S. § 55-11-12, involving an interested person and in which any of the shares or
assets of the corporation are being acquired or converted." Id. § 55-13-01(7) (emphasis added).
[*309] The statute defines an "interested person" as
[a] person, or an affiliate of a person, who at any time during the one-year period immediately
preceding approval by the board of directors of the corporate action met any of the following
conditions: 1. Was the beneficial owner of twenty percent (20%) or more of the voting power of
the corporation, other than as owner of excluded shares[, or] 2. Had the power, contractually or
otherwise, other than as owner of excluded shares, to cause the appointment or election of
twenty-five percent (25%) or more of the directors to the board of directors of the corporation."
Id. § 55-13-01(7)(a).
[*310] The Merger was an "interested transaction" as defined in the appraisal statute because it
was a qualifying "corporate action" thereunder and BAT was an "interested person" due to its
42% shareholder stake and right under the Governance [**172] Agreement to appoint five out
of fourteen directors to the RAI Board. (Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶ 4; JX0020.0006, at § 2.01I(ii);
Wajnert Tr. 60:13-21, 61:25-62:8.) Therefore, Dissenters are entitled to appraisal rights.
[*311] As such, Dissenters are then entitled to a judgment for "the amount, if any, by which the
court finds the fair value of the shareholders' shares, plus interest, exceeds the amount paid by
the corporation to the shareholder for the shareholder's shares." N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(e)(i). The
trial court shall also assess all court costs of the proceeding "against the corporation, except that
the court may assess costs against all or some of the shareholders demanding appraisal, in
amounts the court finds equitable, to the extent the court finds such shareholders acted
arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith with respect to the rights provided by this
Article." Id. § 55-13-31(a).

B. Goal of the Appraisal Proceeding
[*312] There is little case law in North Carolina addressing judicial appraisal actions
under section 55-13-30. See Russell M. Robinson, II, Robinson on North Carolina Corporation
Law § 27.06[1] (7th ed. 2019) ("There is no reported appellate North Carolina decision
determining the fair value of shares in an appraisal proceeding."). HN4
Delaware's [**173] courts, in contrast, have developed a substantial body of law determining
fair value through judicial appraisal. Although Delaware's appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262, is
not identical to section 55-13-30, the two statutes each require a determination of "fair value"45
and are sufficiently similar that the Court finds decisions of the Delaware courts under section
262, although not binding, to be helpful guidance in interpreting the North
Carolina appraisal statute and deciding the fair value of RAI's shares in this action. See,
e.g., Corwin v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, 251 N.C. App. 45, 53, 796 S.E.2d 324, 331 (2016),
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("North Carolina courts often look to Delaware courts for guidance regarding unsettled business
law issues."), overruled on other grounds, 371 N.C. 605, 821 S.E.2d 729 (N.C. 2018); First
Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 2001 NCBC LEXIS 7, at *31 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 10,
2001) ("North Carolina courts have frequently looked to Delaware for guidance because of the
special expertise and body of case law developed in the Delaware Chancery Court and the
Delaware Supreme Court.").
[*313] HN5 Under the North Carolina and Delaware appraisal statutes, "[t]he trial court's
'ultimate goal in an appraisal proceeding is to determine the "fair or intrinsic value" of each share
on the closing date of the merger.'" In re Appraisal of Stillwater Mining Co., Consol. C.A. No.
2017-0385-JTL, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at *56-57 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019) (quoting Dell,
Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 20 (Del. 2017)). "There may
be no perfect methodology for arriving at [**174] fair value for a given set of facts," but a trial
court's conclusions should "follow logically from those facts and [be] grounded in relevant,
accepted financial principles." Dell, 177 A.3d at 22-23. "The basic concept of value . . . is that
the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his
proportionate interest in a going concern." Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., No.
9320-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, at *37 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (quoting Tri-Cont'l Corp.
v. Battye, 31 Del. Ch. 523, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)).

C. Burden of Proof
[*314] HN6 North Carolina's appraisal statute omits a specific reference to burden of proof.
Delaware's statute contemplates that "the burden to establish fair value by a preponderance of the
evidence rests on both the petitioner and the respondent." Laidler v. Hesco Bastion Envtl., Inc.,
C.A. No. 7561-VCG, 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *20 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2014) (emphasis
added). Given that both statutes compel the Court to determine fair value rather than to decide
between the parties' competing positions, the Court concludes that Delaware's approach is
consistent with the text and intent of North Carolina's appraisal statute and should be applied
here.
[*315] As a result, the Court concludes that, as in Delaware, HN7 "[n]o presumption,
favorable or unfavorable, attaches to either side's valuation, and [e]ach party also
bears [**175] the burden of proving the constituent elements of its valuation position . . . ,
including the propriety of a particular method, modification, discount, or premium." In re Panera
Bread Co., C.A. No. 2017-0593-MTZ, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *41-42 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31,
2020) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted). As the Delaware Chancery Court has
explained, in language this Court concludes should apply equally under section 55-13-30,
[T]he Court . . . has discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models as its general
framework or to fashion its own. The Court may evaluate the valuation opinions submitted by
the parties, select the most representative analysis, and then make appropriate adjustments to the
resulting valuation. The court also may make its own independent valuation calculation by . . .
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adapting or blending the factual assumptions of the parties' experts. It is also entirely proper for
the Court . . . to adopt any one expert's model, methodology, and mathematical calculations, in
toto, if that valuation is supported by credible evidence and withstands a critical judicial analysis
on the record. When . . . none of the parties establishes a valuation that is persuasive, the Court
must make a determination based on its own analysis. [**176]
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, at *59-60 (Del. Ch.
May 31, 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on
other grounds sub nom. Dell, 177 A.3d 1; see also IQ Holdings, Inc. v. Am. Commercial Lines
Inc., No. 6369-VCL, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 234, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 2013); Gholl v.
eMachines, Inc., C.A. No. 19444-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171, at *18 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24,
2004).

D. Fair Value
[*316] HN8 Under Delaware's appraisal statute, "fair value does not equal best
value." Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448-VCL, 2018
Del. Ch. LEXIS 160, at *45 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Court concludes that the same is true under North Carolina's appraisal statute. Rather, for
purposes of section 55-13-30, the Court concludes that, as in Delaware, a "[f]air value for the
purposes of appraisal 'means a price that is one that a reasonable seller, under all of the
circumstances, would regard as within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could
reasonably accept[.]'" Id. at *44 (quoting DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172
A.3d 346, 370 (Del. 2017)). Nor are dissenting shareholders entitled "to the best price
theoretically attainable had market conditions been the most seller-friendly." In
re Appraisal Solera Holdings, Inc., CONSOLIDATED C.A. No. 12080-CB, 2018 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 256, at *51 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018); see also Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at
*59 ("As the Delaware Supreme Court recently explained, 'fair value is just that, "fair." It does
not mean the highest possible price that a company might have sold for had Warren Buffet
negotiated for it on his best [**177] day and the Lenape who sold Manhattan on their worst.'"
(quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 370)).
[*317] Nevertheless, "'[i]t is not sufficient for . . . directors to achieve the best price that a
fiduciary will pay if that price is not a fair price.' Nor is it sufficient to obtain a fair price if that
price is not the best alternative available for the corporation and its stockholders." In re Dole
Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., CONSOLIDATED C.A. No. 8703-VCL, CONSOLIDATED
C.A. No. 9079-VCL , 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223, at *112 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (citation
omitted).
[*318] HN9

To determine the fair value of a corporation's stock,

the court can consider a wide range of factual evidence, including, but not limited to, the market
price, the merger price, other offers for the company or its assets, prices at which knowledgeable
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insiders sold their shares, internal corporate documents . . . and valuation work prepared for nonlitigation purposes.
Reynolds Am. Inc. v. Third Motion Equities Master Fund, Ltd., 2018 NCBC LEXIS 94, at *7-8
(N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2018) (quoting In re Dole Food Co., 114 A.3d 541, 550 (Del. Ch.
2014)). "Even where the parties have retained credible experts, the court should consider 'factual
evidence relating to valuation as a cross-check, or reality-check, on the litigation-driven figures
generated by [those] experts.'" Id. at *8 (quoting Dole Food, 114 A.3d at 550).
[*319] HN10 In North Carolina, as in Delaware, the court cannot "adopt at the outset an
'either-or' approach, [**178] thereby accepting uncritically the valuation of one party, as it is the
[c]ourt's duty to determine the core issue of fair value on the appraisal date." In re Appraisal of
Metromedia Int'l Gp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 899-900 (Del. Ch. 2009). "[T]he court should first
envisage the entire pre-merger company as a 'going concern,' as a standalone entity, and assess
its value as such. '[T]he corporation must be viewed as an on-going enterprise, occupying a
particular market position in the light of future prospects.'" Dell, 177 A.3d at 20 (quoting In
re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Del. 1992)); see also Stillwater, 2019 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 320, at *57 ("[T]he trial court must assess 'the value of the company . . . as a going
concern, rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition.'" (quoting M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v.
Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999))); IQ Holdings, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 234, at *2 ("Fair
value is determined by valuing the business as a going concern."). "[T]he appraisal endeavor is
'by design, a flexible process.'" Dell, 177 A.3d at 21 (quoting Golden Telecom Inc. v. Global GT
LP, 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010)).
[*320] HN11 The North Carolina appraisal statute provides that fair value must be
determined "immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action as to which the
shareholder asserts appraisal rights[.]" N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5). Thus, the Court must determine
fair value as of the Transaction Date rather than when the Merger Agreement was signed in
January 2017. See Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at *57 ("Put differently, the valuation
date is the date on which the merger closes."). "If the value of [**179] the corporation changes
between the signing of the merger agreement and the closing, then the fair value determination
must be measured by the 'operative reality' of the corporation at the effective time of the
merger." Id. at *57-58.
[*321] North Carolina's statute provides the Court with certain guidelines for performing its
valuation. HN12 Under N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5), fair value is to be assessed (i) "using
customary and current valuation concepts and techniques," (ii) "excluding any appreciation or
depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action unless exclusion would be inequitable," and
(iii) "without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status." The statute does not limit
or prescribe the specific "valuation concepts and techniques" that the Court may use, and
requires only that they be "customary and current" and "generally employed for similar business
in the context of the transaction requiring appraisal." Id.
[*322] In the merger context, courts, economists, and valuation professionals customarily and
currently use a wide range of valuation concepts and techniques, including but not limited to
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assessing market evidence of the value of the shares, assessing whether the transaction process
was one in [**180] which the resulting deal price is a reliable indicator of value, reviewing
internal valuations performed by the company prior to consideration of the merger, estimating
the net present value of the company's expected future cash flows (a DCF analysis), comparing
the company's trading multiples to the trading multiples of similar firms, and comparing the
multiples paid in the merger to the multiples paid in similar transactions. See Dole Food, 114
A.3d at 550; see also Sieg Co. v. Kelly, 568 N.W.2d 794, 798 (Iowa 1997) (applying statute that,
like North Carolina's, is patterned on the Model Business Corporation Act: "[a]s we have
observed on prior occasions, there is no predominant formula for arriving at fair value").
[*323] HN13 "[T]hose knowledgeable about valuation recognize that the field is as much art
as science." Dole Food, 114 A.3d at 553 n.7. "Fair value is, by now, a jurisprudential concept
that draws more from judicial writings than from the appraisal statute itself." Del. Open MRI
Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 310 (Del. Ch. 2006). Therefore, it is
appropriate to view skeptically the use of any one approach to the exclusion of all others,
particularly when that approach purports to identify with precision a value far out of line with all
other evidence. Dole Food, 114 A.3d at 557 ("Rather than supporting the petitioners' idealized
depiction of valuation as a scientific [**181] process that should be reserved exclusively for
neutral opiners, the martial metaphor suggests the need to consider other evidence as a check on
the warring experts' models."). Ultimately, "[w]hat is necessary in any particular appraisal case is
for the Court . . . to explain its fair value calculus in a manner that is grounded in the record
before it." In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp., CONSOLIDATED C.A. No. 12456-VCS, 2019 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 271, at *3 (Del Ch. Jul. 19, 2019) (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 388) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted).

E. Deal Price as Fair Value
[*324] HN14 Courts will in appropriate cases "afford[ ] substantial, if not exclusive, weight to
deal price in the fair value analysis." Dell, 177 A.3d at 30; see also In re Appraisal of AOL Inc.,
C.A. No. 11204-VCG, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018) ("[A]
transaction that demonstrates an unhindered, informed, and competitive market value is at least
first among equals of valuation methodologies in deciding fair value."). As the notes to the
Model Business Corporation Act, on which North Carolina's statute is based, explain, "A court
determining fair value under chapter 13 should give great deference to the aggregate
consideration accepted or approved by a disinterested board of directors for an appraisaltriggering transaction." Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.01 cmt. 2 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2016).46
[*325] Indeed, HN15 Delaware courts have [**182] recognized that "the price produced by
an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single
analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a
well-heeled client." Dell, 177 A.3d at 24. "The fact that a transaction price was forged in the
crucible of objective market reality (as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought
process of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that the price is fair." Van de Walle v.
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Unimation, Inc., C.A. No. 7046, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 27, at *50 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991). As a
result, Delaware courts will in appropriate cases "afford[ ] substantial, if not exclusive, weight to
deal price in the fair value analysis." Dell, 177 A.3d at 30.47
[*326] Nevertheless, HN16 "[t]here is no presumption that the deal price reflects fair
value." Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at *60; see also Dell, 177 A.3d at 21; DFC, 172
A.3d at 366-67. "As a general matter, the persuasiveness of the deal price depends on the
reliability of the sale process that generated it." Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at *6162. "If the sale process is not open or sufficiently reliable, the deal price should not be regarded
as persuasive evidence of fair value." Panera, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *43 (internal
quotation [**183] marks omitted). In short, "[a] deal price serves as a persuasive indicator of
fair value where the sale process bears 'objective indicia of fairness that rendered the deal price a
reliable indicator of fair value.'" Id. (quoting Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at *44).
[*327] Although "[t]here is no checklist or set of minimum characteristics for giving weight to
the deal price[,]" id., the Delaware courts have recognized "objective indicia of fairness" in a
deal process "where (i) information was sufficiently disseminated to potential bidders, so that (ii)
an informed sale could take place, (iii) without undue impediments imposed by the deal structure
itself[,]" AOL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63, at *21. Other "objective indicia" include "negotiations
at arm's-length; board deliberations without any conflicts of interest; buyer due diligence and
receipt of confidential information about the company's value; and seller extraction of multiple
price increases." Panera, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *44 (internal quotation marks, brackets,
and footnotes omitted).
[*328] As noted by the court in Panera, HN17 "[t]he Delaware Supreme Court has
particularly stressed the absence of post-signing bidders as an objective indicator that the sale
process was reliable and probative of fair value." Id. at *44; see also, e.g., Aruba, 210 A.3d at
136 ("It cannot [**184] be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure simply
because buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a
bidding contest against each other."); Dell, 177 A.3d at 29 ("Fair value entails at minimum a
price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would
pay."); id. at 33 (finding also that absence of a higher bid meant "that the deal market was
already robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment," which
"suggest[ed] the price [wa]s already at a level that [wa]s fair").
[*329] Although some Delaware decisions have suggested that, in certain circumstances, unless
there is a robust auction involving well-informed and unconstrained bidders, the transaction price
is not a reliable indicator of fair value, see Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d
497, 508 (Del. Ch. 2010) (declining to give any weight to the merger price where controlling
shareholders refused to allow an auction), the Delaware Supreme Court has not retreated from its
long-held view that when "the directors possess a body of reliable evidence with which to
evaluate the fairness of a transaction, they may approve that transaction without conducting an
active survey of the market[,]" Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del.
1989); see [**185] also, e.g., LongPath, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, at *70 ("I am not aware of
any case holding that a multi-bidder auction of a company is a prerequisite to finding that the
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merger price is a reliable indicator of fair value."); Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at
*70 (rejecting "a rule that pre-signing outreach is invariably required before the deal price can
serve as persuasive evidence of fair value"); Columbia Pipeline, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 303, at
*116-17 (declining to impose "minimum requirements for other sale processes to meet before the
deal price can be considered as a persuasive indicator of fair value").
[*330] Indeed, HN18 Delaware courts have recognized that "[a]t least for a widely held,
publicly traded company, a sale process could [result in an informed sale] through the public
announcement of a transaction and a sufficiently open post-signing market check." Stillwater,
2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at *70. Moreover, "a board may pursue a single transaction partner,
so long as the transaction is subject to an effective market check under circumstances in which
any bidder interested in paying more has a reasonable opportunity to do so." Id. at *75 (internal
quotation marks omitted). That said, "if a board fails to employ any traditional value
maximization tool, such as an auction, a broad market check, or a go-shop provision, that board
must possess an impeccable knowledge [**186] of the company's business for the Court to
determine that it acted reasonably." Panera, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *54 (quoting In re
OPENLANE, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 156, at *18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011)).
[*331] Even when the deal price is not given controlling weight, it remains a relevant indicator
of fair value that should not be ignored, particularly when independent and well-informed
directors negotiated with the buyer at arm's length. See Dole Food, 114 A.3d at 559; Jarden,
2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 271, at *10 (finding fair value to be consistent with the "less reliable, but
still relevant, deal price less synergies value"); Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft
Cos., C.A. No. 11184-VCS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 255, at *73-74 (Del. Ch. July 27,
2018) (concluding that even when a merger price is not a reliable indicator of fair value, "[t]hat
does not mean, however, that the Merger Price is irrelevant for purposes of the Court's fair value
determination. To the contrary, it is appropriate to consider the Merger Price as a 'reality check'
on the Court's DCF valuation" (emphasis omitted)).
[*332] In this case, there are numerous objective indicia of a robust deal process that led to a
deal price that reliably reflected RAI's fair value.
[*333] First, RAI's stock traded in an efficient market. At all relevant times, the Company had a
market capitalization of approximately $67 billion, its shares were publicly traded in high
volumes and with high liquidity on the NYSE, its stock was widely covered [**187] by equity
analysts, information concerning the Company was widely available and readily disseminated,
and the market reacted to breaking news and information concerning the Company.
(PX0063.0010, .0025; PX0115.0181; JX0017.0003; de Gennaro Tr. 187:18-188:8, 215:1523); see, e.g., Dell, 177 A.3d at 6-7, 27 (noting that "the evidence suggests that the market for
Dell's shares was actually efficient and, therefore, likely a possible proxy for fair value" because,
among other things, Dell's stock actively traded on the NASDAQ, the company had a $20 billion
market cap, the stock was widely covered by equity analysts, and its share price "quickly
reflected the market's view on breaking developments"); Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at
*164, *173 (relying on certain "attributes of market efficiency characteristics such as market

90

capitalization, public float, weekly trading volume, bid-ask spread, analyst following, and market
reaction to breaking news and information").
[*334] Second, through the Governance Agreement and its other contractual relationships with
BAT, RAI had freedom to make decisions independent of BAT concerning the Merger, (Wajnert
Tr. 63:18-64:3; JX0023.0080), providing reliable evidence that the Merger was an arm's-length
transaction. Indeed, [**188] the Transaction Committee twice rejected BAT's merger offers
without countering, strongly suggesting that the Transaction was prepared to recommend RAI's
continued independence as an alternative to executing a transaction with BAT unless BAT
increased the bid price. (JX0023.0067-.0073.) Moreover, there was ample evidence that RAI
seriously considered strategic alternatives to a merger with BAT. (Wajnert Tr. 73:24-74:24;
Cameron Dep. Tr. 106:16-107:11; Crew Tr. 665:16-666:15); see, e.g., Solera, 2018 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 256, at *52 (HN19 "Reliance on the deal price as evidence of fair value is strengthened
when independent representatives of a target company actively negotiate with potential buyers
and demonstrate a real willingness to reject inadequate bids.").
[*335] Third, the Transaction Committee and the Board were free of conflicts in negotiating
and deliberating upon the Merger. The Transaction Committee was composed of fully
independent, sophisticated executives with substantial experience in considering and negotiating
complex mergers and acquisition transactions. From management's regular presentations and
submissions to the Committee and the Board, including those concerning RAI management's
financial projections, the Committee [**189] and the Board had impeccable knowledge of the
Company's business and its future prospects for growth. The Committee and the Board were able
to consider the proposed transaction and any alternatives, including maintaining RAI as an
independent entity, fully free of conflicts, and were aware that BAT would not force a deal on an
unwilling RAI. (de Gennaro Tr. 214:9-215:14; Wajnert Tr. 63:4-10, 68:8-69:17); see, e.g., Dell,
177 A.3d at 28 (citing fact that special committee was "composed of independent, experienced
directors and armed with the power to say 'no'" as factor supporting fairness of deal
price); Columbia Pipeline, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 303, at *64-65 (noting six of seven board
members were experienced outside directors in supporting fairness of deal price).
[*336] Fourth, BAT assessed RAI's value having access to extensive public information about
the Company as well as confidential, nonpublic information shared at regular RAI Board
meetings. (Wajnert Tr. 146:15-149:15; Gompers Tr. 844:22-845:2); see, e.g., Panera, 2020 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 42, at *45-46 (citing buyer's access to public and nonpublic information in
supporting fairness of deal price); see also, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (similarly noting that deal
price was "informed by robust public information[ ] and easy access to deeper, non-public
information"). [**190]
[*337] Fifth, as a result of the Transaction Committee's efforts, RAI was able to extract four
price increases from BAT during the course of the Merger negotiations. These increases—from
$56.50 to $59.64 per share—resulted in an additional $4.5 billion for RAI's shareholders.
(JX0023.0068-.0076; Wajnert Tr. 80:19-22; Nowell Dep. Tr. 173:25-175:10, 175:17176:25); see, e.g., Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (holding the deal price supported fair value where "[t]he
Committee, composed of independent, experienced directors and armed with the power to say
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'no,' persuaded [buyer] to raise its bid six times"); Panera, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *4647 (finding two price increases supported deal price as fair value); Columbia Pipeline, 2019 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 303, at *65-66 (holding the deal price supported fair value where committee
extracted two price increases from buyer).
[*338] Finally, although the Transaction Committee did not solicit other buyers or engage in an
auction process, no third-party bidders expressed interest or submitted a bid during the Merger
negotiations or in the six-month post-agreement signing period despite widespread public
awareness of BAT's October 20 Offer soon after it was made. (Wajnert Tr. 90:3-6; Clark Tr.
1429:16-18); see, e.g., Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at *131 (HN20 "The failure of
any other party to come forward provides [**191] significant evidence of fairness, because
'[f]air value entails at minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no
class of buyers in the market would pay.'" (quoting Dell, 177 A.3d at 29)).
[*339] Dissenters contend that RAI's deal process was wholly unreliable and thus that the deal
price in no way reflects fair value. In particular, Dissenters' experts, Yilmaz and Zmijewski,
opine that the Transaction Committee's failure to seek out potential buyers other than BAT,
(Yilmaz Tr. 1938:1-3), or to push BAT to dilute its shares, subsidize potential bidders' costs, or
offer support for an alternative transaction, (Yilmaz Tr. 1941:21-1942:1; Zmijewski Tr. 1311:38), render the deal price unreliable, (Yilmaz Tr. 1868:11-14; Zmijewski Tr. 1308:11-1309:13).
As proof, Zmijewski asserts that Japan Tobacco was interested in acquiring RAI but did not bid
due to BAT's ownership position. (Zmijewski Tr. 1312:20-1313:3.) Dissenters suggest that,
given Japan Tobacco's acquisition of six tobacco companies in the past five years, Japan
Tobacco would have bid for RAI if BAT had been open to an alternative bid. (DX0272.0001
(email stating "in a different world where BAT did not own its stake [Japan
Tobacco] [**192] would have made a play for RAI").
[*340] The Court disagrees. While RAI could have improved the optics of its deal process by
actually soliciting bidders and pressing BAT to encourage alternative bidders, there were few (if
any) companies in the tobacco industry or adjacent industries that could have made an offer for
RAI. Although Japan Tobacco appears to have been the only one of these potential bidders that
conceivably might have bid for RAI other than BAT, Japan Tobacco never expressed interest or
submitted a bid despite its almost certain knowledge of BAT's October 20 Offer and the public
deal announcement in January 2017. (Wajnert Tr. 171:19-172:12.) No evidence was introduced
from Japan Tobacco (or any other potential third-party bidder) to suggest that Japan Tobacco (or
any other potential third-party bidder) would have bid had BAT been open to such an offer, and
the evidence offered to prove Japan Tobacco's interest—an internal email within Goldman
reporting what an unnamed person at Japan Tobacco allegedly said—is hearsay and hardly
persuasive. (DX0272.0001.)
[*341] In addition, while the Merger Agreement included a no-shop provision, BAT's
information rights, and a $1 billion [**193] termination fee, (JX0023.0061-.0062), no
persuasive evidence was introduced to suggest that these provisions undermined the sales
process or otherwise discouraged other bidders, including Japan Tobacco, from coming forward.
As a result, the Court finds that the Committee's decision not to solicit potential alternative
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buyers or to push BAT to change its position on alternative bids does not undermine the
reliability of the deal price under the circumstances here. See, e.g., Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (where
news of a potential sale was public, "interested parties would have approached the Company . . .
if serious about pursuing a deal"); Panera, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *49 (finding failure of
market participants "to pursue a merger when they had a free chance to do so . . . provides
significant evidence of fairness" of the deal price); Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc.,
939 A.2d 34, 60 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("If MONY was truly worth $43 per share" rather than the $31
deal price, "certainly some savvy investor likely would have competed with AXA, as each dollar
per share below that level, according to Highfields's theory, would have resulted in the purchaser
realizing approximately $50 million in value."); see also, e.g., Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136.
[*342] The additional testimony Dissenters presented to dispute the reliability of the deal
price, [**194] in particular that from Yilmaz, was also unpersuasive. Yilmaz conceded that he
did not consider the specifics of the Merger in forming his opinions and instead opined as a
"theorist." (Yilmaz Tr. 1968:24-1969:7.) He also acknowledged that it was possible that a board
of directors could obtain fair value even where the sole bidder was a large blockholder, (Yilmaz
Tr. 1974:7-1975:18), explaining further that
if the board was all well meaning and [the] board knew everything that was relevant and they
don't give in to any pressure and they were able to do the best thing for their shareholders, it is
possible that they can get fair value,
(Yilmaz Tr. 2009:12-2010:2).
[*343] In addition, while he opined that it was "highly likely" that BAT's ownership stake
adversely affected the deal price, (Yilmaz Tr. 1949:23-1950:9), Yilmaz did not attempt to
measure any supposed effects deriving therefrom. He also did not analyze the possibility of
RAI's suffering from agency problems due to BAT's ownership stake or review the deposition
testimony of the Transaction Committee members who engaged with BAT in the negotiations.
(Yilmaz Tr. 1976:4-1977:6, 1978:14-1980:6, 1981:23-1982:6.) In fact, in giving
his [**195] opinion on the reliability of the deal price, Yilmaz did not consider or assess
whether the Transaction Committee actually resisted BAT in the negotiations. (Yilmaz Tr.
1977:7-1979:15.) Yilmaz's theoretical opinions are insufficient to undermine the compelling
evidence indicating that the deal process led to a price reflecting the fair value of RAI.
[*344] Further, the "golden parachute" compensation paid to certain members of RAI
management and the contingent fee nature of the compensation paid to the Financial Advisors
does not undermine the reliability of the deal price as fair value. There was no evidence that any
member of RAI's management placed his or her personal interests above the best interests of the
Company, and the same is true for each of the Financial Advisors. Indeed, HN21 Delaware
courts have noted that "[c]ontingency clauses are standard in financial advisor agreements and
seldom create a conflict of interest." Panera, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *74. There was no
evidence of such a conflict here. See id. at *76 (finding that a financial advisor's contingency fee
did not undermine the reliability of the deal price and concluding that "[i]n any event, [the
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advisor's] fairness opinion would not have precluded a board determination [**196] that it was
better for [the seller] to remain a standalone company").
[*345] Similarly, Dissenters' challenges to the reliability of the information RAI provided to the
Financial Advisors, including their use of five-year rather than ten-year projections, does not
undermine the deal price's reliability. To the contrary, it is clear these projections, increased by
the management overlays, were the most accurate and up-to-date projections RAI had
available. Cf. Dole Food, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223, at *102 (criticizing management for
"[w]ithholding the company's latest projections" from the special committee and advisors
(internal quotation mark omitted)).
[*346] Nor does the Financial Advisors' choice of inputs for their DCF analyses, including their
choice of perpetuity growth rate and their decision to apply that rate in year six of their DCF
calculations, undermine the deal price's reliability. See, e.g., Merion Capital, 2016 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 189, at *55 (finding financial advisors' DCF-based valuation ranges consistent with
market indicators and thus supportive of deal price as fair value).
[*347] Accordingly, based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that the Merger was
negotiated at arm's length by independent, fully informed, and deeply knowledgeable directors
with the [**197] assistance of independent and experienced advisors, all of whom had extensive
experience in the tobacco industry and a deep and impeccable knowledge of RAI and its
potential opportunities, challenges, and future prospects. The Committee and the Board acted
with full transparency and in relentless pursuit of value, rejected two BAT offers outright,
indicating their seriousness in continuing as an independent entity, and extracted four price
increases from BAT resulting in an additional $4.5 billion for RAI's shareholders. The non-BAT
shareholders voted overwhelmingly (99% of shares voted) in favor of the Merger, a transaction
that had received widespread favorable reaction from industry observers and analysts. As in Dell,
and particularly given the fact that RAI's size and industry position meant that there were few, if
any, likely bidders other than BAT, "[n]othing in the record suggests that increased competition
would have produced a better result." 177 A.3d at 28. The Court thus concludes that, under the
circumstances present here, even without more aggressive outreach and a competitive auction,
the resulting deal price is reliable evidence of RAI's fair value.
[*348] Consideration of the Delaware [**198] Supreme Court's decision in Golden Telecom, a
case heavily relied upon by Dissenters, does not change this result. Although the case has
numerous similarities with the case at bar, including the presence of large, 40%-plus
shareholders who were unsupportive of an alternative transaction, RAI had certain rights and
leverage through the Governance Agreement that were not present in Golden Telecom. While the
target board in Golden Telecom treated the deal like "a merger proposal by a controlling
stockholder," 993 A.2d at 508, here, as the Supreme Court of North Carolina has concluded, the
Governance Agreement prevented BAT from having effective control of RAI. See Corwin, 371
N.C. at 625, 821 S.E.2d at 743. Further, the contemporaneous market reaction to the deal
in Golden Telecom, where the "weight of the evidence suggest[ed] that the market believed that
[the buyer] was getting a bargain[,]" id. at 509, was far different than here, where the market
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believed the Transaction Committee succeeded in negotiating a fair price, (Gompers Tr. 802:25803:8; Yilmaz Tr. 2003:4-22).

F. Alternative Methods of Valuation
[*349] HN22 In Delaware, the appraisal statute expressly commands a court
in appraisal actions to "take into account all relevant factors" and not to ignore [**199] any
indicia of fair value. 8 Del. C. § 262(h). This Court has previously held that "[e]ven where the
parties have retained credible experts, the court should consider 'factual evidence relating to
valuation as a cross-check, or reality-check, on the litigation-driven figures generated by [those]
experts.'" Reynolds, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 94, at *12 (quoting Dole Food, 114 A.3d at 550).)
Accordingly, the Court considers alternative methods of valuation to test the reliability of the
deal price as fair value.

a. Unaffected Market Price
[*350] HN23 One common valuation concept is to consider the price an asset fetches in the
market. As this Court has previously observed in an appraisal action,
[P]ublicly traded companies operate in an environment where there is a market mechanism
which provides a strong, if not determinative, indicator of the value of minority shares. There are
federal and state statutory protections built into transactions involving publicly held companies.
Information from which shareholders can evaluate transactions is readily available from public
companies because of disclosure and filing requirements of the federal securities laws.
Beam v. Worldway Corp., 1997 NCBC LEXIS 8, at *14 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1997).48
[*351] HN24 Delaware precedent is in accord, holding that "the price a stock trades at in an
efficient market is an important indicator [**200] of its economic value that should be given
weight[.]" Aruba, 210 A.3d at 138; Jarden, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 271, at *58 n.322 (noting that
courts may "look to stock price to corroborate a fair value conclusion"). "Indeed, '[w]here there
is an established market for a corporation's stock, market value must be considered in appraising
the value of the corporation's shares.'" Dole Food, 114 A.3d at 559 (quoting Cooper v. Pabst
Brewing Co., Civil Action No. 7244, 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *22 (Del. Ch. June 8,
1993)). "[T]he efficient market hypothesis . . . teaches that the price produced by an efficient
market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst,
especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a wellheeled client." Dell, 177 A.3d at 24.
[*352] For this reason, courts have used a company's unaffected market price as a barometer for
fair value as "[m]arket prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques
because, unlike, e.g., a single person's discounted cash flow model, the market price should
distill the collective judgment of the many based on all the publicly available information." DFC,
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172 A.3d at 369-70; see also Jarden, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 271, at *58 ("When the market is
efficient, the trading price of a company's stock can be a proxy for fair value.").
[*353] HN25 The Delaware Supreme Court has noted the importance of market price in
determining the fair [**201] value of highly regulated industries like tobacco:
Publicly traded companies in industries like tobacco, energy, pharmaceuticals, and certain
commercial products are subject to close regulation, the development of which can affect their
future cash flows. Precisely because of that reality, the market's assessment of the future cash
flows necessarily takes regulatory risk into account as it does with all the other reasonable
uncertain factors that affect a company's future.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 372.
[*354] Dissenters' arguments attacking the use of RAI's market price are unavailing. In
particular, the Court rejects Dissenters' contention that a stock's trading price can never show fair
value because it implicitly contains a minority discount. (Defs.' Opening Post-Trial Br. 26-27,
49.) While Dissenters' argument may have some currency in closely-held corporations, it has no
application here in the public company setting. (Gompers Tr. 787:1-9); see, e.g., Lawrence A.
Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the "Implicit Minority
Discount" in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 5-6 (2007) (stating that "not a
single piece of financial or empirical scholarship affirms the core premise of the [implicit
minority discount] [**202] - that public company shares systematically trade at a substantial
discount to the net present value of the corporation").
[*355] Based on the evidence presented and the Court's findings of fact concerning RAI's
Unaffected Stock Price and its Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price, the Court concludes that each
support the reliability of the deal price of $59.64 per share as the fair value of RAI's shares as of
the Transaction Date.

b. Discounted Cash Flow Analyses
[*356] HN26 Courts may also consider more theoretical "valuation concepts and techniques,"
such as analyses of comparable companies, comparable precedent transactions, and DCF
analyses.
[*357] A DCF analysis is an accepted valuation methodology. See, e.g., Columbia Pipeline,
2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 303, at *137 ("The DCF method is a technique that is generally accepted
in the financial community."). "A DCF analysis, although complex in practice, is rooted around a
simple principle: the value of the company at the time of the merger is simply the sum of its
future cash flows discounted back to present value." AOL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 63, at
*26 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet, "a DCF analysis is only as reliable as the inputs
relied upon and the assumptions underlying those inputs. . . . [T]he use of math should not
obscure [**203] the necessarily more subjective exercise in judgment that a valuation exercise
requires." Id. at *26-27 (internal quotation marks omitted). Importantly, "[i]nputs in a discounted
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cash flow are predictions which are necessarily speculative in nature." Harris v. Rapid-Am.
Corp., Civil Action No. 6462, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 166, at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 1990), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).
[*358] HN27 The weight and utility of DCF analysis and other methodologies will depend on
the specific circumstances of the case. They are generally given less weight in cases like this one
where there was an active public market for the stock and a robust deal process. See, e.g., DFC,
172 A.3d at 370 ("[A] singular discounted cash flow model is often most helpful when there isn't
an observable market price."); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340,
359 (Del. Ch. 2003) ("In view of the market's opportunity to price UFG directly as an entity, the
use of alternative valuation techniques like a DCF analysis is necessarily a second-best method
to derive value.").
[*359] The DCF calculations in this case aptly illustrate the Delaware Supreme Court's
observation that, despite their widespread acceptance, "DCF valuations involve many inputs—all
subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight
differences in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps." Dell, 177 A.3d at 38.49 The
Delaware [**204] Court of Chancery has explained,
The DCF model typically can generate a wide range of estimates. In the world of real
transactions (capital budgeting decisions for example) the hypothetical, future-oriented, nature of
the model is not thought fatal to the DCF technique because those employing it typically have an
intense personal interest in having the best estimates and assumptions used as inputs. In the
litigation context use of the model does not have that built-in protection.
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civil Action No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *26 n.17
(Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990).
[*360] The wide variability and susceptibility to manipulation attendant to DCF analysis
in appraisal litigation has increasingly caused Delaware courts to question its reliability. See,
e.g., Highfields, 939 A.2d at 52-53 (stating that the DCF methodology "has much less utility in
cases where the transaction giving rise to appraisal was an arm's-length merger"); In
re Appraisal of Jarden Corp., CONSOLIDATED C.A. No. 12456-VCS, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS
994, at *3 n.4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 2019) ("I am more convinced than ever that the experts'
inability to agree on inputs is evidence that DCF is not reliable here, particularly given the
presence of a reliable 'market-based metric.'" (quoting Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at
*174); Columbia Pipeline, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 303, at *140, *142 ("Dell and DFC teach that a
trial court should have greater confidence in market indicators and less confidence in a divergent
expert determination. . . . The wide swings in output [**205] that result from legitimate debate
over reasonable inputs undermine the reliability of [petitioners' expert's] DCF model.").
[*361] This is particularly so for post-merger DCFs prepared by experts for purposes of
litigation. See, e.g., Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., C.A. No. 19734, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS
75, at *28 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004) ("[T]his court is inherently suspicious of post-merger,
litigation-driven forecasts because 'the possibility of hindsight bias and other cognitive
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distortions seems untenably high.'" (quoting Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del. Ch.
2001))).
[*362] HN28 When a DCF analysis is used, Delaware courts have increasingly cautioned that
"it is only reliable when it can be verified by alternative methods to DCF or by real world
valuations." S. Muoio & Co. v. Hallmark Entm't Invs. Co., Civil Action No. 4729-CC, 2011 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 43, at *75 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2011), aff'd, 35 A.3d 419 (Del. 2011). Indeed, courts in
Delaware have consistently rejected DCF-based valuations that differ dramatically from other
evidence of value. See, e.g., Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at *3 ("The experts disagreed
over too many inputs, and the resulting valuation swings were too great, for this decision to rely
on a [DCF] model when a market-tested indicator is available."); Columbia Pipeline, 2019 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 303, at *139 ("[The expert's] valuation of $32.47 per share stands in contrast with
contemporaneous market evidence."); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Civil Action No. 7129,
2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, at *13-14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005) ("Easton's projections are supported by several independent
indicia of value, while Torkelsen [**206] does not even attempt to perform reasonableness
checks upon his valuation."); Gray v. Cytokine Pharmascis., Inc., C.A. No. 17451, 2002 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 48, at *23 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) ("In sum, when compared to other indications of
value, Davis's valuation is such an outlier that it casts doubt on its reliability, quite apart from its
exact assumptions and methodologies.").
[*363] Applying these principles here, and for the reasons discussed at length above, (see
supra § II(F)(b)), the Court concludes that the DCF analyses performed by the Financial
Advisors were reliable and constitute persuasive evidence that the fair value of RAI's shares as of
the Transaction Date was at or below the deal price of $59.64 per share.
[*364] The Court further concludes that Zmijewski's DCF analysis and his valuation of RAI at
$92.17 per share is unreliable. Indeed, Zmijewski's valuation of RAI's shares for this litigation is
an extreme outlier when compared to all other indicia of value in the record and is based on
projections unsuited for valuation analysis and a blended PGR that is unsupported by credible
and persuasive evidence, undermining its reliability either as a basis to challenge the deal price
as fair value or as support for Dissenters' requested $92.17 per share valuation.

c. Comparable Companies/Comparable [**207] Transactions Analyses
[*365] HN29 It is common practice to cross-check the output of a DCF analysis against
comparable companies analyses. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 386-88 (finding it reasonable for the
Chancery Court to consider comparable companies in fair value determination). "The idea is that
if the market expects comparable companies to grow at a certain rate, then one can infer the
growth of the subject company by applying a multiple drawn from the comparables to a relevant
metric, such as EBITDA or revenues." In re Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., C.A. No. 5713-CS,
2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, at *29 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012).
[*366] As the court in Panera recently explained,
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Before a comparable companies multiples analysis can be undertaken with any measure of
reliability, it is necessary to establish a suitable peer group through appropriate empirical
analysis. If, and only if, a proper peer set can be selected, the next step in the comparable
companies analysis is to select an appropriate multiple and then determine where on the
distribution of peers the target company falls. Where the experts' identified companies are too
divergent from the company in terms of size, public status, and products, to form meaningful
analogs for valuation purposes, this Court will disregard this valuation metric.
Panera, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at *100 (internal quotation marks and
footnotes [**208] omitted).
[*367] HN30 Like a comparable companies analysis, "[a] comparable transactions analysis is
an accepted valuation tool in . . . appraisal cases. The analysis involves identifying similar
transactions, quantifying those transactions through financial metrics, and then applying the
metrics to the company at issue to ascertain a value." Highfields, 939 A.2d at 54. "The utility of
the comparable transactions methodology is directly linked to the 'similarity between the
company the court is valuing and the companies used for comparison.'" Id. (quoting Lane v.
Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., C.A. No. 12207-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, at *126 (Del.
Ch. July 30, 2004)).
[*368] Based on the evidence presented and as discussed above, the Court concludes that the
comparable companies and comparable transactions analyses performed by the Financial
Advisors each serve as a useful market or "sanity" check showing that Zmijewski's valuation is
clearly excessive. (See supra § F(a)(iii).) The analyses are less useful as support for the deal price
as fair value. The Court gives no weight to the comparable companies analysis for this
purpose, see, e.g., Lane, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 108, at *126 ("HN31 At some point, the
differences become so large that the use of the comparable company method becomes
meaningless for valuation purposes." (quoting In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485,
490 (Del. Ch. 1991))), but finds that the Lorillard Transaction [**209] provides support that the
deal price is a reliable indicator of the fair value of RAI's shares as of the Transaction Date.

d. Contemporaneous Market Reaction
[*369] HN32 Delaware courts often consider analyst commentary concerning proposed
transaction prices in assessing the valuation of a company in appraisal actions. See, e.g., DFC,
172 A.3d at 353, 373. Contemporaneous analyst reaction to BAT's October 20 Offer was
decidedly positive, generally supporting the reliability of the deal price as fair value for RAI's
shares. This is in marked contrast to the two cases on which Dissenters principally rely where the
opening bid in each was criticized as unfair to shareholders: Golden Telecom, 993 A.2d at 509,
and the RJR Nabisco transaction from the 1980s, (Yilmaz Tr. 1997:22-1998:2, 2000:17-21).
[*370] Moreover, the vast majority of RAI's public shareholders, including the Company's
officers and directors, approved the deal price negotiated by the Transaction Committee even
though the majority-of-the-minority condition gave them the power to vote it down. (Corr. Stip'd
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Facts ¶ 18; DX0277.0011; DX0324.0002; JX0023.0044; Crew Tr. 671:23-672:10.) Such strong
non-BAT officer, director, and shareholder approval provides powerful, contemporaneous
evidence that [**210] the deal price constituted fair value for RAI's shares. See,
e.g., Technicolor, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *105 ("Yet knowledgeable officers and directors
all sold their stock for $23 per share. This fact while itself not conclusive is relevant in
concluding that as of January 24, 1983, sophisticated, knowledgeable persons would not have
concluded that Technicolor stock had an inherent value of $62.75[.]").
[*371] The Court finds unpersuasive Yilmaz's contention that the shareholder vote should be
disregarded because the shareholders did not have the June 2017 ten-year projections. (Yilmaz
Tr. 1903:20-1904:22.) The Court finds little relevance in RAI's year six through ten projections
for valuation purposes, and no persuasive evidence was presented that disclosure of those
projections would have changed the shareholder vote. Moreover, the October 2016 Projections
disclosed in the Proxy were more optimistic than the first five years of the June 2017 projections,
(Zmijewski Tr. 1370:17-1372:7), providing no basis to conclude that shareholders would have
voted against the transaction had the June 2017 projections been disclosed.
[*372] Further, Mason Capital's own contemporaneous view of RAI's value on a standalone
basis shortly after [**211] the October 20 Offer suggests that the deal price was for fair value.
(See supra § II(F)(a)(vi).) That valuation of $54.44 per share—derived before litigation
commenced and Mason received in discovery RAI's ten-year projections on which so much of
Dissenters' case rests—serves as a useful market check to the $59.64 per share deal price and
undermines the reliability of both Mason's litigation valuation of $88.16 per share and
Zmijewski's $92.17 per share valuation as reasonable determinations of fair value.

G. Exclusion of Value in Anticipation of the Corporate Action
[*373] The Court must value RAI as a standalone business as of the closing date on July 25,
2017, as though the Merger were not planned and did not happen. See HN33 N.C.G.S. § 5513-01(5) (requiring court to "exclud[e] any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the
[merger]").50 That means the Court must exclude any value arising from synergies that were
expected from the Merger. See Boettcher v. IMC Mortg. Co., 871 So. 2d 1047, 1053 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004) (determining fair value under an appraisal statute patterned on the Model
Business Corporation Act "required the exclusion of any appreciation or depreciation in IMC's
shares based upon anticipation of the consummation of the proposed asset sale"); see also Jarden,
2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 271, at *6-7 (noting [**212] that Delaware law requires "back[ing] out"
synergies (citing ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., Nos. 8508-VCL, 9042-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 125, at *79 (Del Ch. July 21, 2017))).
[*374] Here, the deal price includes the portion of the $400 million (or approximately $0.28 per
share) in anticipated synergies that was paid to the RAI shareholders. (JX0021.0007;
JX0023.0068.) Dissenters are not entitled to the value of those synergies, so those amounts must
be deducted from the deal price to arrive at fair value under the statute. See, e.g., Union Ill., 847
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A.2d at 356 HN34 (instructing courts to exclude "any value that the selling company's
shareholders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject company, not as a
stand-alone going concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from which synergistic gains can
be extracted"); Stillwater, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 320, at *138 ("In an arm's-length, synergistic
transaction, the deal price generally will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for a
premium that includes . . . a share of the anticipated synergies[.]" (quoting Olson v. ev3, 2011
Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, at *10 (Del Ch. Feb. 21, 2011))).
[*375] Likewise, the Court should not adjust its valuation of RAI to incorporate a control
premium because [**213] HN35 a control premium is not part of the company as a standalone
enterprise. As Gompers testified, a "control premium is the value to somebody else who [thinks
he/she] can derive more value from [the existing] assets" than current management can, which is
"not the value of that company under the existing management — assuming that no transaction
occurred." (Gompers Tr. 789:14-17.) Thus, a control premium does not inhere in the standalone
company but instead "represents the value only under the control of the [acquirer.]" (Gompers
Tr. 912:17-18.) As such, a control premium is value arising "in anticipation of" the
merger, N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5), and, accordingly, must be excluded from the appraisal value of
the pre-merger company, (Yilmaz Tr. 1867:8-10; Gompers Tr. 911:7-9).

H. No Discount for Lack of Marketability or Minority Status
[*376] HN36 North Carolina's appraisal statute also provides that the valuation should not be
discounted "for lack of marketability or minority status." N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5). Neither lack of
marketability nor minority status are at issue in this case.
[*377] First, there is no lack of marketability of RAI shares because of RAI's highly liquid and
transparent market on the NYSE. (JX0017.0003.) Second, Dissenters [**214] did not have
"minority status" because RAI did not have a majority or controlling shareholder. (JX0023.0080;
Wajnert Tr. 63:18-64:18.) As the Supreme Court of North Carolina has already held, BAT was
not a controlling shareholder because the Governance Agreement placed "contractual handcuffs"
on BAT that prevented it from oppressing RAI's remaining shareholders or otherwise exercising
control. Corwin, 371 N.C. at 619, 821 S.E.2d at 739. To the extent Dissenters suggested at trial
that the existence of a large blockholder can affect the value of a company's shares, (Yilmaz Tr.
1969:8-1971:2), Dissenters offered no specific evidence in support of that theory in this case.

I. Interest, Attorneys' Fees, and Costs
[*378] Section 55-13-30(e) provides, in relevant part, that "each shareholder made a party to
the proceeding is entitled to judgment either (i) for the amount, if any, by which the court finds
the fair value of the shareholder's shares, plus interest, exceeds the amount paid by the
corporation to the shareholder for the shareholder's shares[.]" HN37 Under N.C.G.S. § 55-1301(6), "interest" is calculated by applying the statutory rate "from the effective date of the
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corporate action until the date of payment." Thus, under the statute, interest stops running on an
amount [**215] when that amount is paid. As a result, because RAI's payment obligations to
Dissenters ceased when it paid each Dissenter $59.64 per share plus interest in 2017, no further
interest is due to Dissenters under the statute. Other states with similar statutes have interpreted
their statutes similarly.51
[*379] Dissenters' arguments to the contrary are without merit. They argue that section 55-1330 requires judgment to be calculated by starting with the adjudged fair value of RAI's shares,
add interest at the legal rate through the date of judgment, and then subtract the amounts already
paid. (Defs.' Opening Post-Trial Br. 61-63.) Given the large sums involved here, such an
interpretation would result in an interest award to Dissenters in this action of over $100 million
even though the Court has concluded that RAI paid them fair value for their shares. The Court
concludes that this is a nonsensical result, one supported neither by the text of the statute nor the
intent of the legislature.
[*380] N.C.G.S. § 55-13-31(b)(1) also provides that
[t]he Court in an appraisal proceeding may also assess the expenses for the respective parties, in
amounts the court finds equitable . . . [a]gainst [**216] the corporation and in favor of any or all
shareholders demanding appraisal . . . if the court finds the corporation did not substantially
comply with the requirements of G.S. 55-13-20, 55-13-22, 55-13-25, or 55-13-27.
Although Dissenters have sought their expenses here, the Court finds that RAI substantially
complied with each of the cited statutes and therefore that an award of attorneys' fees and
expenses against RAI is not justified.
[*381] Finally, N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(a) provides,
The court shall assess the costs against the corporation, except that the court may assess costs
against all or some of the shareholders demanding appraisal, in amounts the court finds
equitable, to the extent the court finds such shareholders acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in
good faith with respect to the rights provided by this Article.
RAI does not seek, nor does the Court find grounds, to assess costs against Defendants.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that costs should be assessed against RAI as provided
under section 55-13-30(a).

IV.
CONCLUSION
[*382] The evidence at trial of all "valuation concepts and techniques," "excluding any
appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the" merger and "without discounting for lack of
marketability or minority status," establishes [**217] the fair value of RAI's shares as of the
Transaction Date to be no more than $59.64 per share.
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[*383] An imperfect, but nonetheless robust, deal process conducted by independent and
sophisticated directors and financial advisors with deep and impeccable knowledge of RAI's
business and growth prospects considered all reasonable and likely alternatives, extracted
multiple price increases from BAT, and negotiated a final deal price of $59.64. The market
valued RAI stock at well under $59.64 prior to BAT's first offer and likely would have continued
to do so through the Transaction Date if the Merger had not occurred. Properly conducted DCF
analyses, including three separate analyses conducted by RAI's highly regarded, independent,
and conflict-free financial advisors, support a fair value of $59.64 or less. The acquisition
multiples in precedent transactions, while of less value, suggest a fair value below $59.64, and
when considered together with the trading multiples for comparable companies, at a minimum
and with all other evidence of value introduced at trial, provide a useful market or sanity check
undermining the extraordinary $92.17 per share valuation reached by Zmijewski,
which, [**218] if accepted, would suggest an enormous, implausible mispricing of more than
$50 billion.
[*384] For these and all the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the fair value of
RAI stock as of the Transaction Date was no more than the deal price of $59.64 per share.
[*385] WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ENTERS JUDGMENT ordering that:
a. No further sums are due from RAI to Defendants for payment of Defendants' shares;
b. RAI shall not be liable for Defendants' attorneys' fees and expenses incurred in connection
with this action; and
c. RAI shall pay Defendants' court costs as provided in N.C.G.S. 55-13-31(a) no later than fortyfive (45) days after the entry of this Judgment.
This the 27th day of April, 2020.
/s/ Louis A. Bledsoe, III
Louis A. Bledsoe, III
Chief Business Court Judge

APPENDIX A
DISSENTERS' SHAREHOLDINGS AND PAYMENTS RECEIVED
Dissenter

Shares52

Magnetar Defendants
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Dissenter

Third Motion Equities

Shares52

1,652,198

Master Fund Ltd.
Magnetar Capital Master

116,572

Fund, Ltd.
Spectrum Opportunities

93,294

Master Fund Ltd
Magnetar Fundamental

51,590

Strategies Master Fund
Ltd.
Magnetar MSW Master

40,576

Fund Ltd.
Total

1,954,230

Canyon, Mason, and BlueMountain Defendants
The Canyon Value

1,661,466

Realization Master [**219] Fund,
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Shares52

L.P.
Canyon Value Realization

1,008,856

Fund, L.P.
Canyon Blue Credit

164,000

Investment Fund L.P.
Canyon-SL Value Fund,

139,888

L.P.
Permal Canyon IO Ltd.

68,180

Canyon Value Realization

45,672

MAC 18 Ltd.
Amundi Absolute Return

27,733

Canyon Fund P.L.C.
Mason Capital Master

3,484,886

Fund, L.P.
Blue Mountain Credit

337,000
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Shares52

Alternatives Master Fund
L.P.
BlueMountain Summit

202,681

Trading L.P.
BlueMountain

114,360

Montenvers Master Fund
SCA SICAV-SIF
BlueMountain Foinaven

67,379

Master Fund L.P.
BlueMountain Guadalupe

43,580

Peak Fund L.P.
Anton S. Kawalsky,

2,000

trustee for the benefit of
Anton S. Kawalsky Trust
UA 9/17/2015
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Shares52

Total

7,367,681

Defendant Barry Blank Trust
Barry W. Blank Trust

320,000

Total

320,000

APPENDIX B
RULINGS ON REMAINING EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS54
1. As noted in the Judgment to which this Appendix B is attached, the parties lodged numerous
objections to proffered exhibits and testimony during the trial. The Court ruled on many of these
objections at the time they were made. As to others, however, the Court received the proffered
exhibits and testimony subject to objection and permitted post-trial briefing and argument on the
objections. The Court's rulings on the parties' remaining [**220] evidentiary objections are set
forth below in this Appendix B and are incorporated into the body of the Judgment as if set forth
in full therein.
2. "The trial court has wide discretion in making [a determination of the admissibility of
evidence] and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." Hamilton v. Thomasville Med.
Assocs., Inc., 187 N.C. App. 789, 792, 654 S.E.2d 708, 710 (2007) (quoting Heatherly v. Indus.
Health Council, 130 N.C. App. 616, 619, 504 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998)).

A. RAI's Objections to Zmijewski's and Yilmaz's Opinions
3. RAI objects to the Court's consideration of select testimony and demonstrative exhibits
offered by two of Dissenters' expert witnesses, Zmijewski, (Zmijewski Tr. 1266:4-16, 1267:5-21,
1286:1-1287:7, 1324:10-18, 1325:21-1328:8, 1329:5-1332:1, 1341:10-1347:18, 1348:4-1351:7,
1358:23-1361:17, 1362:18-20; Zmijewski's demonstrative slides,55 at Slide 26, Slide 58), and
Yilmaz, (Yilmaz Tr. 1914:21-1920:3), because Dissenters failed to timely disclose the opinions
reflected in this evidence, (Reynolds American Inc.'s Post-Trial Evid. Br. 1-9 [hereinafter "RAI's
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Evid. Br."], ECF No. 216). Although the Court is sympathetic to RAI's concerns that Zmijewski
and Yilmaz offered expert opinions at trial that neither expert had previously disclosed, the Court
nevertheless, in the exercise of its discretion, hereby overrules RAI's objections [**221] in the
circumstances here. The Court notes, however, that the challenged testimony and demonstrative
slides lack persuasive force, and the Court thus affords them little weight in its determination of
RAI's fair value.

B. RAI's Objections to Constantino's Testimony
4. RAI objects to portions of Constantino's testimony, (Constantino Tr. 1798:19-1800:6,
1801:15-1802:4), that it believes constitutes hearsay regarding the risk of heightened menthol
regulation and certain messaging by RAI and Lorillard management regarding the risk of a
menthol ban, (RAI's Evid. Br. 9-12). The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, hereby overrules
RAI's objections but finds the challenged testimony lacking in evidentiary value and gives it
little weight in the Court's determination of RAI's fair value.

C. Dissenters' Objections to Deposition Testimony of Holland, Nowell, Eckler, and Peters
5. Dissenters contend that certain designated deposition testimony should be excluded, (Defs.'
Opening Post-Trial Evid. Br. 14-17 [hereinafter "Defs.' Evid. Br."], ECF No. 214), including all
of RAI's affirmative designations of Holland's Rule 30(b)(6) testimony, (Holland 30(b)(6) Dep.
Tr.), certain designated testimony of Nowell, [**222] (Nowell Dep. Tr. 94:6-24, 168:11-24,
171:20-172:5, 172:13-16, 175:11-16, 182:6-24), and Eckler, (Eckler Dep. Tr. 79:19-80:23,
108:23-109:16, 113:3-114:9, 137:8-138:16), and certain counter-designations of the deposition
testimony of Peters, (Peters Dep. Tr. 75:14-22, 110:14-21, 160:22-162:4, 162:15-164:2, 164:25166:25). The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, hereby overrules Dissenters' objections. The
Court notes, however, that it has not relied on most of this testimony in reaching its
determination of fair value, and where it has, as noted by specific reference in the Judgment, the
testimony is cumulative to other evidence establishing the facts or conclusions for which this
testimony is cited.

D. Dissenters' Objections to Gompers's Expert Testimony
6. Dissenters seek to exclude the testimony of RAI's expert, Gompers, on grounds that Gompers
improperly: (i) vouched for the Financial Advisors' DCF analyses, (Defs.' Evid. Br. 10), (ii)
attempted to summarize the factual record and characterize lay witness testimony, (Defs.' Evid.
Br. 11), (iii) testified to the efficiency of the market for RAI stock based on a non-testifying
expert's prior deposition testimony, (Defs.' Evid. [**223] Br. 12), and (iv) parroted hearsay
analyst reports without conducting any independent analysis, (Defs.' Evid. Br. 13).
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7. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion and for the reasons set forth below, overrules
Dissenters' objections and considers Gompers' testimony in determining the fair value of RAI's
shares in this action.
8. Vouching occurs when an expert merely "parrots" or "rubber stamps" an opinion from another
witness. See In re Wagner, No. 06-cv-01026, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22769, at *10 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 29, 2007);56 Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 794, 808-09,
822 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Experts cannot merely vouch for the opinions of others. See, e.g., State v.
Bullock, No. COA10-320, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 2058, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 2,
2010) ("[E]xpert testimony is not admissible to vouch for a witness's credibility."); see also,
e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 664 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) ("[T]he expert witness must in the end be giving his own opinion."); FrontFour Capital
Grp. LLC, v. Taube, C.A. No. 2019-0100-KSJM, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 97, at *50 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 11, 2019) ("[The expert] opined that the process used by various investment banks was
reasonable, but an expert cannot simply vouch for the work of someone else.").
9. Gompers's work in this case was not mere vouching; he did not simply "rubber stamp" the
Financial Advisors' opinions or claim their work as his own. To the contrary, Gompers
performed his own detailed, independent analyses using customary [**224] valuation techniques
and relying on his training and expertise as a financial economist, to test the validity and
reasonableness of the Financial Advisors' inputs, analyses, and valuations. (Gompers Tr. 745:220, 752:1-757:23; PDX0005.) As such, Dissenters' challenge on this basis is overruled. See,
e.g., Iconics, Inc. v. Massaro, 266 F. Supp. 3d 461, 469 (D. Mass. 2017) ("Nor may an expert
'parrot' the conclusions of other witnesses, although an expert may rely on other witness's
testimony or other expert conclusions to form an opinion."); Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA,
LLC, 281 F.R.D. 534, 544 (C.D. Cal. 2012) ("[A]n expert can appropriately rely on the opinions
of others if other evidence supports his opinion and the record demonstrates that the expert
conducted an independent evaluation of that evidence."); Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson
& Co., No. C 04-02123 WHA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124780, at *18 (N.D. Cal. May 22,
2008) ("[T]he expert might scrutinize a . . . test, its protocol, and its participants so carefully that
it would be reasonable to rely on it after the fact.").
10. Gompers also did not improperly provide a summary of the factual record. An expert is not
permitted to "rehash[ ] otherwise admissible evidence" or testify "solely for the purpose of
constructing a factual narrative based upon record evidence." Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. v.
Schneider, 379 F. Supp. 2d 461, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citations omitted); see also,
e.g., Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alon USA L.P., 705 F.3d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 2013) ("Rule 703 was
not intended [**225] to abolish the hearsay rule and to allow a witness, under the guise of
giving expert testimony, to in effect become the mouthpiece of the witnesses on whose
statements or opinions the expert purports to base his opinion." (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Gompers has done neither here. Rather, as noted above, Gompers performed extensive
independent work to test the Financial Advisors' DCF-based valuations of RAI, (Gompers Tr.
745:2-20, 752:1-753:18, 770:7-771:6, 779:25-780:25), to adjust RAI's unaffected stock price to
account for changes between the October 20 Offer and the Transaction Date, (Gompers Tr.
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789:21-792:25), and to explain why Zmijewski's valuation of RAI was an outlier when compared
to all other evidence of value in the case, (Gompers Tr. 799:16-801:23, 802:12803:8). See Sharkey v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 978 F. Supp. 2d 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) ("[I]nformation and testimony [that] is not accessible to a lay person . . . is admissible as
expert testimony."). Dissenters' challenge on this basis is therefore overruled.
11. Neither was Gompers's testimony concerning the market efficiency of RAI stock improper,
nor did he improperly rely upon an expert whose conclusions are not part of the record. First,
there is no legal or evidentiary rule [**226] in North Carolina requiring a court's determination
of market efficiency to reflect a consideration of expert testimony. Indeed, courts in Delaware
and elsewhere have identified numerous factual criteria to be considered in assessing whether the
market for a particular security is efficient. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Jarden Corp., C.A. No.
12456-VCS, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 271, at *57-60 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019); In
re Appraisal Solera Holdings, Inc., C.A. No. 12080-CB, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 256, at *60-62
(Del. Ch. July 30, 2018); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1285-87 (D.N.J. 1989). While
expert testimony no doubt can be helpful in this determination, there is no reason why, in the
appropriate case, a trial court cannot make this determination solely from the factual record. And
here, as discussed in the body of the Judgment, ample evidence was introduced at trial to permit
a finding of market efficiency for the trading of RAI's stock.
12. In addition, Gompers did not present any testimony regarding market efficiency that relied on
another expert. See, e.g., J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444-45
(8th Cir. 2001) (affirming exclusion of testifying expert's testimony that was "inextricably
linked" to excluded expert's testimony); Beck's Office Furniture & Supplies, Inc. v. Haworth,
Inc., No. 95-4018, No. 95-4029, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 20608, at *21 (10th Cir. Aug. 16,
1996) ("Experts . . . may not merely parrot the opinions of other experts whose conclusions are
not themselves in the record."). Instead, both he and Yilmaz testified that they had not seen any
evidence contradicting market efficiency. (Gompers Tr. 785:3-11, 785:20-786:8; Yilmaz Tr.
1967:4-13.) [**227] Dissenters' challenge on these grounds are therefore overruled.
13. Finally, Gompers did not act as a conduit for otherwise inadmissible hearsay. See,
e.g., Laugelle v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 2014 Del. Super. LEXIS 508, at *48 (Del. Super.
Ct. Oct. 6, 2014) ("[E]xperts are not to serve as a 'conduit' for otherwise inadmissible hearsay
statements."); see also, e.g., United States v. Baca, No. CR 16-1613 JB, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
211943, at *52 (D.N.M. Dec. 17, 2018) ("[T]he expert must form his own opinions by 'applying
his extensive experience and a reliable methodology' to the inadmissible materials."); Gannett
Co., Inc. v. Kanaga, 750 A.2d 1174, 1187 (Del. 2000) ("The danger exists, however, that Rule
703 can be used as a 'back door' hearsay exception — a crafty litigant could give hearsay to its
expert for the purpose of having the expert refer to it as a basis for the expert's opinion." (citation
omitted)); Towerview LLC v. Cox Radio, Inc., C.A. No. 4809-VCP, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 159,
at *6-7 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2013) ("[The expert] did not refer to the document in his expert report
or testify about it at trial or in his deposition. Hence, there is no basis for treating the document
as admissible as nonhearsay to support [his] expert opinion under Rule 703."); In re J.C., No.
COA08-1339, 2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 344, at *7 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (The
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"admissibility [of evidence under Rule 703] does not depend on an exception to the hearsay rule,
but on the limited purpose for which [**228] it is offered." (quoting State v. Wood, 306 N.C.
510, 516-17, 294 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1982))).
14. Although Dissenters correctly argue that the analyst reports on which Gompers relied are
hearsay, the Financial Advisors and both sides' experts agreed that analyst reports are frequently
relied upon by valuation experts in appraisal actions, (Gompers Tr. 745:2-20, 802:12-24;
Zmijewski Tr. 1380:17-1381:2; de Gennaro Tr. 187:18-188:8, 199:2-19; Clark Tr. 1445:1-17;
Constantino Tr. 1790:17-1791:11, 1793:25-1794:9; Eckler Dep. Tr. 58:18-59:4), and experts are
allowed to rely on hearsay if it is reasonable to do so, as it is here, see N.C. R. Evid. 703 ("If of a
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences
upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence."); see also,
e.g., Towerview LLC, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 159, at *5 ("A document may be considered
nonhearsay if it is admitted as basis evidence to help the factfinder understand the expert's
thought process and determine what weight to give to the expert's opinion." (internal quotation
marks omitted)); id. at *9 ("Petitioner tacitly has accepted the fact that analyst reports are proper
evidence for the experts to consider[.]"); Hammel v. USF Dugan, Inc., 178 N.C. App. 344, 349,
631 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2006) ("When an expert witness testifies to the facts that are the basis for
his [**229] or her opinion, 'such testimony is not hearsay [because it is used] to show the basis
of the opinion.'" (quoting State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 25, 409 S.E.2d 288, 302 (1991))); In re
Lint, No. COA02-1109, 2003 N.C. App. LEXIS 1156, at *6 (N.C. Ct. App. June 17, 2003) (Rule
703 "permits an expert witness to rely on an out-of-court communication as a basis for an
opinion and to relate the content of that communication to the [fact-finder].").
15. Here, Gompers examined each individual analyst report and explained how the reports
supported his conclusions; he did not simply adopt them as his own or read them into the record.
(Gompers Tr. 729:24-730:9, 745:21-747:2, 785:24-786:8.) As such, this testimony is properly
admitted, and Dissenters' objection is overruled. State v. Brewington, 367 N.C. 29, 45, 743
S.E.2d 626, 635 (2013) ("[T]he expert opinion was 'independent' and . . . the report was not used
for the truth of the matter asserted because it was only used to support this 'independent opinion'
of a qualified expert.").

E. Adverse Inference Concerning Shivdasani/Missing Witness Rule
16. Dissenters seek to invoke the "missing witness rule" to obtain an inference that the expert
testimony of Dr. Anil Shivdasani ("Shivdasani") concerning market efficiency, an expert retained
by RAI, would have been adverse to RAI because RAI decided not to call him as a witness at
trial. (Defs.' [**230] Evid. Br. 5-9.) Dissenters suggest RAI elected not to call Shivdasani
because he found that the market for RAI's stock was inefficient and, because of a recent adverse
court ruling, would be seen as lacking credibility. (Defs.' Evid. Br. 6.)
17. North Carolina courts have applied the "missing witness rule" to fact witnesses with unique
information that was unavailable from another source. See, e.g., Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. v. Head &
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Engquist Equip., L.L.C., 2003 NCBC LEXIS 6, at *135-36 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 2, 2003). The
rule has been characterized as "similar" to "the well-established principle of 'spoliation of
evidence[.]'" McLain v. Taco Bell Corp., 137 N.C. App. 179, 183, 527 S.E.2d 712, 715-16 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2000) (citing Yarborough v. Hughes, 139 N.C. 199, 209, 51 S.E. 904, 908 (N.C. 1905)).
As one court has noted,
What is called the "missing witness rule" is not a rule; it is simply a "permissible inference that a
factfinder may draw from the absence of a potential witness who might have knowledge of facts
at issue in the case," when the witness is "peculiarly available" to the party not calling the
witness.
Rockwell v. State, No. 150, 2019 Md. App. LEXIS 651, at *7 (Md. App. Aug. 2,
2019) (quoting Harris v. State, 458 Md. 370, 182 A.3d 821, 832 (Md. 2018)). "Notably, an
adverse inference cannot be drawn when the witness is not available, or where his testimony is
unimportant or cumulative, or where he is equally available to both sides." Dansbury v. State,
193 Md. App. 718, 1 A.3d 507, 521 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted). "[T]he doctrine applies only if the missing witness is particularly
under the control of the defendant [**231] rather than being equally available to both
parties." State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577, 183 P.3d 267, 278 (Wash. 2008).
18. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, denies Dissenters' request for an adverse inference
arising from Shivdasani's failure to testify. First, Dissenters deposed Shivdasani and could have
introduced his videotaped deposition testimony at trial under N.C. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4), which
provides that "The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for
any purpose if the court finds: . . . the witness is an expert witness whose testimony has been
procured by videotape as provided for under Rule 30(b)(4)." Because Shivdasani's testimony was
available to both sides, there is no basis for the adverse inference permitted by the rule.
19. Moreover, North Carolina courts have never suggested that the missing witness rule should
apply to expert witnesses. Indeed, there are sound reasons why it should not, including that there
may be "many explanations for a party's decision not to call a particular expert that may have
nothing to do with a party's fear that the expert will reveal prejudicial information[,]" including
cost, redundancy, resolution of claims, dismissal of parties, and witness availability. Washington
v. Perez, 219 N.J. 338, 98 A.3d 1140, 1153-54 (N.J. 2014) (noting additional reasons to
reject [**232] application of the rule to experts include that (i) "the content of an expert
witness's testimony is unlikely to be a mystery to the parties and their counsel when a case
proceeds to trial"; (ii) "an expert is unlikely to be in exclusive possession of factual evidence that
would justify an adverse inference charge"; and (iii) "court rules do not compel a litigant who
has disclosed the name and opinion of a particular expert to call that expert to testify at
trial"); see also In re Care & Treatment of Gonzalez, 409 S.C. 621, 763 S.E.2d 210, 215 (S.C.
2014) (holding that an "unfavorable inference may be drawn only from a party's failure to call an
available, material witness where under all the circumstances, the failure to produce such witness
creates suspicion of a willful attempt to withhold competent evidence").
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F. Post-Merger Evidence
20. Dissenters objected at trial to RAI's effort to introduce evidence relating to the period after
the Transaction Date57 as irrelevant to the determination of fair value. (Defs.' Evid. Br. 1-5.)
RAI also lodged a conditional objection, contending that should the Court sustain Dissenters'
objection, Dissenters' post-merger evidence, which Dissenters offered solely as rebuttal to RAI's,
should likewise be excluded. (RAI's Evid. Br. [**233] 24-29.)
21. North Carolina offers little guidance concerning a court's consideration of post-merger
evidence in determining fair value under the appraisal statute, section 55-13-30. The North
Carolina appraisal statute itself is silent, simply instructing the court to determine "[t]he value of
the corporation's shares . . . immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action as to
which the shareholder asserts appraisal rights[.]" N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5). North Carolina case
law does not adequately fill the gap. See, e.g., IRA for Benefit of Oppenheimer v. Brenner Cos.,
107 N.C. App. 16, 25, 419 S.E.2d 354, 360 (1992) ("The post-merger financial information does
not affect Interstate's findings made prior to the merger.").
22. The Court thus turns to Delaware for guidance. Delaware courts in appraisal litigation will
"permit consideration of post-merger evidence that could have been discerned at the time of the
merger, but [do not permit] consideration of post-merger evidence that was not capable of being
known on the date of the merger." In re Cinerama Inc., C.A. No. 7129, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 32,
at *11 (Del. Ch. Feb. 25, 1999) (emphasis omitted); see also Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Civil
Action Nos. 7959, 7960, 7967, 7968, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at *47 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22,
1988) ("Post-merger data may be considered only if it is 'known or susceptible of proof as of the
date of the merger and not the product of speculation.'" (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983))), aff'd, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
23. [**234] Courts have on occasion considered competent evidence of events post-dating the
relevant corporate action when those events are relevant to the reasonableness of a company's
pre-closing views of its future business prospects. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758
A.2d 485, 499 (Del. 2000) ("[T]his Court held that post-merger evidence is admissible 'to show
that plans in effect at the time of the merger have born fruition.'" (quoting Gonsalves v. Straight
Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 362 (Del. 1997))); In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., No.
10782-VCS, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, at *44 n.268 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (finding that "postclosing performance is probative of the reliability of . . . management projections"); Gearreald v.
Just Care, Inc., C.A. No. 5233-VCP, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30,
2012) (noting "[t]he Court . . . should take into account all relevant factors known or
ascertainable as of the merger date that illuminate the future prospects of the company").
24. RAI argues that its post-merger evidence here addresses RAI's proper consideration of
regulatory risks, the dynamic quality of the vapor industry, and the lack of support for Dissenters'
claim that the market mispriced RAI. (RAI's Evid. Br. 25-26.) Such evidence, however, reaches
beyond the reasonableness of RAI's pre-closing views of its future business prospects and is
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therefore not properly considered in this proceeding. In the exercise of the Court's discretion,
Dissenters' objection [**235] is therefore sustained. See, e.g., Kahn v. Household Acquisition
Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del. 1991) (excluding evidence of post-merger offers "as valid
indications of merger-date fair value because they were not 'known or susceptible of proof as of
the date of the merger'" (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713)). Consistent with RAI's
conditional objection, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, will likewise disregard the postmerger evidence offered by Dissenters.
SO ORDERED, in the exercise of the Court's discretion and effective contemporaneously with
the filing of the Judgment to which these rulings are attached as Appendix B and incorporated
therein.
Footnotes
1
Four experts appeared and testified at trial. Plaintiff's expert was Dr. Paul Gompers ("Gompers"),
the Eugene Holman Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. (Gompers
Tr. 721:5-18; Parties' Witness Summaries 3, ECF No. 189.) Defendants introduced expert
testimony from three experts: Dr. Fredrick Flyer ("Flyer"), the Executive Vice President of
Compass Lexecon, an economic consulting firm, (Flyer Tr. 1065:18-1066:11; Parties' Witness
Summaries 2); Dr. Mark Zmijewski ("Zmijewski"), a Professor Emeritus of financial accounting
and corporate finance at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, (Zmijewski Tr.
1237:23-1238:5; Parties' Witness Summaries 6); and Dr. Bilge Yilmaz ("Yilmaz"), the Wharton
Private Equity Professor and a Professor of Finance at the Wharton School of the University of
Pennsylvania, (Yilmaz Tr. 1863:23-1864:21; Parties' Witness Summaries 6). Nine fact witnesses
appeared and testified at trial. Deposition testimony was introduced from an additional seven fact
witnesses.
2
The parties lodged numerous objections to proffered exhibits and testimony during the trial. The
Court ruled on many of these objections at the time they were made. As to others, however, the
Court received the proffered exhibits and testimony subject to objection and permitted post-trial
briefing and argument on the objections. The Court's rulings on the parties' remaining
evidentiary objections are set forth in Appendix B attached hereto and those rulings are
incorporated herein.
3
Any determination later stated as a Conclusion of Law that should have been stated as a finding
of fact is incorporated in these Findings of Fact. The Court incorporates herein and adopts as
findings of fact the Corrected Joint Statement of Stipulated Facts filed by the parties on
September 27, 2019. (Corrected Joint Statement Stipulated Facts [hereinafter "Corr. Stip'd
Facts"], ECF No. 233.) Citations to the record herein are not exhaustive and do not necessarily
reflect all evidence upon which corresponding findings of fact are based.
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4
Each individual Dissenter, with the number of shares the Dissenter owned and the amount RAI
paid to the Dissenters for the Dissenters' shares, is set forth in the chart attached hereto as
Appendix A. As shown on the chart, there are three groups of dissenters: the "Magnetar
Defendants," the "Canyon, Mason, and BlueMountain Defendants," and the "Barry Blank Trust."
5
Thomas Wajnert ("Wajnert"), the former Chair and Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") of AT&T
Capital Corporation, was Chair of the RAI Board of Directors from 2010 until December 31,
2016. (Wajnert Tr. 31:17-32:16, 34:11-12; Parties' Witness Summaries 5.)
6
Joseph Fragnito ("Fragnito") was President and Chief Commercial Officer of RJRT at the time of
the Merger. (Fragnito Tr. 1666:9-13; Parties' Witness Summaries 3.)
7
Andrew Gilchrist ("Gilchrist") was Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") of RAI at the time of the
Merger. (Gilchrist Tr. 370:20-371:6; Parties' Witness Summaries 3.)
8
Carolyn Hanigan ("Hanigan") was the President of RAI Innovations at the time of the Merger.
(Hanigan Tr. 1612:3-7; Parties' Witness Summaries 3.)
9
Debra Crew ("Crew") was President and Chief Operating Officer of RJRT before she became
RAI's CEO and joined the RAI Board on January 1, 2017. She served as RAI's CEO through the
Transaction Date. (Crew Tr. 631:17-22; Parties' Witness Summaries 2.)
10
Maxence de Gennaro ("de Gennaro") was a Managing Director at Lazard who provided financial
advice to RAI concerning the Merger as well as in connection with RAI's purchase of Lorillard
Tobacco Company ("Lorillard") in 2015. (de Gennaro Tr. 184:13-185:18, 186:21-187:9; Parties'
Witness Summaries 2.)
11
RAI's EPS growth goal was in response to shareholder demands and expectations. (Gilchrist Tr.
373:20-374:13 ("Q. And is there a reason that the company tracked EPS as its primary metric?
A. That was what the shareholders were primarily focused on. That's what our board had
structured, you know, a lot of our goals and objectives around. So that was our primary focus and
that's where our goals and objectives had been — you know, had been focused from the board
perspective.").)
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12
Mark Peters ("Peters") was RJRT's CFO at the time of the Merger. (Peters Dep. Tr. 17:14-18:7.)
Portions of Peters's deposition were admitted into the trial record. (ECF No. 207.)
13
Synergies are gains that a buyer expects to achieve through the combination of its existing
business and the acquired one. See, e.g., Adam Barone, Synergy, Investopedia (March 10, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/synergy.asp ("Synergy is the concept that the combined
value and performance of two companies will be greater than the sum of the separate individual
parts."); Synergy, Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/synergy (defining "synergy" as "a mutually advantageous conjunction or
compatibility of distinct business participants or elements (such as resources or efforts)").
14
Ronald Price ("Price") was Vice President of Business Development of RJRT at the time of the
Merger. (Price Tr. 940:12-941:7; Parties' Witness Summaries 5.)
15
Susan Cameron ("Cameron") was RAI's CEO from 2005 to 2010 and again from May 1, 2014
until December 31, 2016. She became the Chairman of the RAI Board on January 1, 2017 and
held that position at the time of the Merger. (Cameron Dep. Tr. 10:18-11:8; Fragnito Tr. 1669:59; Parties' Witness Summaries 1.) Portions of Cameron's deposition were admitted into the trial
record. (ECF No. 201.)
16
Winton Jennette ("Jennette") was RJRT's Senior Vice President of Strategy and Planning at the
time of the Merger. (Jennette Dep. Tr. 12:21-24; Parties' Witness Summaries 4.) Portions of
Jennette's deposition were admitted into the trial record. (ECF No. 205.)
17
This risk was somewhat mitigated by Newport's appeal to younger smokers. (Flyer Tr. 1115:1925.)
18
At the same time, extensive regulation, including restrictions on marketing, distribution, points
of sales, and taxation, made it very difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to bring new
products from other countries into the United States, if at all. (Flyer Tr. 1086:6-1086:17, 1089:125.)
19
Flyer testified that the purpose of much of this legislation was to reduce "second-hand smoke
essentially. And the health effects of . . . [e]nvironmental smoke levels . . . . So that's really my
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understanding is the impetus for — behind most of these laws in public places, you don't want to
expose nonsmokers to smoke." (Flyer Tr. 1183:6-16.)
20
The divested cigarette brands included Winston, Salem, Kool, and Maverick, four of RAI's
weaker "tail brands." (Flyer Tr. 1114:6-19.)
21
After the Lorillard Transaction in 2015, the Board of Directors was temporarily increased to
fourteen directors. BAT was still limited to nominating only five of those fourteen directors.
(JX0023.0065; DX0393.0045.)
22
The thirteenth director, who was neither a BAT designee nor an independent Other Director, was
RAI's CEO. The fourteenth director, added after the Lorillard Transaction, was the former CEO
of Lorillard, who was also not an independent Other Director. (DX0393.0045.)
23
Daniela Constantino ("Constantino") was a Partner and a Senior Member of the research team of
Mason Capital Management ("Mason Capital"), one of the Dissenters, at the time of the Merger.
(Constantino Tr. 1787:25-1788:6, 1789:17-1790:10; Parties' Witness Summaries 1.)
24
Zachary Eckler ("Eckler") was a Vice President (and later Managing Director) at Goldman who
advised the Transaction Committee concerning the Merger. (Price Tr. 1056:3-5; Eckler Dep. Tr.
19:05-20:01; Parties' Witness Summaries 2.) Portions of Eckler's deposition were admitted into
the trial record. (ECF No. 199.)
25
John Clark ("Clark") was a Managing Director at JPMorgan who advised RAI's Board regarding
the Merger. (Clark Tr. 1425:6-21; Parties' Witness Summaries 1.)
26
Dissenters appear to have backed away from this contention in their post-trial briefing, asserting
that the reason management did not provide the ten-year projections on which the 2016 "Strategy
Day" presentation (explained in depth below) was based is "irrelevant." (Defs.' Responsive PostTrial Br. 12, ECF No. 231.) The Court addresses the contention nonetheless.
27
Lionel Nowell ("Nowell") became Lead Director of RAI's Board and Chair of the Transaction
Committee on January 1, 2017 and served in that capacity at the time of the Merger. (Nowell
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Dep. Tr. 13:17-23; Crew Tr. 638:22-639:2; Parties' Witness Summaries 4.) Portions of Nowell's
deposition were admitted into the trial record. (ECF No. 202.)
28
For example, Goldman noted in its fairness opinion presentation that if "[BAT] is not supportive
[of a third-party sale of RAI], a merger requires approximately 88% approval from all other
shareholders." (DX0277.0011.)
29
The Financial Advisors eventually received deal fees of $46.3 million (Goldman), $41.1 million
(JPMorgan), and $11.1 million (Lazard), nearly all of which was contingent upon the completion
of the Merger. (JX0023.0101, .0116, .0130.)
30
Steven Holland ("Holland") was Senior Director of Capital Markets of RAI Services Co., a
wholly-owned subsidiary of RAI, where he worked in the treasury group providing information
to financial advisors at the time of the Merger. (Gilchrist Tr. 598:3-16; DX0115; Parties' Witness
Summaries 4.) Portions of Holland's deposition were admitted into the trial record. (ECF No.
206.)
31
Stephen Thad Martin ("Martin") was the Senior Director of Financial Planning of RAI Services
at the time of the Merger. (Gilchrist Tr. 465:19-21; Parties' Witness Summaries 4.) Portions of
Martin's deposition were admitted into the trial record. (ECF No. 204.)
32
As will be discussed infra, the evidence actually shows that RAI management advocated to the
Financial Advisors for a higher valuation, in order to obtain the best possible purchase price for
the Company. (Price Tr. 1054:23-1055:14.)
33
Holland was designated pursuant to N.C. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) to testify regarding certain topics on
behalf of RAI. (Parties' Witness Summaries 4.) Portions of Holland's 30(b)(6) deposition were
admitted into the trial record. (ECF No. 210.)
34
Offer value is calculated based on the trading price of BAT stock and the British pound/U.S.
dollar exchange rate as of the closing price on the date of the offer. (JX0023.0068-.0070.) Total
value is the implied market capitalization, i.e., RAI's total shares outstanding on the offer date
multiplied by the value per share of the offer. (JX0023.0084-.0085.)
35

118

Zmijewski also testified at trial about a series of late-made calculations that were disclosed to
RAI the morning prior to his testimony. He acknowledged, however, that "[he] did one
valuation. . . . And that value is $92.17." (Zmijewski Tr. 1325:3-13, 1325:21-23 ("Q. So is it fair
to say that the rest of these just illustrate the math if I asked you 'what would it be if?' A. Yes.").)
36
A market that is semi-strong form efficient quickly incorporates into the price of a security the
release of all new publicly available information. (Gompers Tr. 833:11-15; Yilmaz Tr. 1874:1821.)
37
RAI did not offer expert testimony to establish that the market for RAI's stock was semi-strong
form efficient, an alleged failure of proof Dissenters suggest precludes the Court from finding
market efficiency. (Defs.' Resp. Post-Trial Br. 19, ECF No. 231.) The Court disagrees and
concludes that expert testimony on market efficiency is not necessary to the Court's
determination in light of the undisputed evidence of record establishing that the market for RAI's
shares was semi-strong efficient at the time of the Merger. (See Appendix B at § E.)
38
At trial, no evidence was offered of a material, value-relevant event between October 20, 2016
and July 25, 2017 that affected RAI separately from the tobacco industry or the market as a
whole.
39
Indeed, Gompers acknowledged that (i) Philip Morris International sells cigarettes in countries
with vastly different regulatory environments, economies, and smoking populations including
Indonesia, the Philippines, Russia, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Sweden and Norway, (Gompers
Tr. 899:2-8); (ii) ITC Limited is an Indian conglomerate that sells a "very high percentage" of its
tobacco in India, (Gompers Tr. 899:9-11); and (iii) four of the five other potentially comparable
companies are, at best, "weak comparables" to RAI, (Gompers Tr. 897:13-898:14). Peters also
testified that "the international players compete in a very different market with very different
structures." (Peters Dep. Tr. 188:20-22).
40
Each Financial Advisor used a slightly different calculation in its precedent transactions analysis.
Goldman used the transaction multiples derived from dividing the EV by the EBITDA from the
last twelve months ("LTM EBITDA"), Lazard used the transaction multiples derived from
dividing the EV by the adjusted 2016 EBITDA, and JPMorgan used the transaction multiples
derived from dividing the implied firm value ("FV") by the adjusted LTM EBITDA.
(PX0115.0258, .0539, .0582.)
41
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Lazard also calculated the EV/LTM EBITDA multiple implied by the proposed transaction with
BAT as 16.9x, significantly higher than the EV/LTM EBITDA multiple for the Lorillard
Transaction, 13.1x, a transaction which occurred fewer than three years prior. (PX0115.0578,
.0585.)
42
Zmijewski excluded the ITG Transaction because it was a forced sale involving weaker tail
brands in contrast to RAI's strong premium and super-premium brands. (Zmijewski Tr. 1303:425.)
43
For example, Japan Tobacco's acquisitions of Gryson NV, a company operating in Belgium, and
JT International, a company operating in Malaysia, are weak comparable transactions to BAT's
acquisition of RAI, a company operating primarily in the United States. So is BAT's acquisition
of Souza Cruz, a company operating primarily in Brazil. (PDX0005.0015; Gompers Tr. 780:17781:8.)
44
Flyer ran the calculations for 1% and 1.25% PGR after 2026 but focused the bulk of his trial
testimony on explaining the reasonableness of a 1% PGR after 2026. (Flyer Tr. 1079:7-1079:19.)
45
Similar to the North Carolina appraisal statute, the Delaware appraisal statute asks a court to
determine "the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger." 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
46
Dissenters contend that an assessment of deal price in determining fair value is not a "customary
and current valuation concept and technique" under section 55-13-01(5). Dissenters' contention,
however, has no support in North Carolina case law and is squarely refuted by the legislative
history reflected in the Model Business Corporation Act commentary set forth above.
47
See also, e.g., Verition Partners Master Fund, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 135
(Del. 2019) (noting the Delaware courts' "long history of giving important weight to markettested deal prices" and listing cases); see also generally, e.g., Panera, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS
42; In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc., Cons. C.A. No. 12736-VCL, 2019 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 303 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019); Solera, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 256; In re Appraisal of
PetSmart, Inc., CONSOLIDATED C.A. No. 10782-VCS, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89 (Del. Ch.
May 26, 2017); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., C.A. No. 8900-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 268 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., C.A. No.
8094-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015).
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48
Dissenters contend that a consideration of unaffected market price in assessing fair value is not a
"customary and current valuation concept and technique" under section 55-13-01(5). (Defs.'
Opening Post-Trial Br. 26-27.) The Court disagrees. Not only does this Court's Beam decision,
cited above, conclude otherwise, but Dissenters' reading of the statutory text is unduly restrictive
in this context.
49
For example, as discussed above, a change in PGR from 2.2% to 0% drops Zmijewski's DCF
valuation from $92.17 to $58.00 per share, an over $50 billion reduction in share value.
(Zmijewski Tr. 1396:2-9.)
50
The Delaware appraisal statute is similar: "Through such proceeding the Court shall determine
the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon the
amount determined to be the fair value." 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (emphasis added).
51
See, e.g., Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 357 (Colo. 2003); Ely, Inc. v.
Wiley, No. LA-22998, Slip Op. at 9 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 546
N.W.2d 218 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); First W. Bank Wall v. Olsen, 2001 SD 16, 621 N.W.2d 611,
615 (S.D. 2001); Utah Res. Int'l, Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 2014 UT 59, 342 P.3d 761, 768
(Utah 2014); HMO-W Inc. v. SSM Health Care Sys., 2003 WI App 137, 266 Wis. 2d 69, 667
N.W.2d 733, 735-36 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003); Brown v. Arp & Hammond Hardware Co., 2006 WY
107, 141 P.3d 673, 677 (Wyo. 2006).
52
(Compl. Judicial Appraisal ¶¶ 3-25.)
53
(Corr. Stip'd Facts ¶¶ 20-25.) The exact amount of payments made to each individual Defendant
was not included in evidence.
54
The Court does not redefine in this Appendix B terms that have been defined in the Judgment,
and such terms shall have the same meaning in this Appendix B as they have been defined in the
Judgment.
55
These demonstrative slides were not marked with an exhibit number, but redacted versions of the
slides in question were attached to RAI's Post-Trial Evidentiary Brief. (See ECF No. 217.4.)
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56
North Carolina courts may look to decisions interpreting the relevant Federal Rules of Evidence
in construing the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., State v. McGrady, 368 N.C. 880,
887-88, 787 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2016); N. C. R. Evid. 102, cmt. ("A substantial body of law construing
[the Federal Rules of Evidence] exists and should be looked to by the courts for enlightenment
and guidance in ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly in adopting these rules.").
57
The challenged evidence is as follows: Gompers Tr. 793:16-797:25, 800:14-801:20, 918:14923:3; Flyer Tr. 1080:17-1082:20, 1083:3-1084:16, 1115:5-15, 1192:18-1196:1, 1197:3-1199:2,
1203:14-1204:9; Fragnito Tr. 1671:6-10, 1686:24-1687:9, 1692:20-21, 1707:18-1709:7;
Constantino Tr. 1794:10-1795:10, 1795:14-19.
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